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Enduring Questions and the Ethics of Memory Blunting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2017

JOSEPH VUKOV
JOSEPH VUKOV*
Affiliation:
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGOjvukov@luc.edu
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Abstract:

Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival approaches even while avoiding the problems these rivals face. In addition to arguing for this primary thesis, the paper also aims to suggest something about neuroethics generally: despite what some neuroethicists claim, new discoveries in neuroscience may not typically upend traditional views of morality. Rather, discoveries in neuroscience often provide us with new occasions to reflect on enduring questions about what it means to be human.

Keywords

memoryneuroethicscognitive enhancementnarrative identitymemory modification
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , Summer 2017 , pp. 227 - 246
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2017 

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