Several authors have investigated the question of whether canonical logic-based accounts of belief revision, and especially the theory of AGM revision operators, are compatible with the dynamics of Bayesian conditioning. Here we show that Leitgeb’s stability rule for acceptance, which has been offered as a possible solution to the Lottery paradox, allows to bridge AGM revision and Bayesian update: using the stability rule, we prove that AGM revision operators emerge from Bayesian conditioning by an application of the principle of maximum entropy. In situations of information loss, or whenever the agent relies on a qualitative description of her information state—such as a plausibility ranking over hypotheses, or a belief set—the dynamics of AGM belief revision are compatible with Bayesian conditioning; indeed, through the maximum entropy principle, conditioning naturally generates AGM revision operators. This mitigates an impossibility theorem of Lin and Kelly for tracking Bayesian conditioning with AGM revision, and suggests an approach to the compatibility problem that highlights the information loss incurred by acceptance rules in passing from probabilistic to qualitative representations of belief.

In this article, I provide Urquhart-style semilattice semantics for three connexive logics in an implication-negation language (I call these “pure theories of connexive implication”). The systems semantically characterized include the implication-negation fragment of a connexive logic of Wansing, a relevant connexive logic recently developed proof-theoretically by Francez, and an intermediate system that is novel to this article. Simple proofs of soundness and completeness are given and the semantics is used to establish various facts about the systems (e.g., that two of the systems have the variable sharing property). I emphasize the intuitive content of the semantics and discuss how natural informational considerations underly each of the examined systems.

We prove neighbourhood canonicity and strong completeness for the logics $\mathbf {EK}$ and $\mathbf {ECK}$ , obtained by adding axiom (K), resp. adding both (K) and (C), to the minimal modal logic $\textbf {E}$ . In contrast to an earlier proof in [10], ours is constructive. More precisely, we construct minimal characteristic models for both logics and do not rely on compactness of first order logic. The proof involves a specific circumscription technique and quite some set-theoretic maneuvers to establish that the models satisfy the appropriate frame conditions. After giving both proofs, we briefly spell out how they generalize to four stronger logics and to the extensions of the resulting six logics with a global modality.

Frege’s definition of the real numbers, as envisaged in the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, is fatally flawed by the inconsistency of Frege’s ill-fated Basic Law V. We restate Frege’s definition in a consistent logical framework and investigate whether it can provide a logical foundation of real analysis. Our conclusion will deem it doubtful that such a foundation along the lines of Frege’s own indications is possible at all.

I show that the logic $\textsf {TJK}^{d+}$ , one of the strongest logics currently known to support the naive theory of truth, is obtained from the Kripke semantics for constant domain intuitionistic logic by (i) dropping the requirement that the accessibility relation is reflexive and (ii) only allowing reflexive worlds to serve as counterexamples to logical consequence. In addition, I provide a simplified natural deduction system for $\textsf {TJK}^{d+}$ , in which a restricted form of conditional proof is used to establish conditionals.

A notion of strictly primitive recursive realizability is introduced by Damnjanovic in 1994. It is a kind of constructive semantics of the arithmetical sentences using primitive recursive functions. It is of interest to study the corresponding predicate logic. It was argued by Park in 2003 that the predicate logic of strictly primitive recursive realizability is not arithmetical. Park’s argument is essentially based on a claim of Damnjanovic that intuitionistic logic is sound with respect to strictly primitive recursive realizability, but that claim was disproved by the author of this article in 2006. The aim of this paper is to present a correct proof of the result of Park.

A vexing question in Bayesian epistemology is how an agent should update on evidence which she assigned zero prior credence. Some theorists have suggested that, in such cases, the agent should update by Kolmogorov conditionalization, a norm based on Kolmogorov’s theory of regular conditional distributions. However, it turns out that in some situations, a Kolmogorov conditionalizer will plan to always assign a posterior credence of zero to the evidence she learns. Intuitively, such a plan is irrational and easily Dutch bookable. In this paper, we propose a revised norm, Kolmogorov–Blackwell conditionalization, which avoids this problem. We prove a Dutch book theorem and converse Dutch book theorem for this revised norm, and relate our results to those of Rescorla (2018).

In some recent works, Crupi and Iacona proposed an analysis of ‘if’ based on Chrysippus’ idea that a conditional holds whenever the negation of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent. This paper presents a sound and complete system of conditional logic that accommodates their analysis. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a general method elaborated by Raidl, which applies to a wide range of systems of conditional logic.

It is customary to expect from a logical system that it can be algebraizable, in the sense that an algebraic companion of the deductive machinery can always be found. Since the inception of da Costa’s paraconsistent calculi, algebraic equivalents for such systems have been sought. It is known, however, that these systems are not self-extensional (i.e., they do not satisfy the replacement property). More than this, they are not algebraizable in the sense of Blok–Pigozzi. The same negative results hold for several systems of the hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). Because of this, several systems belonging to this class of logics are only characterizable by semantics of a non-deterministic nature. This paper offers a solution for two open problems in the domain of paraconsistency, in particular connected to algebraization of LFIs, by extending with rules several LFIs weaker than $C_1$ , thus obtaining the replacement property (that is, such LFIs turn out to be self-extensional). Moreover, these logics become algebraizable in the standard Lindenbaum–Tarski’s sense by a suitable variety of Boolean algebras extended with additional operations. The weakest LFI satisfying replacement presented here is called RmbC, which is obtained from the basic LFI called mbC. Some axiomatic extensions of RmbC are also studied. In addition, a neighborhood semantics is defined for such systems. It is shown that RmbC can be defined within the minimal bimodal non-normal logic $\mathbf {E} {\oplus } \mathbf {E}$ defined by the fusion of the non-normal modal logic E with itself. Finally, the framework is extended to first-order languages. RQmbC, the quantified extension of RmbC, is shown to be sound and complete w.r.t. the proposed algebraic semantics.

Recently, a connection has been established between two branches of computability theory, namely between algorithmic randomness and algorithmic learning theory. Learning-theoretical characterizations of several notions of randomness were discovered. We study such characterizations based on the asymptotic density of positive answers. In particular, this note provides a new learning-theoretic definition of weak 2-randomness, solving the problem posed by (Zaffora Blando, Rev. Symb. Log. 2019). The note also highlights the close connection between these characterizations and the problem of convergence on random sequences.