It is widely thought that chance should be understood in reductionist terms: claims about chance should be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated. There are many possible reductionist theories of chance, differing as to which possible pattern of events they take to be chance-making. It is also widely taken to be a norm of rationality that credence should defer to chance: special cases aside, rationality requires that one’s credence function, when conditionalized on the chance-making facts, should coincide with the objective chance function. It is a shortcoming of a theory of chance if it implies that this norm of rationality is unsatisfiable. The primary goal of this paper is to show, on the basis of considerations concerning computability and inductive learning, that this shortcoming is more common than one would have hoped.

We formulate and explore two basic axiomatic systems of type-free subjective probability. One of them explicates a notion of finitely additive probability. The other explicates a concept of infinitely additive probability. It is argued that the first of these systems is a suitable background theory for formally investigating controversial principles about type-free subjective probability.

The ergodic decomposition theorem is a cornerstone result of dynamical systems and ergodic theory. It states that every invariant measure on a dynamical system is a mixture of ergodic ones. Here, we formulate and prove the theorem in terms of string diagrams, using the formalism of Markov categories. We recover the usual measure-theoretic statement by instantiating our result in the category of stochastic kernels. Along the way, we give a conceptual treatment of several concepts in the theory of deterministic and stochastic dynamical systems. In particular, ergodic measures appear very naturally as particular cones of deterministic morphisms (in the sense of Markov categories), and the invariant $\sigma $-algebra of a dynamical system can be seen as a colimit in the category of Markov kernels. In line with other uses of category theory, once the necessary structures are in place, our proof of the main theorem is much more intuitive than traditional approaches. In particular, it does not use any quantitative limiting arguments, and it does not rely on the cardinality of the group or monoid indexing the dynamics. We hope that this result paves the way for further applications of category theory to dynamical systems, ergodic theory, and information theory.

Several authors have investigated the question of whether canonical logic-based accounts of belief revision, and especially the theory of AGM revision operators, are compatible with the dynamics of Bayesian conditioning. Here we show that Leitgeb’s stability rule for acceptance, which has been offered as a possible solution to the Lottery paradox, allows to bridge AGM revision and Bayesian update: using the stability rule, we prove that AGM revision operators emerge from Bayesian conditioning by an application of the principle of maximum entropy. In situations of information loss, or whenever the agent relies on a qualitative description of her information state—such as a plausibility ranking over hypotheses, or a belief set—the dynamics of AGM belief revision are compatible with Bayesian conditioning; indeed, through the maximum entropy principle, conditioning naturally generates AGM revision operators. This mitigates an impossibility theorem of Lin and Kelly for tracking Bayesian conditioning with AGM revision, and suggests an approach to the compatibility problem that highlights the information loss incurred by acceptance rules in passing from probabilistic to qualitative representations of belief.

This paper contributes to a recent research program that extends arguments supporting elementary conditionalization to arguments supporting conditionalization with general, measure-theoretic conditional probabilities. I begin by suggesting an amendment to the framework that Rescorla (2018) has used to characterize regular conditional probabilities in terms of avoiding Dutch book. If we wish to model learning scenarios in which an agent gains complete membership knowledge about some subcollection of the events of interest to her, then we should focus on updating policies that are what I shall call proper. I go on to characterize regular conditional probabilities in proper learning scenarios using what van Fraassen (1999) calls The General Reflection Principle.

Choices rarely deal with certainties; and, where assertoric logic and modal logic are insufficient, those seeking to be reasonable turn to one or more things called “probability.” These things typically have a shared mathematical form, which is an arithmetic construct. The construct is often felt to be unsatisfactory for various reasons. A more general construct is that of a preordering, which may even be incomplete, allowing for cases in which there is no known probability relation between two propositions or between two events. Previous discussion of incomplete preorderings has been as if incidental, with researchers focusing upon preorderings for which quantifications are possible. This article presents formal axioms for the more general case. Challenges peculiar to some specific interpretations of the nature of probability are brought to light in the context of these propositions. A qualitative interpretation is offered for probability differences that are often taken to be quantified. A generalization of Bayesian updating is defended without dependence upon coherence. Qualitative hypothesis testing is offered as a possible alternative in cases for which quantitative hypothesis testing is shown to be unsuitable.

We discuss the reconciliation problem between probability measures: given n⩾2 probability spaces $(\Omega,{\mathcal{F}}_1,{\mathbb{P}}_1),\ldots,(\Omega,{\mathcal{F}}_n,{\mathbb{P}}_n)$ with a common sample space, does there exist an overall probability measure ${\mathbb{P}} \ \text{on} \ {\mathcal{F}} = \sigma({\mathcal{F}}_1,\ldots,{\mathcal{F}}_n)$ such that, for all i, the restriction of ${\mathbb{P}} \ \text{to} \ {\mathcal{F}}_i$ coincides with ${\mathbb{P}}_i$? General criteria for the existence of a reconciliation are stated, along with some counterexamples that highlight some delicate issues. Connections to earlier (recent and far less recent) work are discussed, and elementary self-contained proofs for the various results are given.

We relate Popper functions to regular and perfectly additive such non-Archimedean probability functions by means of a representation theorem: every such non-Archimedean probability function is infinitesimally close to some Popper function, and vice versa. We also show that regular and perfectly additive non-Archimedean probability functions can be given a lexicographic representation. Thus Popper functions, a specific kind of non-Archimedean probability functions, and lexicographic probability functions triangulate to the same place: they are in a good sense interchangeable.

A basic theory for probabilistic convergence spaces based on filter convergence is introduced. As in Florescu's previous theory of probabilistic convergence structures based on nets, one is able to assign a probability that a given filter converges to a given point. Various concepts and theorems pertaining to convergence spaces are extended to the realm of probabilistic convergence spaces, and illustrated by means of examples based on convergence in probability and convergence almost everywhere. Diagonal axioms due to Kowalsky and Fischer are also studied, first for convergence spaces and then in the setting of probabilistic convergence spaces.