Since it came to power in March 2016 after winning in a 2015 election landslide, 2019 has perhaps been the most problematic year thus far for Myanmar's National League for Democracy (NLD) government. The long-standing Rakhine issue, the initiation of a parliamentary constitutional reform process, and early election fever are some of the key developments to have dominated Myanmar's political attention in 2019. These high-level political events, mainly involving the executive and legislative branches, were accompanied by growing public distrust in the judiciary and the police. All these factors posed challenges for Myanmar in 2019, with considerable implications on the country's domestic and international fronts. Economically, Myanmar was working quite well, though some challenges remain.

The Rakhine Problem: Domestic and International Aspects

The Dual Rakhine Problem

Until early 2019, the “Rakhine problem”, both within and outside Myanmar, was almost exclusively Rohingya-centric. Before the eruption of inter-communal violence in Rakhine State in 2012, the problem had not been envisaged as a Rakhine problem. The issue was merely referred to as the “Rohingya problem”, “conundrum” or “crisis”. After the 1990s, the Rohingya problem was framed internationally as an insurmountable crisis of forced migration and statelessness. Following the first and second Rohingya mass exoduses in 1978 and 1991–92, the Rohingya problem was respectively constructed by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government (1974–88) and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government (1988–97) as a colossal problem of (illegal) colonial migration, armed insurgency, and secession.

The dominant issue among Rakhine affairs remained the Rohingya problem, even after the outbreak of inter-communal violent and non-violent conflicts between Rohingya/non-Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists from 2012 onwards, the emergence of a Rohingya “insurgency” led by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) from 2016 onwards, and the third Rohingya mass exodus from August 2017 onwards. These new problems have added two more layers to the Rohingya problem. First is the internal displacement of more than 100,000 Muslims in camps in Rakhine state. Second is a new protracted refugee situation that saw 909,000 Rohingyas being stranded in camps in Bangladesh as of March 2019, after about 745,000 Rohingyas fled following the Myanmar military's “clearance operation” in response to the ARSA attacks in August 2017.

While the year saw some venting of concern at official corruption in the National Assembly, remarkable in itself, it is rent-seeking activities that define the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) party-state. A market economy operating under a Leninist system, events in 2019 did not detract from the general trajectory of a state hell-bent on prioritizing major projects such as hydro-electricity generating dams and the Chinese-built railroad, moving heaven and earth on the Mekong River, whatever the social and ecological consequences locally or downstream. But the practice of issuing licences and concessions for casinos and/ or agribusiness ventures also creates market distortions. Drought, disease and human dislocation stemming from mega projects or disasters (as with the 2018 dam collapse in Attapeu Province), land alienation and compensation issues all came to national and/or international attention during the year. Various serious human rights cases, including disappearances, suggest the longevity of the Lao PDR authoritarian developmental model, one that brooks no domestic challenge or even external scrutiny.

Governance

Typically, draft laws and amendments to laws are discussed at monthly sessions of the nation's National Assembly, which is invariably chaired by the prime minister. Notably, at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly's 8th legislature held in Vientiane on 23–24 July in the presence of National Assembly president Mrs Pany Yathortou, Lao PDR president Bounnhang Vorachit, and other party and government leaders, Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith called for the sectors responsible to shoulder more responsibility in finding solutions to six pressing issues that were seen as affecting socio-economic development. The first major issue was an outbreak of dengue fever, which had claimed 37 lives and saw at least 16,690 people falling sick. The second topic was an epidemic of African swine fever. Third on the list was the infestation of sweetcorn crops by a plague of caterpillars in Xayaboury Province, which had destroyed 30 per cent of 35,000 hectares of the crop. The fourth issue concerned persistent drought, which resulted in low river levels and affected rice and other crops. The fifth matter of concern was the fluctuating exchange rate, the falling value of the national currency, the kip, and the depletion of foreign-exchange reserves, seen as driving up commodity import prices and hindering economic growth. The sixth issue related to posts on social media by members of the public commenting negatively on state administration and management.

