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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 May 2021
During the fourth century, the amount of money Athenians got from the polis for volunteering to sit on a jury and for attending the assembly diverged significantly. Jury pay remained at 3 obols a day, despite inflation, while the pay given for a principal (kyria) assembly eventually rose from 1 obol to 9 obols—outpacing inflation and overcompensating most citizens for their time. What demographic reconstruction of the jury can explain why the real value of jury pay never declined to the point that too few Athenians volunteered? Self-reliant citizens (penêtes) must have dominated the jury pool, and penêtes with young adult children would have volunteered most often. Having an additional source of household labour reduced the opportunity cost of jury service for these Athenians and made their participation more resilient in the face of the declining value of pay. Citizens who faced greater opportunity costs probably participated less over time, meaning that fourth-century juries gradually became less diverse. By contrast, the growth in assembly pay can best be understood in terms of the ‘Lycurgan’ agenda of the 330s and the 320s. Greater pay helped to ensure that the assembly's newly expanded meeting place on the Pnyx was filled to capacity with citizens from all over Attica. The result was a massive spectacle that celebrated a threatened democracy and stimulated the polis economy. Since the courts lacked the same capacity for spectacle, there was no political motivation to pay jurors more.
My thanks to CQ's referee for their helpful comments. The following abbreviations are used throughout: ‘Kroll’ = J.H. Kroll, Athenian Bronze Allotment Plates (Cambridge, 1972); ‘Ober (1989)’ = J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989); ‘Todd’ = S. Todd, ‘Lady Chatterley's Lover and the Attic orators’, JHS 110 (1990), 146–73.
1 Ar. Eq. 51, 255, 800; schol. Ar. Vesp. 88a, 300.
2 The rate did not fluctuate in the intervening decades; juror allotment tokens (pinakia) from the first half of the fourth century bear the triobol stamp (Kroll, 51–3, 59–68).
3 The piece-work pay given to skilled workers in the Erechtheum accounts makes it impossible to determine their per diem wage. The suggestion that 1 drachma per diem was the normal wage for all the Erechtheum workers, regardless of skill, would mean that the accounts tell us little about market rates (Loomis, W.T., Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens [Ann Arbor, 1998], 117–19Google Scholar). The evidence for this single wage is not, however, clear-cut and it is difficult to explain why this uniformity would exist: Randall, R.H. Jr., ‘The Erechtheum workmen’, AJA 57 (1953), 199–210, at 208–9Google Scholar; Loomis (this note), 234–9. Feyel, C., Les artisans dans les sanctuaires grecs aux époques classique et hellénistique à travers la documentation financière en Grèce (Athens, 2006), 407–28Google Scholar highlights a lack of standardization in the way artisans are paid in temple accounts.
4 On the causes of this inflation, see Loomis (n. 3), 247–8. Price and wage inflation were probably driven by aggregate demand growth after 350 and especially after 338 thanks to peace, which encouraged trade and boosted revenues, and domestic spending. Concomitant labour shortages may also have pushed up wages: Akrigg, B., Population and Economy in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2019), 237–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Price data from Delos illustrates this link between spending, prosperity and inflation: Reger, G., Regionalism and Change in the Economy of Independent Delos, 314–167 b.c. (Berkeley, 1994), 257–64Google Scholar.
5 Markle, M.M., ‘Jury pay and assembly pay at Athens’, in Cartledge, P.A. and Harvey, F.D. (edd.), Crux: Essays Presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday (Exeter, 1985), 265–97Google Scholar, at 285, 293; likewise Ober (1989), 143.
6 After 390 no wheat price is attested until the 330s and too few barley prices survive for speculation about its long-term price history. For price data, see Rathbone, D. and von Reden, S., ‘Mediterranean grain prices in Classical antiquity’, in van der Spek, R.J. et al. (edd.), A History of Market Performance: From Ancient Babylonia to the Modern World (London, 2015), 149–235Google Scholar, at 193–4.
7 One thousand five hundred jurors (see n. 16 below) x 3 obols = 750 drachmas. Six thousand assemblymen (see n. 49 below) x 3 obols = 3,000 drachmas.
