After the global economic crisis of 2008, there has been a trend towards a configuration of institutions and ideologies of state-society relations with a more intensified authoritarian form. At the heart of these political changes is the rise of right-wing political and ideological forces that seek to use religious, ethnic and/ or national communities to build coalitions which are hostile to pluralist politics. This trend is combined with the deepening of the neoliberal market-reform agenda within a more authoritarian framework, especially in a further consolidation of politically linked domestic conglomerates. As such, it marks a shift from the technocratic governance—combined with the social forces that supported it—that had underpinned neoliberal reform over three decades. These mark the political changes that occurred over the long 1990s in Southeast Asia, which is a period that covers the implementation—albeit haltingly—of the Washington consensus and neoliberal policies, the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist project, as well as a push towards democratic polities.

In this chapter, I focus on Indonesia and the Philippines—two countries seen as the democratic benchmarks over the last two decades—as these nations now move in an increasingly authoritarian direction. The first term of President Jokowi's presidency saw a range of illiberal trends, such as the use of legislative means to criminalize political opposition, the passing of social conservative legislation, the increasing role of the security agencies in the political process, the growth of paramilitaries linked to right-wing parties, and the gutting of oversight institutions. The recent elevation of his presidential election opponent Prabowo Subianto to the cabinet suggests that these trends will—if anything—intensify in Jokowi's second term. In the Philippines, the election of President Duterte has led to a spate of extrajudicial killings, the intimidation of political opponents and journalists, and the stacking of courts such as the Supreme Court of the Philippines. As such, both Indonesia and the Philippines provide a window into the drivers of the new authoritarian climate in Southeast Asia. In Thailand, despite the attempt by the junta to provide some form of legitimacy to its rule—via its recent election—there has been only an intensification of the junta's authoritarian rule.

Neoliberalism, Democratic Transitions and the Politics of Governance

The standard model of the transition to democracy has always been problematic in Southeast Asia.

Trends in 2018 indicated that ASEAN regionalism was under pressure, putting into question the grouping's role and function. In contrast, developments in 2019 reflect the independent and collective resolve of Southeast Asian states to manage external political and economic risk, which has had the effect of shoring up cohesiveness of the ten-member grouping, or at least compelling members to put aside regionally divisive issues in order to deal with common challenges. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, ASEAN and its member states have had to adjust to the realities and impact of the ongoing US-China trade war in a bid to ensure economic development and growth.

Secondly, they have sought to break out from the impasse of being sidelined in the regional power play of the United States and China. Despite adhering to a hedging strategy in dealing with China and the United States in the region's management of major power politics, ASEAN member states have telegraphed a heightened consideration of China as both a dialogue and free-trade partner. Thirdly, a stronger consideration of China's political and economic role in the region did somewhat mute the assertions of claimant states against China over disputed features and waters in the South China Sea for most of 2019 until the closing months of that year. Fourthly, in seeking to manage common external challenges in a united fashion, member states—as in previous years—remained unwilling to put more direct pressure on the Myanmar government for human rights violations relating to its Rohingya crisis; a problem that become internationalized since late 2017.

Adjusting to the US-China Trade War

The US-China Trade War, which began in July 2018 when the US government led by President Donald Trump implemented its first round of tariffs and other trade barriers on China—with the goal of forcing it to make changes to what the US says are “unfair trade practices”—has further impacted Asian countries whose supply chains have been closely linked to Chinese industries and are dependent on the US market as a significant export destination. Because of the US-China trade war—amidst the prospect of a global economic slowdown that is already dampening business confidence around the world—the year 2019 saw the worst twelve months for Asia-Pacific trade in goods and services by both volume and value since the global financial crisis ten years ago.