It was generally a busy year for Brunei Darussalam in 2019 as it continued to focus on developmental issues while experiencing peace and political stability. Recurring concerns for the economy and administration surfaced periodically in line with fresh assessments towards the one major national goal—Wawasan 2035 (Brunei Vision 2035). Except for intense but short-lived global attention on its syariah system of jurisprudence, Brunei's domestic affairs were not of much concern for foreign observers. The effects of the preceding years’ reduced income from the country's hydrocarbon exports were still felt by the domestic economy, although global prices for oil had moderately improved in early 2019. Any increase in prices for the period under study was only speculative given the uncertainty of global economic trends. Increasing down-stream hydrocarbon activities provided diversification, while improved productive capacities in agriculture and agroindustry were sought. The recurring national concerns had familiar undertones—except that relevant policymakers appeared more committed to advancing the social and economic development of the state—with frequent admonishment from the Head of State and Government, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah.

Managing the State

As a small state, Brunei is politically and economically manageable in accordance with the stated priorities embodied in its philosophy of Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB; Malay Islamic Monarchy) and Vision 2035, which promotes socio-economic developmental goals. At an average growth rate of 3 per cent, the 2018 population was 442,400, a bane for large-scale economic activities. However, guided by the twin pillars of Vision 2035 and the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030, the policymakers are mindful of the directions that uphold the national aspirations of growth amidst austerity in providing a satisfactory quality of life for Bruneians. The annual economic growth rate is of concern. In his speech on the occasion of the New Year 2019, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah expected better economic growth for the year. However, he reminded his subjects that they had to “march forward … with full spirit and determination” and not be plagued with “lazy syndrome”. He urged them to be “a more proactive and productive society” in light of the economic challenges faced by Brunei.

On 17 April 2019, elections were held across Indonesia, the third-largest democracy in the world. The 2019 elections were significant as the first-ever simultaneous presidential and legislative elections in the nation's history, all held within the same day. The complexity of the 2019 elections meant that effective communication strategies were more vital than ever in reaching out to electoral constituents. Social media, which has become an integral part of everyday social and economic life in the nation, is a natural channel to publicize political visions and missions and to galvanize support for parties and candidates.

As a digital commons, however, social media is inevitably weaponized as well. Concerns over the “dark side” of social media in the form of disinformation (popularly called “hoax”, referring to the general phenomenon of falsehoods) received outsized attention throughout the campaigning period of the 2019 elections. The low barrier to entry and ease of sharing user-generated content means that social media is more easily used for all kinds of purposes, including negative ones. Aksi Bela Islam 212 (the 2 December 2016 Defend Islam Action), combined with intense political mudslinging in past elections, resulted in “hoax” becoming a term that means division to many Indonesians, potentially tearing apart the young democracy.

This chapter examines how social media interplayed with electoral politics in Indonesia's 2019 elections. The first part of the paper outlines the role of social media in the nation's past elections. Social media has been weaponized for use in political smear campaigns since its introduction on to the nation's political landscape in 2012. Aksi Bela Islam 212 gave rise to fears that hoaxes could further split the nation and affect subsequent elections. Combined with worldwide events such as the 2016 US presidential election, it changed Indonesia's understanding of the so-called “fake news” phenomenon. The second part of the paper discusses how the notion of hoax was central to campaign discourses in the 2019 elections. Social media was the dominant means, although not the only one, by which hoaxes were disseminated.

Social Media and Political Contestation in Past Indonesian Elections

Indonesia is nicknamed the “Social Media Nation”. In terms of numbers, active social media users comprise 48 per cent of the country's total population. Indonesian netizens on average spend three hours and twenty-six minutes on social media.

