Clare McAndrew is a leading analyst of the global art market. Here the guest editors of this special issue interview McAndrew on the structures of the art market, its sectorial and regional arrangements, and transformations in its historical, technical, and monetary operation. Their discussion highlights the rapid increase in prices for art and the global extension of the art market since the early-to-mid 2000s, as well as further changes to its operation wrought by the rise of online trading in the early 2010s.

Auctions, normally considered as devices facilitating trade, also provide a way to probe mechanisms governing one’s valuation of some good or action. One of the most intriguing phenomena in auction behavior is the winner’s curse — the strong tendency of participants to bid more than rational agent theory prescribes, often at a significant loss. The prevailing explanation suggests that humans have limited cognitive abilities that make estimating the correct bid difficult, if not impossible. Using a series of auction structures, we found that bidding approaches rational agent predictions when participants compete against a computer. However, the winner’s curse appears when participants compete against other humans, even when cognitive demands for the correct bidding strategy are removed. These results suggest the humans assign significant future value to victories over human but not over computer opponents even though such victories may incur immediate losses, and that this valuation anomaly is the origin of apparently irrational behavior.

In Great Britain, more than eleven million animals are transported to or from livestock markets annually. Time spent at markets is considered by Defra (Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) to be ‘neutral time’, ie potentially a rest period. However, sheep in markets are subject to many potential stressors, which may prevent them resting. Lying and ruminating behaviours were analysed from 1,638 behavioural scans of sheep in 279 pens in 23 markets across Great Britain. Likelihood of observing ≥ 1 animals lying down during a scan decreased as stocking density and activity outside the pen increased. Proportion of animals observed lying in a pen (when at least one animal was lying) increased as group size and stocking rate decreased. Likelihood of observing ≥ 1 animals ruminating increased when there was no activity around the pen, and as number of sheep in the pen increased. Proportion of animals observed ruminating in a pen (when at least one animal was ruminating) increased as stocking rate, number of sheep in the pen and activity outside the pen decreased. Proportion of sheep ruminating was greater where there was no activity, compared with where there was activity outside the pen. We suggest that in order to allow higher quality rest periods for sheep in markets, then markets should be organised so that activity around the pen is minimised, eg by filling the market from back to front so that, once penned, sheep are not passed repeatedly. Stocking densities should also be low enough to allow animals to lie if they wish, while groups sizes should not be so low as to increase fear responses.

This article examines how selected attributes of Bordeaux fine wines (producer, vintage, quality, bottle size, case, flaws, and transaction volume) affect prices in three types of trading venues: auctions, electronic exchange, and the over-the-counter (OTC) market. The findings indicate a price differentiation across the venues. Wine aging leads to relatively higher prices at auctions than on the electronic exchange or the OTC. There is a nearly linear relationship between prices and wine ratings, the strongest of which is found in the case of auctions. The bottle size effect is mostly positive for supersized formats and is the strongest on an electronic exchange and the weakest at auctions. The transaction volume negatively affects wine prices in all the trading venues. The simulation results facilitate the construction of more realistic trading models and may help traders make more informed decisions on the choice of a trading venue, depending on the wine characteristics. (JEL Classifications: D40, G12, Q14, L66)

A breeding female’s perceived value is a complicated process and depends on a combination of expected production costs, reproductive success, and calf values. A conceptual asset value model based on female characteristics as signals and net implicit marginal value expectations is developed. A hedonic model based on sequentially sold individuals at multiple Mississippi auction locations is estimated by panel regression. Among other findings, pregnant females are discounted in proportion to abortion risk, which decreases toward birth. A follow-up cost/benefit analysis indicates producers are better off from at home pregnancy checking and selling only nonpregnant females or cow/calf pairs.

In this article, we report the results of an experiment designed to address the effect of risk attitudes on valuations of aged wines. We find that higher risk taking in the economic domain is associated with a significantly higher willingness to pay for an old wine. Given the increasing interest of consumers and investors in old wines, our results are applicable to the pricing of old wines and to the use of auctions as an efficient willingness to pay elicitation mechanism. (JEL Classifications: C91, D44, L66)

The laboratory provides a test bed to inform many design choices for emissions permit markets. Experiments are sometimes strongly motivated and structured by specific theoretical models and predictions, but in other cases the experiment itself can be the model of the market and regulatory environment. We review specific experimental applications that address design issues for permit auction rules, permit expiration dates and banking, liability rules, and regulatory enforcement.

Data from Kansas cattle auctions were analyzed to estimate the impact a wide variety of physical characteristics had upon cow prices. Weight, lot size, health, pregnancy, grade, dressing percent, breed, time of sale, and market location were important factors affecting the differences in cow prices across lots on a given day. Results suggest that producers interested in maximizing the price they receive for their cows should market healthy cows in desirable lot sizes at higher dressing percentages.

The present article discusses general issues associated with experimental auctions and their relative advantages and disadvantages over other marketing research techniques. Experimental auctions create an active market environment with feedback where subjects exchange real goods and real money, which is not generally the case with other methods. The article also discusses four experimental design issues associated with experimental auctions: auction mechanism, market feedback and bidder affiliation, demand reduction and wealth effects, and multiple attribute valuation. Each of these experimental design issues, if not properly controlled, have the potential to create serious flaws in marketing recommendations.

Environmental and consumer groups have called for mandatory labeling ofgenetically engineered (GE) food products in the United States, stating thatconsumers have the “right to know.” Herein, we use a nonhypothetical fieldexperiment to examine the willingness to pay for GE-labeled products, usingthe only second-generation GE product currently on the U.S. market—GEcigarettes. Our results suggest consumers pay less for GE-labeled cigaretteswhen marketing information is absent. But, when presented with marketinginformation on the attributes of the cigarette, we find no evidence thatconsumers pay less for GE-labeled cigarettes.