8 Jurors swore to listen (Aeschin. 2.1; Dem. 18.2) and to judge (Dem. 23.96, 57.63) impartially. It was believed that the poor majority should dominate juries (Dem. 21.209–10), and accordingly pay was a cornerstone of the democracy because it reduced the economic cost of participation ([Ath. Pol.] 27.4; cf. Arist. Pol. 1292b25–9, 1293a1–10). Another explanation, that pay was held at 3 obols because jurors could serve more frequently and so cumulatively earn more pay than assemblymen, is unlikely. Not every juror would be chosen to serve every court day, and by the late fourth century a citizen had to work twice as long in the courts as he would in the assembly to earn 1 drachma (see n. 52 below).
9 Todd, 167–70. Similar arguments were coincidentally advanced by Ober (1989), 136–7; Markle, M.M., ‘The participation of farmers in Athenian juries and assemblies’, AncSoc 21 (1990), 149–65Google Scholar, at 164–5; and Sallares, R., The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World (London, 1991), 54–7Google Scholar.
10 Todd, 173.
11 For 6,000 jurors, see Kroll, 69–86. The regular re-inscription of dicastic pinakia suggests regular turnover in the juror pool and, as such, competition for places (Kroll, 82). For the estimate of thirty thousand Athenian citizens in the second half of the fourth century, see Hansen, M.H., Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century b.c. (Herning, 1985), 65–9Google Scholar. Demographic arguments in this paper are derived from the model applied to Athens by Hansen (this note), 9–13, with adjustments by Akrigg, B., ‘Demography and Classical Athens’, in Holleran, C. and Pudsey, A. (edd.), Demography in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge, 2011), 37–59, at 52–7Google Scholar. I convert Akrigg's age bracket estimates from percentages of males to percentages of citizens (18–29 years old: 39.7 per cent of citizens; 30–44: 34.5 per cent; 45–59: 18.7 per cent; 60+: 6.9 per cent).
12 Todd, 168.
13 See Todd, 149–53. For Todd, 196, the rate helped preserve a rural majority. Aristotle imagines that pay and fines could be used to shape the demographics of juries, and Athenians were familiar with the operation of short-term inflation (Pol. 1294a36–41; cf. 1308a35–b10, Xen. Vect. 4.5–10). The jury court was, however, seen as a staunchly democratic institution (see page 11 below), and it is difficult to imagine an ancient, direct democracy using long-term inflation to reshape its juries surreptitiously.
14 See Ar. Ach. 181, 214, 375–6, 676, Eq. 255–7, 977–84, Vesp. 224, 300–15, 1071–90, Pax 348–54, Plut. 276–7; cf. Isoc. 7.54, 8.130, 15.152. The construction of jurors as rich in fourth-century rhetoric and elite speakers’ attacks on opponents for non-elite attributes are rhetorical strategies: Ober (1989), 219–26, 306–11.
15 Hansen, M.H., ‘How often did the Athenian dicasteria meet?’, GRBS 20 (1979), 243–7Google Scholar. See Kroll, 5–7 on the date and Boegehold, A.L., The Lawcourts at Athens (Princeton, 1995)Google Scholar, 36–9 for the selection procedure.
16 Mirhady, D.C. and Schwarz, C., ‘Dikastic participation’, CQ 61 (2011), 744–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. One thousand five hundred jurors is a reasonable guess: Hansen, M.H., The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Norman, 1999), 189Google Scholar.
17 See n. 11 above.
18 Todd, 163; Hansen, M.H., ‘Political activity and the organization of Attica in the fourth century b.c.’, GRBS 24 (1983), 227–38Google Scholar, at 235–6.
19 See Shimmura, T. and Yoshimura, T., ‘Circadian clock determines the timing of rooster crowing’, Current Biology 23 (2013), 231–3CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed, at 232. The demesmen of Halimus left a deme assembly in the asty early to avoid travelling in the dark (Dem. 57.9–10).
20 Summer solstice: 116 minutes between astronomical twilight and sunrise; winter solstice: 95 minutes.
21 There is a close correspondence between the trittys distributions within the juror pool (23 per cent city, 42 per cent coast, 35 per cent inland) and the distributions in the boulê (26 per cent city, 39 per cent coast, 35 per cent inland). The use of bouleutic quotas was presumably meant to ensure geographic distribution and fair access to pay: Hansen (n. 18), 229. Carawan, E., ‘Court reform, klêrôtêria, and comic testimony’, CJ 111 (2016), 385–416Google Scholar, at 404–12 argued that in the first half of the fourth century the 10-letter sections were assigned not only to different trittyes within each tribe but also to demes within each trittys (six bouleutai = one-section letter). He conceded (409) that this may not have been true in the second half of the century, and the pinakia suggest it was not: three tokens belonging to Phalerum demesmen show at least three-section letters (Kroll, tokens 36b, 120a, 133c), not the two that would be expected based on its bouleutic quota. On section letters and the different classes of pinakia, see Kroll, 36–50, 96–7.