On his seventy-fifth birthday, on 14 April 2019, Nguyen Phu Trong visited the southern province of Kien Giang, a practice he had adopted since being re-elected as secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in 2016. This time it did not go well; it was rumoured that Trong suffered a stroke, and he was subjected to a lengthy hospital stay. He appeared fragile during his first public appearance a month later, and in June he had to delegate National Assembly (NA) chairwoman Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan to visit China on his behalf. There was only limited coverage of these events in the tightly controlled Vietnamese media, as they tried to downplay the significance of Trong's deteriorating health.

In 2021 the VCP will hold its 13th National Congress, at which Trong—who will be seventy-seven by then—is expected to step down. However, this is only a high possibility, not a certainty. When re-elected in 2016, Trong hinted that he would retire in the middle of his term to make room for younger leaders. In the two years following his re-election, however, he consolidated power to become the most powerful figure in Vietnamese politics in decades. The sudden health incident will have likely put an end to any wish of his to remain in power for longer. What is more important however is whether Trong's illness has any implications for Vietnamese succession politics. As the head of both the party and the state, Trong's preference will weigh heavily in the candidate selection process for the hot seat in 2021. The tradition in Vietnamese politics is for party elders to have strong opinions over who will assume their posts (or even who should step down). The rise and fall of Secretary General Le Kha Phieu vividly illustrated that. Phieu was promoted to the party's supreme position in 1997 when he gained the support of both Le Duc Anh and Do Muoi after a long tug of war between two camps. He was nevertheless dethroned four years later when the party elders opposed his re-election.

Tran Quoc Vuong, the executive secretary of the party's Secretariat—the fourth most powerful member of the party—was considered Trong's right-hand man and his favoured candidate for the top post.

The twenty-two chapters in Southeast Asian Affairs 2020 again highlight the dynamism and diversity of the eleven countries covered and Southeast Asia as a region. Events ranged from the tragic deaths from overwork and poor conditions of many election workers in Indonesia during the national elections to the release on social media of a rap song supporting former Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak, the first leader of UMNO to lose a parliamentary election.

Six overarching themes each feature in many of the twenty-two chapters, and no chapter is devoid of all six. Two of these themes are global in nature, two relate to major powers outside of Southeast Asia, and two are domestic in nature. The enduring and definitive nature of these themes is underlined by the fact that many of them feature heavily in previous volumes of Southeast Asian Affairs, including those like major power competition and transitions in political leadership that have been constant themes since the first volume was published almost a half century ago. Others, like environmental degradation and the political ramifications of social media, are distinctly modern.

Environmental Degradation

In the thematic chapter for Malaysia, Serina Rahman looks at the ambitious environmental policy agenda of the Pakatan Harapan government and the political challenges it faces. Global pressure particularly from the European Union on the Malaysian palm oil industry, a major source of Malaysian exports, has led to a defensive response from Kuala Lumpur in contrast to the proactive position the government has taken against the export of trash to Malaysia from advanced Western economies. The Pakatan Harapan government has taken a regional lead in trying to address some of the causes and consequences of environmental degradation. Will others follow?

Social Media Politics

The thematic chapter for Indonesia by Jennifer Yang Hui looks at the use and influence of social media in the 2019 elections in the largest country of Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, social media is now the predominant channel of political communication between politicians and voters and supporters of politicians and voters. A large industry of social media political communication has arisen that is changing the conduct of election campaigns fundamentally. In the 2014 and 2019 presidential campaigns, black propaganda against political opponents has proven to be widespread even if its effectiveness is questionable.

The year 2019 was publicly labelled an election year in Indonesia, as mammoth elections were conducted, accompanied by a media and social media frenzy that absorbed the attention of the country's citizens. The year was also a milestone from which to look back on and reflect upon the first term of President Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi), as well as to look forward to his second five-year term. In April 2019 more than 140 million citizens went to the ballot box to elect their president and vice-president, 575 members of the House of Representatives, 2,000 provincial representatives for 33 provinces, and 17,610 district and city representatives in more than 500 city and district councils. The total number of candidates running for legislative election was 245,000. The presidential election in 2019 was the fourth election after the New Order era, while the parliamentary election was the twelfth in Indonesian history. With an expenditure of more than 25 trillion rupiah (US$1.78 million), this year's elections also led to the death of 144 election ad-hoc committee members due to overwork, fatigue and stress. More than 7,385,500 personnel were distributed across 809,500 polling stations. These figures demonstrate how electoral democracy has become institutionalized in the country.

