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What Can Laboratory Experiments Teach Us About Emissions Permit Market Design?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2016

Timothy N. Cason
Timothy N. Cason*
Affiliation:
Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana
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Abstract

The laboratory provides a test bed to inform many design choices for emissions permit markets. Experiments are sometimes strongly motivated and structured by specific theoretical models and predictions, but in other cases the experiment itself can be the model of the market and regulatory environment. We review specific experimental applications that address design issues for permit auction rules, permit expiration dates and banking, liability rules, and regulatory enforcement.

Keywords

cap-and-tradeauctionsliabilityregulationcompliancebanking
Type
Invited Papers
Information
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 151 - 161
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

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