22 Most pinakia of known provenance were recovered from the environs of the asty, Hansen (n. 18), 234; Kroll, 9–11, 21. While the reality of migration to Athens is clear, establishing its scale is difficult: Osborne, R., ‘The potential mobility of human populations’, OJA 10 (1991), 231–51Google Scholar; Jones, N.F., The Associations of Classical Athens (New York, 1999), 86–94Google Scholar. On non-permanent migration within Attica, see Taylor, C., ‘Migration and the demes of Attica’, in Holleran, C. and Pudsey, A. (edd.), Demography and the Graeco-Roman World: New Insights and Approaches (Cambridge, 2011), 117–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Xenophon (Vect. 4.33; cf. 3.9–10) in the 350s refers to 3 obols per diem for each citizen as ‘sufficient maintenance’ (ἱκανὴν τροφήν); in 329/8 public slaves received trophê of 3 obols per diem (IG II2 1672 col. i.4–5, col. ii.141–2); and the adynatos dole was 2 obols per diem ([Ath. Pol.] 49.9). Demosthenes (4.28–9) in the 340s calculates a minimum trophê for servicemen of 2 obols per diem. Ober, J., ‘Wealthy Hellas’, TAPhA 140 (2010), 241–86Google Scholar, at 280 (cf. at 264) guesses that between five thousand and ten thousand citizens earned 1 drachma or less (a category he labels ‘subsistence’), but does not estimate the income distribution within this group. See C. Taylor, Poverty, Wealth, and Well-Being: Experiencing Penia in Democratic Athens (Oxford, 2017), 69–113, 249–58 on measures and models of economic inequality.
24 For comparison, Hansen (n. 11), 18–20 estimates that at least twenty per cent of eligible citizens were unfit for hoplite service. The monthly payment of the dole (Aeschin. 1.104) probably meant that many adynatoi lived in city demes, I assume fifty per cent. Approximately forty-seven per cent were under 30 or over 60, and I estimate that two-thirds were worth more than 300 drachmas (see [Ath. Pol.] 49.4), the value of a small dwelling (cf. Isae. 2.35; Dem. 59.39).
25 Kroll, token 83b.
26 Smaller estates would not provide significant leisure time: Davies, J.K., Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens (New York, 1981), 28–9Google Scholar, 34–5.
27 On poor Athenians’ self-fashioning and negotiation of their own well-being, see Taylor (n. 23), 195–233.
28 Even though the elderly, the very poor and the adynatoi living in non-city demes still stood to lose less income than the penêtes, the expenses of accommodation in Athens and, for the infirm, the physical difficulty of long-distance travel make it unlikely that they were over-represented among morning volunteers relative to their numbers in the jury pool.
29 See Worthington, I., ‘The length of an Athenian public trial: a reply to Professor MacDowell’, Hermes 131 (2013), 364–71Google Scholar, at 365 n. 4.
30 Hansen (n. 15), 244.
31 Todd, 158–67 also sees the consensus values of rhetoric as evidence of an agrarian majority on the grounds that farmers self-identified as landowners, not as rich or poor, and so grouped themselves with the very rich, but this is unnecessary. Ober (1989), 311–14 offers a stronger historical/functionalist explanation for the emergence of the set of values seen in fourth-century rhetoric.
32 Nine thousand citizens were worth at least 2,000 drachmas in 322 (Diod. 18.18.4–5). Of these 9,000, at least 1,200 eisphora-payers were only nominally ‘farmers’ as members of the leisure class. Two thousand drachmas was the approximate value of 40 plethra (3.6 ha)—enough to support a household: Gallant, T.W., Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, 1991), 82–7Google Scholar. For Hodkinson, S., Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta (London, 2000), 390–2Google Scholar, an estate of 30 plethra could also be viable. The number of additional farmers with 30–40 plethra must be less than the 4,500 who served as hoplites but were worth less than 2,000 drachmas, because a 30-plethron estate would be worth about one thousand and five hundred drachmas: Wees, H. van, ‘Demetrius and Draco: Athens’ property classes and population in and before 317 b.c.’, JHS 131 (2011), 95–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 99–100. Removing 1,200 landowners and adding, say, two thousand small farmers gives around ten thousand small to ‘middling’ farmers. We can only guess the size of the average holding within this group.