Yet, democracy in Indonesia is not perfect. A successful electoral process does not directly result in “substantial democracy”, which emphasizes the guarantee of civil liberties, freedom of expression, protection for minority groups, as well as social and economic rights. It is with respect to the substantive aspects of democracy that many observers and pundits on Indonesian politics have expressed worries about the “stagnation”, “regression”, “illiberal turn”, and “decline” of democracy in the country, with reasons that will be explored in the sections that follow. Such observers are concerned that after two decades Indonesia has entered another version of the New Order regime, one marked by ignorance of basic human rights and which neglects the political rights of minority groups, all for the ambition of economic development. A more empathetic view though suggests that Indonesia is a young democratic country and that it will need time to nurture a vibrant democracy beyond formal elections.

This chapter provides an overarching view of macroeconomic trends in Southeast Asia in 2019.

The current state of the regional economies is first assessed. In general, the regional economies had to face a troubled global environment but demonstrated an encouraging degree of resilience in doing so.

The cyclical prospects are then considered. Two key factors will drive the outlook for next year. The first is how the global economy pans out—especially whether an improvement in the trade picture allows a recovery in business confidence and capital spending. A second factor is the impact of supportive monetary and fiscal policies.

Finally, a review of developments this year that shaped key drivers of the secular regional outlook is conducted. Four key drivers are identified and are likely to be supportive of an improved growth outlook in the medium term—infrastructure spending, synergies from economic integration initiatives, production relocation out of China and an improved business ecosystem.

Section 1: Recent Trends in the Regional Economies

Two contrasting themes characterized economic developments in Southeast Asia in 2019—growing challenges and a surprising degree of resilience. The regional economies had to contend with a turbulent global environment in 2019. Global demand for Asian exports was subdued, depressing economic growth and commodity prices in a region that remains heavily trade-dependent. Nevertheless, the region demonstrated a degree of resilience: economic growth continued, albeit modestly, while external stability was maintained. This relatively benign outcome was partly the payoff to the improved capacity for policy response in the region—and it builds a good base for future economic performance.

A confluence of disturbances hurt the global economy in 2019. Global economic activity began to weaken from around the middle of 2018 onwards and the decline persisted through 2019. As a result, global economic growth eased, from 3.8 per cent in 2017 to 3.6 per cent in 2018 and then to an estimated 3.0 per cent in 2019 according to the International Monetary Fund (Figure 1). In parallel, the world economy saw a pronounced slowing in export demand (Figure 2). Not surprisingly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) became more cautious about world trade prospects.

Back in 1974, renowned writer Ursula Le Guin won the Hugo Award for Best Short Story for “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas”. Omelas was a peaceful, prosperous and blissful city. However, every child in the city, as a rite of passage, is made aware that their utopia depends on one child being locked and tortured in a basement. While the author frames the ending of the story in terms of those few who cannot stomach it and thus walk away from Omelas, a more instructive aspect is the part of those who did not—the ones who, no matter how begrudgingly, made the conscious decision to accept the price of paradise.

Halfway into his term, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, with his concomitant strongman approach to “get things done in the wake of democratic dysfunction”, continues to enjoy a “very good” approval rating from as much as 78 per cent of the population. While it is lower than the 86 per cent rating he held in 2016, it is still exceptionally high compared to those of other post- 1986 Philippine presidents. Duterte's popularity notably endures despite delays in infrastructure projects, a widely criticized rapprochement with China, doubt about the credibility of the Philippine National Police over the “ninja cops” issue, brewing unrest from farmers arising from competition with rice imports following the passage of the Rice Tariffication Law, and growing international criticism over the country's human rights record as evidenced by the so-called Iceland resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Council last June. During this year's midterm election, which was seen as a referendum on Duterte's illiberal approach to politics, the opposition failed to gain a single seat in the Senate. One writer despaired that the elections proved that “the Philippines just became more authoritarian, thanks to the people”.

