This chapter delves into the question of the impact of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions on private contractual relations. It opens with a discussion of the characterisation of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions as potential legal or factual impediments to the performance of contractual obligations. A detailed analysis of the case law follows, bringing to the fore some degree of reluctance on the part of judicial authorities to allow operators to suspend the performance of their contractual obligations or to terminate contractual relations on account of their exposure to extraterritorial or secondary sanctions, at least in the absence of sanctions or force majeure contractual clauses. The chapter also explores the potential tension between such sanctions, on the one hand, and measures – commonly referred to as blocking statutes – enacted by states or by the EU to thwart their effects, on the other hand. A discussion, in this respect, of the relevant case law reveals a quest for a balance between policy objectives and economic soundness and shows the existence of incongruent views on the compatibility of sanctions clauses with blocking statutes.

Sanctions are intrinsically complex. Implementation of sanctions regulations often entails navigating an extremely dynamic environment consisting of numerous restrictions and prohibitions, difficulties in interpretation, inconsistent measures adopted by imposing jurisdictions and countermeasures. This has been evident following the sanctions against Russia, often described as unprecedented in scale. The more frequent resort to sanctions further means that an increasing number of international contractual relationships are affected. Financial institutions operating globally are particularly impacted. This is exacerbated by the use of secondary sanctions which remain a controversial foreign policy tool and even subject to countermeasures, for example, blocking statutes. Consequently, financial institutions and other economic operators with an international presence, torn between two conflicting regimes, face an unsolvable legal dilemma. This uncertainty extends to the termination of contracts involving persons or activities subject to secondary sanctions. Although in most cases international (financial) contracts contain sanctions clauses (often under force majeure provisions), it remains unclear whether these can be relied on, especially where the institution’s own jurisdiction opposes secondary sanctions. This chapter presents in more detail what are the practical challenges in sanctions implementation. It focuses on financial institutions and provide recommendations on how such challenges could be addressed.

A remedy is specific when the plaintiff seeks to get the court to coerce the defendant into doing (or not doing) a particular thing. The word ‘coercion’ is used advisedly. The court orders the defendant to do (or not to do) the particular thing, and if the defendant refuses to comply, the court may use measures such as imprisonment, sequestration and fines to encourage compliance with its order. The two most important examples of specific relief in Australia are the decree of specific performance and the injunction. This chapter will consider specific performance, and the next chapter will consider injunctions. Specific performance relates to ordering the defendant to comply with the terms of a contract, but injunctions may be ordered across private law and beyond. Specific performance is exclusively equitable, and generally operates in relation to a common law cause of action; namely, breach of contract.

This chapter argues that, even if emerging economies actively promote hybrid procedures and workouts and they create a simplified insolvency framework for micro- and small enterprises (MSEs), ordinary insolvency proceedings will still play a significant role in the economy. On the one hand, they will serve as the primary mechanism for the reallocation of assets of nonviable medium and large enterprises (MLEs). On the other hand, formal reorganization procedures can still be relevant for viable MLEs unable to complete a workout or hybrid procedure due to the lack of trust on the debtor’s management team or the need to use some provisions exclusively available in formal insolvency proceedings. Therefore, emerging economies should make sure to improve the efficiency of their ordinary insolvency proceedings. Nonetheless, they cannot adopt the type of complex procedure heavily supervised by courts existing in countries with strong institutional environments. Instead, they should design a procedure requiring a minimum involvement of courts. The chapter explains how this goal can be achieved while enhancing the attractiveness of ordinary insolvency proceeding for debtors and creditors.

Legal technologies using AI-augmented algorithms to translate the purpose of a law into a specific legal directive can be used to produce self-driving contracts, that is, a contract which instead of relying on a human referee to fill gaps, update, or reform the provisions of the contract, uses data-driven predictive algorithms to do so instead. Self-driving contracts are not simply science fiction; not only are self-driving contracts possible, they are in fact already with us.