33 The fifth-century domination of the stratêgia and the ostrakophoriai by Athenians registered in city demes (49 per cent and 56 per cent of names, respectively) reflects the advantage of proximity, since it was easier for their fellow demesmen to journey into the asty to vote: Taylor, C., ‘From the whole citizen body? The sociology of election and lot in the Athenian democracy’, Hesperia 76 (2007), 323–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 335–9, and id., ‘A new political world’, in Osborne, R. (ed.), Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution (Cambridge, 2007), 72–90Google Scholar, at 84–9. City over-representation in the stratêgia weakened in the fourth century, probably owing to a mixture of migration to the city and post-war wealth redistribution: Taylor (n. 23), 96–111.
34 Todd, 168–9.
35 See Jameson, M., ‘Agriculture and slavery in Classical Athens’, CJ 73 (1977), 122–45Google Scholar, at 124–31; Halstead, P. and Jones, G.G., ‘Agrarian ecology in the Greek islands: time stress, scale and risk’, JHS 109 (1989), 41–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gallant (n. 32), 34–59; Hanson, V.D., The Other Greeks (London, 1995), 63–82Google Scholar, 155–67. Todd, 169, using early modern Europe for comparison, estimates that a farmer would need to work no more than two hundred days a year. The detailed modelling of Gallant ([n. 32], 107–12) shows that 175–200 days would be insufficient to keep production above subsistence level: it is likely that a citizen (alongside his family) would have to spend something like forty per cent more time working on the farm, some two hundred and forty-five to two hundred and eighty man-days a year.
36 Todd, 160, 168 n. 195.
37 McHugh, M., The Ancient Greek Farmstead (Oxford, 2017), 21–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
38 See n. 32 above. On smallholder farming, see Burford, A., Land and Labor in the Greek World (Baltimore, 1993), 66–8Google Scholar, 80–1, 136–7.
39 Cf. Pol. 1292b25–9, 1319a30–b1. The busy farmer was a topos (e.g. Hes. Op. 299–319; Eur. Supp. 420–2; Xen. Oec. 20.16–20; Pl. Resp. 565a), and I doubt the image of farmers in Old Comedy as disinclined to participate in government (e.g. Ar. Ach. 32–6, Pax 348–51). See D. Rosenbloom, ‘From ponēros to pharmakos: theater, social drama, and revolution in Athens, 428–404 b.c.e.’, ClAnt 21 (2002), 283–346, at 318–29.
40 Todd, 160, 168–9.
41 See A. Bresson (transl. S. Rendall), The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy (Princeton, 2016), 170–4, 199–203; E.M. Harris and D.M. Lewis, ‘Introduction: markets in Classical and Hellenistic Greece’, in E.M. Harris et al. (edd.), The Ancient Greek Economy: Markets, Households and City-States (Cambridge, 2016), 1–40; McHugh (n. 37), 132–52.
42 See Ar. Pax 563–4, Eccl. 816–22; Theophr. Char. 4.15; cf. agricultural retailers in Pl. Resp. 2.371c–d. Ἀττικὴ οἰκονομία is defined as selling, rather than storing, produce (Arist. [Oec.] 16.2–3; cf. Plut. Per. 16.3–4). By allocating a greater portion of their time to the cultivation of cash crops, farmers may have won back some of the stretches of quiet time that Todd assumes all farmers enjoyed, albeit with increased risk. Many Athenian farmers do seem to have specialized for the market (A. Moreno, Feeding the Democracy [Oxford, 2007], 57–72), but the extent of cash cropping throughout Attica is unclear: H. Lohmann, ‘Agriculture and country life in Classical Attica’, in B. Wells (ed.), Agriculture in Ancient Greece (Stockholm, 1992), 29–60, with the criticisms of Foxhall, L., Olive Cultivation in Ancient Greece (Oxford, 2007), 61–8Google Scholar, 77–82, 199–200.
