In this paper, the authors explore the question of whether cognitive enhancement via direct neurostimulation, such as through deep brain stimulation, could be reasonably characterized as a form of transformative experience. This question is inspired by a qualitative study being conducted with people at risk of developing dementia and in intimate relationships with people living with dementia (PLWD). They apply L.A. Paul’s work on transformative experience to the question of cognitive enhancement and explore potential limitations on the kind of claims that can legitimately be made about individual well-being and flourishing, as well as limit the kind of empirical work—including the authors’ own—that can hope to enlighten ethical discourse. In this paper, the authors advance the following theses: (1) it is sometimes reasonable to characterize cognitive enhancement as a transformative experience; (2) the testimonies of people intimately acquainted with dementia may still be relevant to evaluating cognitive enhancement even though cognitive enhancement may be a transformative experience; and (3) qualitative studies may still be useful in the ethical analysis of cognitive enhancement, but special attention may need to be given to how these are conducted and what kind of insights can be drawn from them.

This paper discusses two opposing views about the relation between artificial intelligence (AI) and human intelligence: on the one hand, a worry that heavy reliance on AI technologies might make people less intelligent and, on the other, a hope that AI technologies might serve as a form of cognitive enhancement. The worry relates to the notion that if we hand over too many intelligence-requiring tasks to AI technologies, we might end up with fewer opportunities to train our own intelligence. Concerning AI as a potential form of cognitive enhancement, the paper explores two possibilities: (1) AI as extending—and thereby enhancing—people’s minds, and (2) AI as enabling people to behave in artificially intelligent ways. That is, using AI technologies might enable people to behave as if they have been cognitively enhanced. The paper considers such enhancements both on the level of individuals and on the level of groups.

Neuropsychiatric illnesses including mood disorders are accompanied by cognitive impairment, which impairs work capacity and quality of life. However, there is a lack of treatment options that would lead to solid and lasting improvement of cognition. This is partially due to the absence of valid and reliable neurocircuitry-based biomarkers for pro-cognitive effects. This systematic review therefore examined the most consistent neural underpinnings of cognitive impairment and cognitive improvement in unipolar and bipolar disorders. We identified 100 studies of the neuronal underpinnings of working memory and executive skills, learning and memory, attention, and implicit learning and 9 studies of the neuronal basis for cognitive improvements. Impairments across several cognitive domains were consistently accompanied by abnormal activity in dorsal prefrontal (PFC) cognitive control regions—with the direction of this activity depending on patients’ performance levels—and failure to suppress default mode network (DMN) activity. Candidate cognition treatments seemed to enhance task-related dorsal PFC and temporo-parietal activity when performance increases were observed, and to reduce their activity when performance levels were unchanged. These treatments also attenuated DMN hyper-activity. In contrast, nonspecific cognitive improvement following symptom reduction was typically accompanied by decreased limbic reactivity and reversal of pre-treatment fronto-parietal hyper-activity. Together, the findings highlight some common neural correlates of cognitive impairments and cognitive improvements. Based on this evidence, studies are warranted to examine the reliability and predictive validity of target engagement in the identified neurocircuitries as a biomarker model of pro-cognitive effects.

Population ageing and the global burden of dementia pose a major challenge for human societies and a priority for public health. Cognitive enhancement, i.e. the targeted amplification of core cognitive abilities, is raising increasing attention among researchers as an effective strategy to complement traditional therapeutic and assistive approaches, and reduce the impact of age-related cognitive disability. In this paper, we discuss the possible applicability of cognitive enhancement for public health purposes to mitigate the burden of population ageing and dementia. After discussing the promises and challenges associated with enhancing ageing citizens and people with cognitive disabilities, we argue that global societies have a moral obligation to consider the careful use of cognitive enhancement technologies as a possible strategy to improve individual and public health. In addition, we address a few primary normative issues and possible objections that could arise from the implementation of public health-oriented cognitive enhancement technologies.

Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival approaches even while avoiding the problems these rivals face. In addition to arguing for this primary thesis, the paper also aims to suggest something about neuroethics generally: despite what some neuroethicists claim, new discoveries in neuroscience may not typically upend traditional views of morality. Rather, discoveries in neuroscience often provide us with new occasions to reflect on enduring questions about what it means to be human.