This chapter joins the chorus of other reviews that have described the Philippine political trajectory as heading towards greater illiberalism and the centralization of power with the executive, which undermines the integrity of democratic politics as a modus vivendi. However, as a way forward it also takes stock of Duterte's broader policy agenda, in addition to his governance style and its corrosive impact on democratic institutions, which many writers have emphasized.

In early 2019 I was dining with a Japanese diplomat in the company of two fellow Singaporeans. When the conversation turned to the Bicentennial Commemorations, the diplomat asked inquisitively, “Why do Singaporeans find it necessary to celebrate two hundred years of colonialism?” After a moment's pause the Singaporeans around the table took random stabs at answering our dinner companion's question. Our replies ranged from the pedantic (“It's not a celebration, it's a commemoration”), the cynical (“It's for the feel-good factor to help with upcoming elections”), to the dismissive (“you know Singaporeans, they love nostalgia”). As we spoke I sensed that we were ourselves struggling to understand the event as much as we sought to explain it to our Japanese friend. Like most Singaporeans, we had felt that the Bicentennial Commemorations simply did not embody the same significance or emotional heft as SG50 in 2015 when we celebrated fifty years of independence. The country's Golden Jubilee was easier to embrace because it was an unabashed and unambiguous celebration of the nation-building project and the undeniable progress we had made as one people. But what were the Bicentennial Commemorations—or SG200—supposed to commemorate? Was it to mark the arrival of English rogue gentleman Stamford Raffles and the East India Company and, by implication, the unplugging of the island from the Malay world and its ascension into the global economy? If so, then it's understandable that the celebration of colonial capitalism and globalization did not exactly tug at the heartstrings of Singaporeans. The unthinking celebration of colonialism would also certainly be out of step with our sensibilities. Or was SG200 a knowing wink at the island's distinction from a region still mired in its internal political and economic squabbles and thus a marker of the nation's discrete sense of self, or what we would describe today as Singapore exceptionalism? The more we mulled over the question, the more uncertain we became. Then, somewhere between the fourth and seventh cup of sake, a particular remark from one of us, I forget who, struck me—“We don't have history, so we imagine it.”

In the build-up to Malaysia's 14th General Elections (GE14), the then-opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition campaigned on multiple reform platforms— including that of sustainability and inclusivity. Buku Harapan (The Book of Hope), the coalition's much-lauded manifesto, was written to encapsulate the grievances of an electorate hankering for change (with a little less regard to the practicality of the promises within), and it had all the right sustainability targets. The publication won praise from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with a coalition of twenty NGOs releasing the results of a survey indicating that 69 per cent of those who intended to vote considered the environment a factor in their choice of government.

The Promise

The PH coalition promised to govern “based on principles of sustainability and sustainable development”, pledging that development projects would comply with international environmental protection standards, that logging quotas would be strictly enforced and that a PH government would support the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs). The coalition also vowed it would focus on the development of green technology and renewable energy, and that it would set up a “National Coordination Council for Climate Adaptation and Mitigation”. Promise 39 of the Buku Harapan declared that a PH government would be “an environmentally friendly government”. For the indigenous peoples of Malaysia, whose lives, identities and livelihoods depend entirely on the preservation of natural habitats, the manifesto's Promise 38 was an assurance that the coalition would advance “the interests of Orang Asal in Peninsular Malaysia” and “recognise, uphold and protect the dignity and rights” of the indigenous people.