43 Harris and Lewis (n. 41), 12–13, 19–28.
44 Though the smallest farms probably lacked slaves (Burford [n. 38], 182–3), agricultural slave-holding is typically seen as widespread: Jameson (n. 35); id., ‘Agricultural labor in ancient Greece’, in B. Wells (ed.), Agriculture in Ancient Greece (Stockholm, 1992), 135–46, at 142–6; Y. Garlan, Slavery in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, 1988), 60–5; Hanson (n. 35), 63–70.
45 Gallant (n. 32), 73–112, especially from 87. In Gallant's model the father dies at 40, and this downplays the length of time in which a household could maximize its productivity with a labour surplus. A household might also produce well above its needs at the beginning of its existence, but this was dependent on securing outside labour (89, 104–7).
46 See n. 33 above.
47 Likewise, it is because present-day Western democracies can reliably empanel juries of requisite size and tolerable diversity (albeit owing to the compulsory nature of jury service) that they can afford to undercompensate jurors by paying the minimum wage or less. Until 2018, pay for US federal jurors had remained unchanged for 28 years.
48 Age could command respect in deliberative settings (Aeschin. 1.23–4, 2.108, 3.2, 3.4; Dem. Ex. 45.2) and arbitrators were always selected from men in their sixtieth year ([Ath. Pol.] 53.4–7).
49 See M.H. Hansen, ‘Reflections on the number of citizens accommodated in the assembly place on the Pnyx’, in B. Forsén and G. Stanton (edd.), The Pnyx in the History of Athens (Helsinki, 1996), 23–34, at 29–33. On the post-war economy, see Strauss, B., Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy, 403–386 b.c. (London, 1986), 43–86Google Scholar. On the quorum, see Hansen, M.H., ‘How many Athenians attended the ecclesia?’, GRBS 17 (1976), 115–34Google Scholar, at 121–30; id., ‘The Athenian ecclesia and the assembly-place on the Pnyx’, GRBS 23 (1982), 241–9, at 241–2. Pay may only have been given to the first 6,000 attendees: Hansen (this note [1976]), 133 n. 70.
50 [Ath. Pol.] 41.3; Ar. Eccl. 293–4, 300–10; and cf. Ar. Plut. 329–30.
51 On wage inflation, see pages 1–2 above. The kyria assembly already existed in the 390s (IG I3 41.37) but paid no more than an ordinary assembly.
52 Hansen, M.H., ‘The duration of a meeting of the Athenian ecclesia’, CPh 74 (1979), 43–9Google Scholar, at 48–9.
53 In 390: (6,000 assemblymen x 3 obols) x 40 meetings ([Ath. Pol.] 43.3) = 20 talents. In the 320s: ([6,000 x 6 obols] x 30 meetings) + ([6,000 x 9 obols] x 10 meetings) = 45 talents. Recovery may have led to a small increase in assembly pay in the 340s: Dem. Ex. 53.4 talks of orators controlling the dêmos ‘with the drachma, the chous and the four obols’. The chous (of grain) suggests that, like a distribution, the two other payments were available to many Athenians. The drachma is, accordingly, best identified as the theôrikon, and the 4 obols as assembly pay.
54 Todd, 173.
55 On this debate, see Blanshard, A.J.L., ‘What counts as demos? Some notes on the relationship between the jury and “the people” in Classical Athens’, Phoenix 58 (2004), 28–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hansen, M.H., ‘The concepts of demos, ekklesia, and dikasterion in Classical Athens’, GRBS 50 (2010), 499–536Google Scholar.
56 Todd, 173; likewise, Ober (1989), 143 and Burke, E.M., ‘The habit of subsidization in Classical Athens: towards a thetic ideology’, C&M 56 (2005), 5–47Google Scholar and ‘Finances and the operation of the Athenian democracy in the “Lycurgan era”’, AJPh 131 (2010), 393–423, at 402–5, 410–11.
57 The lack of additional money for jurors (and jurors sitting as nomothetai) evidently did not affect Lycurgus’ effectiveness as prosecutor and legislator. On the Lycurgan ‘programme’ and its goals, see Faraguna, M., Atene nell'età di Alessandro: problemi politici, economici, finanziari (Roma, 1992), 257–85Google Scholar; Burke (n. 56 [2010]), 411–13. On Lycurgus’ financial strategies, see Burke, E.M., ‘Lycurgan finances’, GRBS 26 (1985), 251–64Google Scholar; Faraguna (this note), 289–396; S. Lambert, Rationes Centesimarum: Sales of Public Land in Lykourgan Athens (Amsterdam, 1997), 280–91.