There are manifold intriguing issues located within largely unexplored borderlands of bioethics, future studies (including global risk analysis), and astrobiology. Human enhancement has for quite some time been among the foci of bioethical debates, but the same cannot be said about its global, transgenerational, and even cosmological consequences. In recent years, discussions of posthuman and, in general terms, postbiological civilization(s) have slowly gained a measure of academic respect, in parallel with the renewed interest in the entire field of future studies and the great strides made in understanding of the origin and evolution of life and intelligence in their widest, cosmic context. These developments promise much deeper synergic answers to questions regarding the long-term future of enhancement: how far can it go? Is human enhancement a further step toward building a true postbiological civilization? Should we actively participate and help shape this process? Is the future of humanity “typical” in the same Copernican sense as our location in space and time is typical in the galaxy, and if so, can we derive important insights about the evolutionary pathways of postbiological evolution from astrobiological and Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (SETI) studies? These and similar questions could be understood as parts of a possible unifying research program attempting to connect cultural and moral evolution with what we know and understand about their cosmological and biological counterparts.

In recent years, significant efforts have been made toward elucidating the potential of the human brain. Spanning fields as disparate as psychology, biomedicine, computer science, mathematics, electrical engineering, and chemistry, research venturing into the growing domains of cognitive neuroscience and brain research has become fundamentally interdisciplinary. Among the most interesting and consequential applications to international security are the military and defense community’s interests in the potential of cognitive neuroscience findings and technologies. In the United States, multiple governmental agencies are actively pursuing such endeavors, including the Department of Defense, which has invested over $3 billion in the last decade to conduct research on defense-related innovations. This study explores governance and security issues surrounding cognitive neuroscience research with regard to potential security-related applications and reports scientists’ views on the role of researchers in these areas through a survey of over 200 active cognitive neuroscientists.

One debate in contemporary bioethics centers on whether the development of cognitive enhancement technologies (CETs) will hasten the need for moral enhancement. In this article we provide a new argument in favor of pursuing these enhancement technologies together. The widespread availability of CETs will likely increase population-level cognitive diversity. Different people will choose to enhance different aspects of their cognition, and some won’t enhance themselves at all. Although this has the potential to be beneficial for society, it could also result in harms as people become more different from one another. Aspects of our moral psychology make it difficult for people to cooperate and coordinate actions with those who are very different from themselves. These moral failings could be targeted by moral enhancement technologies, which may improve cooperation among individuals. Moral enhancement technologies will therefore help society maximize the benefits, and reduce the costs, associated with widespread access to cognitive enhancements.

This section provides reactions to current and emerging issues in bioethics.

We discuss the importance of cognitive abnormalities in unipolar depression, drawing the distinction between “hot” (emotion-laden) and “cold” (emotion-independent) cognition. “Cold” cognitive impairments are present reliably in unipolar depression, underscored by their presence in the diagnostic criteria for major depressive episodes. There is good evidence that some “cold” cognitive abnormalities do not disappear completely upon remission, and that they predict poor response to antidepressant drug treatment. However, in many studies the degree of impairment is moderately related to symptoms. We suggest that “cold” cognitive deficits in unipolar depression may in part be explicable in terms of alterations in “hot” processing, particularly on tasks that utilize feedback, on which depressed patients have been reported to exhibit a “catastrophic response to perceived failure.” Other abnormalities in “hot” cognition are commonly observed on tasks utilizing emotionally valenced stimuli, with numerous studies reporting mood-congruent processing biases in depression across a range of cognitive domains. Additionally, an emerging literature indicates reliable reward and punishment processing abnormalities in depression, which are especially relevant for hard-to-treat symptoms such as anhedonia. Both emotional and reward biases are strongly influenced by manipulations of the neurochemical systems targeted by antidepressant drugs. Such a pattern of “hot” and “cold” cognitive abnormalities is consistent with our cognitive neuropsychological model of depression, which proposes central roles for cognitive abnormalities in the generation, maintenance, and treatment of depressive symptoms. Future work should examine in greater detail the role that “hot” and “cold” cognitive processes play in mediating symptomatic improvement following pharmacological, psychological, and novel brain circuit-level interventions.

The prospect of being able to take safe and effective drugs to improve mental functioning is becoming a reality. With the potential for widespread use of cognitive enhancers by large sectors of the population, this article discusses the rationale behind the development of these drugs and how society might benefit from them. Important ethical questions and scenarios are also raised. Scientists are urged to explore the implications of their work and engage in active debate with a wide range of interested stakeholders about the ethical and moral consequences of these new technologies to ensure maximal benefit with minimal harm.