A Nation Awaits

Frequent travellers flying to Changi Airport may occasionally find their aircraft caught in a holding pattern, as their flight circles the airport while waiting for clearance to land. Singapore in 2019 appears to be in a similar holding pattern as the country awaits an election that is coming sooner rather than later. Although the current parliamentary term only expires in April 2021, the Election Department's announcement on 4 September 2019 about the formation of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee (EBRC) was the first—and clearest—sign of an impending election. Convened by the prime minister prior to every general election, the EBRC is tasked with determining the number of parliamentary seats and delineating the electoral map of constituencies, taking into account demographic changes and shifts in the residential housing populations. The committee of five senior civil servants was also instructed to increase the number of single-member wards while reducing the average size of Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs). In the past, the committee has taken between three weeks and seven months to issue its report to the prime minister, who would then generally call for an election soon after. This time, however, the committee was reported to be still in the midst of deliberations as of early January 2020, suggesting that the next election will only be likely to be called in the second quarter of 2020 or later, after the conclusion of the Budget and Committee of Supply debates in February 2020.

The PAP Continues Apace with Its Leadership Transition

As part of its preparations for the elections, the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) has taken steps to consolidate its fourth-generation (4G) leadership as Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong moves ahead with his plans to step down after the next election. After being appointed as the PAP's first assistant secretarygeneral in November 2018, Finance Minister Heng Swee Keat was elevated to deputy prime minister in April 2019, in a further affirmation to the public and the international community of his status as heir apparent. In order to facilitate this leadership renewal, the two incumbent deputy prime ministers—Teo Chee Hean and Tharman Shanmugaratnam—relinquished their positions and were appointed as senior ministers, while retaining their roles as coordinating minister for national security and coordinating minister for social policies, respectively.

As an infrastructure financier in many parts of the developing world, China has built hydroelectric plants, railroads, roads, airports and telecommunication networks on a global scale. Southeast Asia occupies a significant place in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Situated at the very centre of the Indo-Pacific region, Southeast Asia has long been a strategically important region for China's foreign relations and security. A stable and positive relationship with the region will serve several of China's interests, such as the development of its maritime economy, energy security, and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Moreover, the centrality of ASEAN in regional multilateralism and its stated neutrality in great power competition adds to the geostrategic importance for China.

To incentivize Southeast Asian states to participate in the BRI, China highlighted the long-term economic benefits of the BRI that could be gained through cooperation on policy coordination, trade facilitation, financial integration, infrastructure development and societal-level exchanges. To counter anti-globalization sentiments, the BRI can be used to sustain and revitalize globalization, to improve infrastructure connectivity, and to promote regional and global trade as part of Chinese efforts to provide public goods. Two corridors pass through Southeast Asia: the China-Indochina Peninsular Economic Corridor and the Sino-Myanmar Economic Corridor (originally Bangladesh-China-India- Myanmar Economic Corridor). In addition, China's proposed Maritime Silk Road includes marine industry cooperation, port alliances and logistics. China has also proposed the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) in Southeast Asia. The LMC has supported some projects that reduce poverty and others that promote small and medium-sized enterprises, agriculture, training in water resource management, and education.

It is undeniable that the vision of infrastructure connectivity is targeted at economic growth and regional development. According to the World Bank, connectivity projects in the BRI will increase the trade of countries along the route by 4.1 per cent. The United Nations Development Programme also suggests that the initiative can help BRI-participating countries accelerate industrial diversification and economic growth to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). With Chinese companies having set up more than fifty-six economic cooperation zones in more than twenty countries, generating US$1.1 billion in tax revenues and 180,000 jobs during the 2014–16 period, the hubs for capital and manufacturing investment may trigger broader market reforms and spur local employment, export earnings and growth.

While Vietnam is often proclaimed to be at a “crossroads”, in retrospect the period between 2014 and 2016 was genuinely an inflection point. Given heightened anxiety over Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and a desire to join the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), Vietnam signalled a greater desire to side with the United States than ever before. This led to a flurry of high-profile visits of Vietnamese leaders to the United States as well as an unprecedented agreement to allow independent trade unions in exchange for TPP membership. It also led to a reduction in political repression.