58 e.g. E. Badian, ‘The ghost of empire: reflections on Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century b.c.’, in W. Eder (ed.), Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v.Chr. (Stuttgart, 1995), 79–106, at 100–3; Hunt, P., War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens (Cambridge, 2010), 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
59 [Ath. Pol.] 27.3–4; Plut. Per. 9.1–3, Cim. 10.1–3.
60 Ar. Eq. 255, 797–800, 904–5, Vesp. 242–4, 408–14, 698–712, Pax 632–48.
61 Dem. 3.31–3; cf. 23.208–9, Ex. 53.4; [Dem.] 13.30–1.
62 See Zelnick-Abramovitz, R., ‘Did patronage exist in Classical Athens?’, AC 65 (2000), 65–80Google Scholar; Maehle, I.B., ‘The economy of gratitude in democratic Athens’, Hesperia 87 (2018), 55–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
63 Hansen (n. 49 [1976]), 130–1 and id. (n. 49 [1996]), 25–9. For the dating, see Rotroff, S.I. and Camp, J.M., ‘The date of the third period of the Pnyx’, Hesperia 65 (1996), 263–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 273–8; S.I. Rotroff, ‘Pnyx III: pottery and stratigraphy’, in B. Forsén and G. Stanton (edd.), The Pnyx in the History of Athens (Helsinki, 1996), 35–40, at 39–40.
64 Todd, 173.
65 A scenario initially accepted by Hansen (n. 49 [1982]), 248–9. If all attendees were paid and if the Pnyx was completely filled at every meeting, it would more than double the cost of pay from 45 talents (see n. 53 above) to 100.5 talents. Pay for all attendees, however, may only have been given at kyria assemblies.
66 Faraguna (n. 57), 269, 273; B. Hintzen-Bohlen, Die Kulturpolitik des Eubulos und des Lykurg: Die Denkmäler- und Bauprojekte in Athen zwischen 355 und 322 v.Chr. (Berlin, 1997), 103–4, 130.
67 A. Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens, rev. J. Gould and D.M. Lewis (Oxford, 19882), 263.
68 See E. Csapo and P. Wilson, ‘The finance and organisation of the Athenian theatre in the time of Eubulus and Lycurgus’, in E. Csapo et al. (edd.), Greek Theatre in the Fourth Century b.c. (Berlin, 2014), 393–424, at 409–23.
69 Hanink, J., Lycurgan Athens and the Making of Classical Tragedy (Cambridge, 2011), 18–22Google Scholar, 68–74.
70 Hanink (n. 69), 92–125; Csapo and Wilson (n. 68).
71 See E. Csapo, ‘The men who built the theatres: theatropolai, theatronai, and arkhitektones’, in P. Wilson (ed.), The Greek Theatre and Festivals (Oxford, 2007), 87–115.
72 Csapo (n. 71), 114; Wilson, P., ‘Costing the Dionysia’, in Revermann, M. and Wilson, P. (edd.), Performance, Iconography, Reception (Oxford, 2008), 88–127Google Scholar, at 91–6; Csapo and Wilson (n. 68), 395–7.
73 The reference to ‘two-obol seats’ (Dem. 18.28) in 346 could refer to the persistence of wooden seating farther back in the theatre, or it was simply a holdover expression for an ‘ordinary’ seat. See C. Papastamati-von Moock, ‘The Theatre of Dionysus Eleuthereus in Athens: new data and observations on its “Lycurgan” phase’, in E. Csapo et al. (edd.), Greek Theatre in the Fourth Century b.c. (Berlin, 2014), 15–76, at 33–4, 72–4 for the chronology of construction.
74 Participation rather than profit seems to have been the reason the theôrikon was also distributed for the Panathenaea ([Dem.] 44.37; Hsch. δ 2351 Latte), most likely before the Panathenaic stadium was begun under Lycurgus (IG II3 1 352; [Plut.] Mor. 841D).