The Action

Immediately after the wholly unexpected outcome of the elections, media announcements designed to demonstrate the new regime's commitment to environmental and indigenous causes came thick and fast. A new Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change (MESTECC) was established. The MESTECC minister Yeo Bee Yin announced in September 2018 that a 20 per cent renewable energy production target would be achieved by 2030. In October she launched the Roadmap towards Zero Single-Use Plastic 2018–2030, declaring that Malaysia will have done away with single-use plastics by 2030.

In 2019, Thailand held its first election in eight years, a period that included five years of military rule. While Pheu Thai won the most seats—as it has in every election since 2001, under several different guises—in second and third place were two new parties. The second-placed party, Palang Pracharat (PPRP), was a party supported by the military regime, comprised largely of former members of parliament (MPs) who had been members of other political parties in the past. Palang Pracharat thus tended to replicate the campaign tactics that had previously secured victory for its MPs in past elections, while also relying on strong support from the state. Although Palang Pracharat garnered the most votes overall, it fell behind Pheu Thai in terms of parliamentary seats. In third place was another new party, Anakhot Mai (lit. New Future), known in English as the Future Forward Party.

Future Forward pursued a campaign strategy that was largely novel in Thai politics. Analysts have observed that the party carefully cultivated an image centred on its leader, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, as representative of the party's aspirations. According to these analysts, many cast their votes for Future Forward candidates because of the image of the leader and the policies of the party, while the qualifications of the individual Future Forward candidates were of little import. Future Forward was also seen as banking its chances for electoral gold on the use of social media to court young voters.

Some analysts would thus describe Future Forward as a new type of party: one built for social media, particularly the young people who spend significant time on it. If this is the case, we may expect to see substantial changes in how other political parties operate, given the success of Future Forward. And since the government is composed of political parties, these changes may eventually reshape the political system in Thailand. In this chapter, I will examine the novelty of Future Forward, the role of Thanathorn, and the function of social media in the party's campaign. I will conclude by considering the future of Future Forward and whether it establishes a new model for political parties in Thailand.

Frontiers and Sovereignty

On 30 August 2019, Timor-Leste commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the self-determination referendum when 98.6 per cent of registered voters chose by a very wide margin (78.5 versus 21.5 per cent) to break away from the Republic of Indonesia and open the way to independence. Since 20 May 2002, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste has been an independent country, recognized by the international community, and a member of the United Nations. High-ranking representatives from friendly nations headed to Dili for the celebrations. Amongst these, the Australian prime minister was a special guest.

Timor-Leste and Australia formally exchanged confirmation notes that brought to full fruition the treaty that had been negotiated in the preceding years, which was to put an end to the “Timor Gap” issue. The maritime borders of Timor- Leste were thus established after a turbulent period of negotiations and juridical claims in international courts. It was highly symbolic that the treaty could be signed in Dili on such a prominent date. In fact, the authorities of Timor-Leste, and chiefly the main negotiator, the once resistance leader, president of the republic (2002–7) and prime minister (2007–15), Xanana Gusmão, presented his efforts as destined to complete the recovery of sovereignty. He placed the agreement on par with the referendum, claiming that full sovereignty could only be achieved when the maritime borders were fixed for good and access to the plentiful natural resources—especially oil and natural gas—firmly placed at the disposal of the people of Timor-Leste. The East Timorese had a fundamental reason to rejoice.

At the time Timor-Leste became independent (20 May 2002), the country was among the poorest on Earth. The first time the United Nations Development Program Human Development Index included data on Timor-Leste (2004, with data for 2002), the country was ranked in 162nd place, included in the group of Low Human Development, with a rating of 0.436. Fifteen years later, Timor- Leste had moved to 132nd place and its performance had risen to 0.625, which permitted its inclusion in the group of Medium Human Development. Much of this tremendous improvement was due to the growth of the country's wealth. The World Bank estimates that the gross national product per capita (in purchasing power parity terms) rose from US$2,578 in 2003 to US$7,645 in 2018, having peaked at US$10,370 in 2012.