Chapter 2 lays out the managerial system that applies to protest in the U.S. It uses a protest typology to describe the scope and limits of protesters’ rights under the First Amendment. The chapter identifies the public forum and time, place, manner, and other restrictions that limit protest activity. It addresses protest permits, policing tactics, enforcement of public order laws, limits on press activity at protests, and other elements of the “managed dissent” system. The chapter sets the stage for the book’s argument that public protest is over-managed in ways that make protest more costly, less safe, and less effective.

This chapter examines the organisational structure of the ecumenical synods. First, a new interpretation of their organisation is proposed. Whereas earlier scholars have argued for a (con)federal structure consisting of a leading group in Rome and quasi-independent local branches in the provinces, the sources indicate that the ecumenical synods were much more uniformly organised, with a central headquarters in Rome, local headquarters in certain cities and mobile delegations travelling along the agonistic circuits. Next comes an overview of synod officials and a discussion of the finances of the two associations. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the relationship between the synods and the emperor. Whereas several other scholars believe that the synods were a tool with which the emperor kept the agonistic world under control, it appears that the synods had more agency than was earlier assumed. Finally, this chapter analyses other agonistic associations in the Roman empire and their relationship with the ecumenical synods.

The debate on the compatibility of neutrality with collective security appears to have occupied scholars in the interwar period but not after the end of World War II. However, it remains relevant. Neutrality defers to collective security only if the Charter mechanism works effectively. Even then, however, neutrality is admissible if it does not subvert collective action authorized by the Security Council or the General Assembly under the Uniting-for-Peace resolution.

This chapter traces a rising national consciousness in English law and legal institutions, focusing on the implications of this for the broader shift from medieval privileges to modern intellectual property. The shift is presented through a narrative highlighting the roots of Parliament in the legal principles and transcendent appeals established in the wake of thirteenth century baronial revolts. We see the impacts of this nationalizing legal revolution in the thought-world of the great monastic chroniclers at the Benedictine abbey of St. Albans. And we see the historical legacy of this nationalizing legal revolution in the rise of statutory supremacy and positive legality. These interrelated developments occurred through processes of semantic legal ordering, in which Parliament appropriated traditional rights of prerogative kingship and the church, establishing itself as the guardian of property owned by an increasingly-vocal class of subjects invested (materially and spiritually) in the Protestant Reformation. Two statutory foundations for modern intellectual property resulted from these complex developments: the Statute of Monopolies (1624) and the Statute of Anne (1710).

This chapter gives a detailed and dramatic account of the first year of the Juba Peace Talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) and the Government of Uganda. It highlights the many tensions and contradictions that occurred, for example, the pressure to bring LRA senior commanders to the table while they feared for their security, Ugandan government insistence to put a deadline on the talks, the lack of capacity within the LRA/M delegation to deliver negotiation papers, the technical and military challenge to have the LRA fighters assemble, the contradictions within international approaches that simultaneously supported the ICC while also requesting that to back off. Ownership of the process became complex for the LRA/M who sought broad civil society participation while aiming to maintain their powerful hold on the process. In offering a narrative of the convoluted and complex events of this first year of peace talks, the chapter also argues that the developing dynamics of the talks made the pursuit of peace not just an unthankful but rather a damaging experience: For the LRA/M, the start to the negotiations was an experience of continuation, with existing political and military power relations entrenched, rather than transformed.

Chapter 7 discusses the continuing relevance and importance of the assembly and petition rights in the modern, online era. Regarding assembly, it notes that large gatherings of citizens such as the 2017 Women’s March (modeled on the 1963 March on Washington lead by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.) continue to play a critical role in enabling ordinary citizens to participate in democratic governance. Even in the Internet era, physical assemblies have a unique ability to express the strength and popularity of political positions, as well as to galvanize the participants in such events. The Internet has for that reason not displaced physical assembly, though it has simplified the organizing of such assemblies and permitted individuals who cannot physically assemble to jointly develop and express shared views. The chapter also explores and criticizes legal barriers to the exercise of assembly rights. Finally, the chapter argues in favor of reviving the traditional right of petition, and in particular the use of physical, hand-delivered petitions as a means to restore contact between citizens and public officials. It closes by demonstrating how the 1965 Selma March illustrates the continuing value of assembly and petition in our democracy.

Chapter 2 discusses the First Amendment right to peaceably assemble and the related right to form associations. In their original proposed constitutional amendments, George Mason and James Madison both included a right “peaceably to assemble to consult for the common good.” Historically the assembly right was a powerful one, entitling the people to gather in public places without prior permission from government officials.Furthermore, even disruptive assemblies were tolerated so long as they did not cross into violence because assembly was recognized as an essential element of popular sovereignty. After all, in an era before electronic communications, physical gatherings were the only way ordinary citizens could exchange and jointly formulate their political beliefs. For similar reasons, the First Amendment has also been long interpreted to protect the right to form permanent associations. This right emerged from efforts during the Washington Administration to suppress the Democratic-Republican Societies, founded to support the French Revolution. Today, the Supreme Court accepts that meaningful citizen participation in government requires stringent protection for associations because it is only through joining groups that individual citizens are able to influence policymaking. The hard question that remains is whether to tolerate discriminatory associations.

The Homeric poems depict a broad spectrum of political behaviors practiced in two organs for collective deliberation, the agorē “assembly” and the boulē “council.” Nuanced representations of collective deliberation reflect the Homeric tradition’s general interest in mechanisms of social cohesion and discord.

Chapter 6 addresses two ways in which our minds can be constructive: either by making inferences on the basis of what’s already there – filling in gaps of information, or by transforming what’s there into something new. This twofold ability of the human mind to construct is basic to our existence, enabling us to go beyond what we encounter around us. The way we talk reflects both inference and transformation processes systematically. Inference involves taking observable facts and combining them with further knowledge or assumptions, in order to come to new insights or conclusions that aren’t directly observable. Transformation, on the other hand, involves taking observable facts or objects and turning them into something different, something that isn’t yet there but that can be accomplished using available tools and operators. Chapter 6 looks at each of these processes of cognitive constructiveness in turn.

This chapter explains how you can discretize the basic equations for single-phase, compressible flow by use of the discrete differential and averaging operators introduced in Chapter 4. These operators enable you to implement the flow equations in a compact form similar to the continuous mathematical description. By using automatic differentiation, you can automatically linearize and assemble the corresponding linear system without having to explicitly derive and implement expressions for partial derivatives in the Jacobian matrix. The combination of discrete operators and automatic differentiation with a flexible grid structure, a highly vectorized and interactive scripting language, and a powerful graphical environment, is the main reason MRST has proven to be an efficient tool for developing new proof-of-concept codes. To demonstrate this, we first develop a compact solver for compressible flow, and then extend the basic single-phase model to include pressure-dependent viscosity, non-Newton fluid behavior, and temperature effects.