75 The orator Philinus, a contemporary of Lycurgus, suggests that the theôrikon was meant to widen general festival participation from the beginning: ‘when the Dionysia was approaching, Eubulus distributed it for the sacrifice so that everyone could celebrate the festival and no citizen would be deprived of the festival (τῆς θεωρίας) because of their lack of private means’ (Harp. Lex. I 154.3–7 Dindorf = Phot. Bibl. θ 151 Theodoridis; Suda θ 219 Adler).
76 The pre-festival distribution perhaps occurred at deme assemblies ([Dem.] 44.37–8). A fragment of fourth-century comedy, likely referencing Eubulus’ ally Diophantus, indicates that the theôrikon was 1 drachma (Zen. 3.27 = Com. Adesp. fr. 950 K.–A.; Hsch. δ 2351 Latte; Suda δ 1491 Adler). This, together with the two-obol seat cost and the dire financial circumstances of the 350s, makes it unlikely that the theôrikon was initially 1 drachma per diem. The statement of Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 33 = Harp. Lex. I 154.1–3 Dindorf; Phot. Bibl. θ 151 Theodoridis; Suda θ 219 Adler) that the theôrikon was at first 1 drachma τῆς θέας must then refer to the cost of a seat over multiple days. The drachma in Dem. Ex. 53.4 is probably the theôrikon (see n. 53 above).
77 Hyp. 1 fr. 6, 10 (Against Archestratides) fr. 47 Jensen; cf. Din. 1.56; Suda θ 219 Adler.
78 Contra Roselli, D.K., Theater of the People: Spectators and Society in Ancient Athens (Austin, 2009), 98Google Scholar n. 60; and Csapo and Wilson (n. 68), 395 n. 13, 396, 419.
79 Cf. Democracy receiving sacrifices and a new statue in the 330s (IG II2 1496.11–12, 140–1; IG II2 2791). It was presumably the strong attachment to the Pnyx as the locus of democracy (cf. Ar. Eq. 42) and the demonstration of wealth made by creating not one but two great sites for public assembly that explains why the assembly initially did not just relocate to the theatre.
80 For the origins of the ephêbeia and the role of ephebes in defending the chôra, see J.L. Friend, ‘The Athenian ephebeia in the Lycurgan period: 334/3–322/1 b.c.’ (Diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2009), 65–98, with 147–83 on the ephêbeia in the Lycurgan ‘programme’.
81 Lyc. 1.1, 47, 113, 145, 150. He also recites the ephebic oath with its invocation of the crops of Attica (1.77).
82 On the assembly as the dêmos, see Hansen (n. 55), 499–515. In more practical terms, the presence of many rural citizens would be beneficial for debates on the defence of the chôra—an item on the agenda of every kyria assembly ([Ath. Pol.] 43.3; cf. Xen. Mem. 3.6.10–11).
83 Thompson, H.A. and Scranton, R.L., ‘Stoas and city walls on the Pnyx’, Hesperia 12 (1943), 269–383CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 297. The economic benefits of increasing visitor traffic to the asty were well known: Xen. [Ath. pol.] 1.17; Vect. 3.5, 12–13, 4.49–50.
84 Lambert, S., Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees 352/1–322/1 b.c. (Leiden, 2008), 343–4Google Scholar.
85 Demades’ famous description of the theôrikon as ‘the glue of the democracy’ ([Plut.] Mor. 1011b) may, in part, refer to its power to orchestrate community-building mass spectacle, not just to redistribute wealth (cf. Dem. 10.39–42).
86 e.g. IG II3 345. On these honorary decrees, see Hanink (n. 69), 103–12; Csapo and Wilson (n. 68), 414–20.
87 Aeschin. 3.34; cf. Aeschin. 3.41–5 with Dem. 18.120–2 on the proclamation of honours in the theatre. See further W.E. Gwatkin Jr., ‘The legal arguments in Aischines’ Against Ktesiphon and Demosthenes’ On the Crown’, Hesperia 26 (1957), 129–41. On the appearance of inscribed honours for citizens for financial or political services in office, see Gygax, M.D., Benefaction and Rewards in the Ancient Greek City (Cambridge, 2016), 218–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
88 See R.F. Townsend, The East Side of the Agora: The Remains Beneath the Stoa of Attalos (The Athenian Agora 27) (Princeton, 1995), 34–6, with 90 on the ‘Square Peristyle’; Boegehold (n. 15), 15.