This chapter investigates how digitization changes the internal organization of firms. Gig economy platforms and freelancing agencies are rapidly taking over market share changing our very definition of a “firm,” whereas those who still work for traditional firms increasingly rely on virtual tools and external digital platforms to coordinate and communicate. Similarly, many of the firm’s other production activities may be outsourced to external providers, including inputs, manufacturing, assembly, logistics, marketing, and even R&D. We explore the emerging nature of the firm if much of its activities are carried out by other organizations, and pinpoint the key characteristics that determine what activities firms may want to continue in-house and which activities they can conveniently use digital markets and platforms to pursue.

This chapter responds to leading arguments about contract remedies, including the theory of efficient breach, contract interpretation, rules of disclosure (or permitting nondisclosure), consideration, and other topics in contract law. It shows how little progress the law-and-economics movement has made in understanding most areas of contract law, despite the obvious connections between contracts and economics.

Summary: Amidst high default rates, how did moneylenders recover unpaid loans? They had two options. One was to recover loans informally through private negotiations with borrowers. The other was to execute written contracts and revert to courts to enforce these contracts. This chapter analyses the history of courts as well as land laws, contract laws and credit surveys to examine the costs incurred by lenders to enforce different types of contracts in the unregulated market. Judicial proceedings were expensive in colonial India and often exceeded the size of loans. The chapter records a loan upgrading process in which lenders attached different types of contracts depending on the stage of default and reimbursed the costs of enforcing these contracts by charging higher interest rates. For small loans in high-risk areas, enforcement was through private negotiations and conditions harsh. These findings suggest an inverse relationship between transaction costs and equity in credit markets.

In most modern, wealthy societies, businessmen and women exploit the advantages that the formal legal process can afford. When transacting across the market, they draft contracts that detail contingencies and specify terms that courts will enforce. When cross-market transactions grow too expensive, they integrate vertically. Using the formal legal process, they combine the contracting parties into one unit.

Chapter five demonstrates how the ambition to preserve the past in song and stone leads to the hope of securing a stable sense of the future in the poetry of Pindar and the tragedies of Aeschylus. Here we see how the mere image of writing becomes a vehicle in epinician and tragic poetry not only for imagining systems of memorialization and justice, but also for questioning the systems thus imagined.

Over the last ten years, implicit consent has become one of the major points of contention in the debate about the propriety of class, mass and collective arbitration. The notion of implicit consent is critical to the development of large-scale arbitral proceedings because it allows multiple disputes to be heard at a single time, in a single forum, even if the relevant arbitration agreements are silent regarding the possibility of joint action by the claimants. The issue arises in the context of both international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration.

The divisive nature of the debate suggests that the controversy about implicit consent will continue so long as the discussion continues to be framed in its present terms. However, it may be possible to advance the conversation by expanding the nature of the analysis. Rather than focusing on implicit consent as a matter of treaty or contract interpretation, it might be beneficial to consider implicit consent from a systemic rather than individual perspective. This chapter therefore applies a dispute system design (DSD) analysis to the question of implicit consent. In particular, this discussion considers whether and to what extent the concept of ""regulatory litigation"" (defined herein as including both judicial and arbitral procedures) can be used to justify use of implicit consent as a means of addressing unanticipated risk, including unanticipated procedural risk.

The discussion proceeds as follows. First, Section II considers how regulatory litigation operates and why an analytical framework based on unanticipated risk might be necessary or useful in the context of large-scale arbitration. Section III then describes what constitutes unanticipated risk in disputes involving class, mass and collective injuries and how those issues affect dispute system design in international commercial and investment settings. Section IV addresses some of the criticisms of implicit consent and regulatory litigation by considering the nature of class, mass and collective claims, while Section V considers how implicit consent and regulatory litigation operate to overcome some of the special problems associated with transnational regulatory disputes. Section VI concludes the chapter with a number of forward-looking observations.

This chapter explores two key concepts in contract law. First, it identifies the parties to a contract and the rules that help in that process. In particular, the doctrines of privity and agency, which assist with determining who incurs rights and obligations under a contract, are discussed. Second, the chapter considers the terms of a contract, including how to identify, incorporate and interpret them. Specific attention is paid to the various types of contract terms and how they should be interpreted.