With President Donald Trump's decision in 2017 to pull out of the TPP, the dynamics have changed. Nearly three years after that decision, Vietnam has returned to its previous political and foreign policy orientations. As this chapter will discuss, the top contenders for power have returned to the previous hedging strategy of maintaining friendly ties with the United States while avoiding antagonizing China. The most likely successors to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong have maintained a generally balanced approach to political reforms and alignment with the United States. In short, it does not appear that there will be an elite-led liberalization on the horizon. If there is a question about significant elite-led political reforms in Vietnam, it is whether it is going to further centralize power in the hands of the party. On this question, we also believe that Vietnam is likely to revert to its previous collective-leadership pattern.

Although party-led political reform is largely off the table, this does not mean social pressures that could possibly force change from the outside have remained static. A number of important developments continue to challenge the regime. On the South China Sea, Vietnam's relationship with China continues to represent a volatile mobilizing issue for collective action. The environment also remains a potent social concern. Additionally, social media continues to inject a new dynamic into these issues, providing both the opportunity for citizens to challenge the regime but at the same time allowing the regime to respond more quickly and shift blame to local governments.

Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter referred to as “ASEAN”) - Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, hereinafter referred to individually as “the Party” and collectively as “the Parties”;

RECOGNISING that trafficking in persons constitutes a violation of human rights and an offence to the dignity of human beings;

RECALLING the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN Charter”), the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and where applicable, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and other international agreements and resolutions of the United Nations on the eradication of trafficking in persons, in the promotion and protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms, fair treatment, rule of law and due process;

REAFFIRMING our commitment to the ASEAN Charter with a view to responding effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of transnational crimes and transboundary challenges;

REAFFIRMING also our commitment to the ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children adopted in 2004; the Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons: Ending Impunity for Traffickers and Securing Justice for Victims in 2007 (“ASEAN Practitioner Guidelines”); the ASEAN Leaders’ Joint Statement in Enhancing Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons in South East Asia in 2011; and ASEAN's efforts in promoting human rights, including the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration adopted in 2012;

REAFFIRMING further our commitment to a stronger and more effective regional and international cooperation against trafficking in persons where the offence is transnational in nature, including but not limited to crimes committed by organised criminal groups;

Dedicated Mechanisms for Regional Cooperation on Climate Change

Introduction

Climate change adaptation, alongside with climate change mitigation, is often regarded as a means to dealing with the potential devastating effects of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines mitigation as “an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases”. Climate change adaptation is referred to as an “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”. In other words, while climate change mitigation has the general objective of reducing carbon emission, climate change adaptation aims to increase resilience against possible future climate events. Unlike its climate change mitigation counterpart, however, climate change adaptation often receives lesser attention from policymakers.

The uncertain nature of future climate events contributes significantly to the lagging behind of climate change adaptation initiatives vis-à-vis climate change mitigation. Furthermore, while carbon emission reduction can be measured with relative ease thanks to the availability of tools such as the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, estimating the level of climate resilience built upon climate change adaptation interventions is not as straightforward. “Timeframe, uncertainty and reverse logic of adaptation, messiness and complexity of adaptation, lack of baseline data, no defined yardsticks for success, and lack of resources and coordination” are some of the identified challenges that render climate change adaptation a less favourable option for policymakers.

Despite an apparent lack of preferences for climate change adaptation, its relevance will become more pronounced as disaster events are increasingly attributed to the changing climate. Working on pre-emptive measures to respond to climate eventualities will result in community preparedness and resilience against potential attendant disasters. As climate change impacts various aspects of human lives in different ways, building climate resilience is key to ensuring the continuity and sustainability of the society.

One way of operationalizing climate change adaptation is through the applications of technology. The concept is not entirely new as local communities have long incorporated traditional practices to deal with climate-induced events such as flooding.

Combatting Human Trafficking in East Asia: Mind the Gaps

Across the world, human trafficking is being committed every hour of the day and is viewed as one of the largest criminal enterprises. Human trafficking, dubbed as modern-day slavery, is an enduring global problem with approximately 40 million men, women and children trapped in horrendous trafficking situations such as forced labour, sexual exploitation and forced marriage. This extremely high figure is a wake-up call to the global community which has committed to eradicating modern slavery and human trafficking by the year 2030 (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Targets 5.2, 8.7, and 16.2). According to some estimates, human trafficking has become one of the most lucrative organized crimes, with illicit profits exceeding US$150 billion every year.

Human trafficking remains an endemic security problem in East Asia, threatening states and societies, as discussed and analysed in this chapter. Two-thirds or 25 million of global trafficking victims were identified to be in the region.

To provide an overview of the extent of human trafficking in East Asia, this chapter briefly reviews trends and patterns of trafficking in the region. It then primarily analyses three fundamental issues that impede the eradication of human trafficking in East Asia. Firstly, the key issue of weak implementation of relevant anti-trafficking frameworks at the national level remains. Secondly, the longstanding problems of corruption and the failure of the state to prosecute complicit officials still exacerbate human trafficking in most states of East Asia. Thirdly, the lack of appropriate protection and assistance mechanisms for victims heightens the vulnerabilities that can push people into trafficking or being victimized again. Lastly, human trafficking as a crime is often “hidden” from the one-size-fits-all global anti-trafficking legal regime that is adopted by national governments in East Asia.

Current Trends and Patterns

Intra-regional trafficking is the major pattern reported in East Asia.

The great majority—more than 85 per cent—of the victims rescued in East Asia and the Pacific were trafficked from within the region in 2016. About 6 per cent of the victims were trafficked from South Asia, specifically from Bangladesh and India.Another 5 per cent of victims belonged to stateless ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya in Myanmar.

Thailand has been detecting foreign victims from neighbouring countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, in addition to victims of domestic trafficking.

Introduction

Over the past decade, the global security environment has undergone significant shifts. There is a noticeable downturn in political will to solve pressing issues collectively. There is a rise in state-centred politics that focuses on the notion of “taking back control—whether domestically from political rivals or externally from multilateral or supranational organizations—that resonates worldwide. It is therefore unsurprising that macroeconomic slowdown and geopolitical tensions dominate news headlines—a battle between sustaining globalism and an emerging nationalism. While this division is surmountable, the utilization of new technologies and social media as platforms to convey political messages to a greater number of people make it more pronounced. Many established, new or emerging democracies have not yet dealt with the political fragmentation and polarization they now face, which makes consolidated and effective governance difficult. These domestic political and economic challenges have made global and regional efforts to govern transnational and non-traditional security issues more difficult. This has led to disproportionately negative effects on marginalized communities both within and across borders.

In South and Southeast Asia, displacement has three major causes— disaster, development and conflict. Disaster impacts have remained localized areas of vulnerability within countries for short periods of time in general. The impacts of development on the displacement of people are harder to monitor with the main driver being rapid urbanization and large-scale infrastructure projects. Finally, but most significantly, conflict as a driver tends to lead to more protracted displacement both within countries and across international borders. Across Southeast Asia, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre identifies the new displacements in 2018 as an estimated 365,000 disaster displaced and 3,000 conflict displaced in Indonesia; 3,800,000 disaster displaced and 188,000 conflict displaced in the Philippines; 82,000 disaster displaced in Malaysia; 315,000 disaster displaced and 57,000 conflict displaced in Myanmar; 50,000 disaster displaced in Thailand; and 633,000 disaster displaced in Vietnam.

From this broad overview of 2018, Southeast Asia as a region remains significantly impacted by disaster displacement over the short term. The numbers of newly displaced by conflict remain relatively low in Southeast Asia in 2018. More broadly, the world also saw numbers of civilian casualties in conflict plateau in 2018. However, there were three notable global developments that have implications and reflections in Southeast Asia.