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This chapter describes the journey that the scientific assessment travels from author nomination through to the drafting and reviewing of the emerging report, and explores the social scientific order that structures and imprints on the IPCC’s writing of climate change through the process. It is in the initial stages of the scientific assessment, in the government nomination and author selection processes, that asymmetries in global knowledge of climate change and their effects become apparent. While developed countries have institutionalised processes for identifying and nominating experts, the majority of developing countries do not submit any author nominations. Once compiled, it is scientific conventions and measures of authority that are used to select and appoint the expertise necessary to fulfil the government approved outline of the report. However, when these activities are situated in broader patterns and practices of knowledge production, it becomes apparent that these reproduce the structures and exclusions of the existing global knowledge economy. These asymmetries are also apparent in the order of relations in the author teams and the submission of government review comments, which reduces the space for more diverse understandings and knowledges of climate change that are relevant to and reflect the interests and needs of all IPCC member governments. The IPCC has attempted to address these asymmetries through selection criteria and other mechanisms to shape the social order of authorship, which to date have proven more successful in broadening gender representation than ensuring the full participation of developing country authors in the assessment.
The feeling of shame (aischunē) is a dramatic key of the Gorgias, notably revealed by Callicles, who accuses both the master of rhetoric Gorgias and Polus of surrendering to Socrates’ refutation out of shame, before yielding himself to the feeling he declared himself immune to. But shame is not only a literary pattern in the dialogue: its function is closely connected to the kind of refutation of each interlocutor. It can be minimally said that shame is a natural effect of refutation, and optimally that it is an essential lever for Socrates to make his interlocutors acknowledge their deep moral commitments. This chapter aims at distinguishing several levels, rather than kinds, of shame among the interlocutors of the Gorgias: shame as sensitivity to others’ opinion, shame as an indication of the beliefs and values we are committed to, and shame as a potential step towards a better understanding of the real good. Though these levels sometimes overlap in the narrative, such distinctions may aid in understanding the role of shame for each interlocutor. Shame remains, for Plato, an ambiguous emotion, which must be used in a certain way to perform purification of wrong opinions.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the present book, by outlining its objectives, providing a working definition for ritual, and introducting the concept of the ritual perspective. The chappter also introduces the conventions used in this book and overviews its contents.
Informality has long been valued in England, and this is true of the political process as well as the institution of the judiciary. In both cases, it is assumed that the senior figures will have absorbed unwritten conventions and will by osmosis naturally understand their respective role in the UK constitution. Much is now starting to change, at least as far as the English judiciary is concerned. It is, first, argued that informal judicial institutions did not become redundant when the separation of powers was formally introduced with a program of modernization of the judiciary in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Selected illustrations of persisting informal judicial institutions are then discussed in relation to the deliberative processes in senior courts; to judicial selection and appointments; and to the disciplinary process. Second, informal judicial institutions are deeply connected with the UK constitutional tradition. The Brexit litigation laid bare the challenges of containing political behavior within certain boundaries, and the unwritten conventions which have bound the judiciary and the executive might now be instinctively understood and shared by only one of these two parties.
How should we perceive the relationship between Athenians and Boiotians in the Archaic and Classical periods (550–323 BCE)? Previous scholarship regarded it as rife with hostility, perpetually locked in mutual fear, only rarely interspersed with times of peace or alliance. In this introduction, the speech given by the Boiotian general Pagondas prior to the Battle of Delion (424 BCE) will be used to argue that his arguments about moralistic behaviour, commemoration and borderland interaction between the neighbours were an exception, rather than the rule, unlike conclusions of previous scholars. Following this speech, the chapter turns to a description of the geographical layout of both regions and how these were intertwined and connected. After this description, the three themes of the book – norms of interstate relations, geopolitical considerations and commemorative practices – are elaborated upon to show what the current state of scholarship on these issues is. It stresses that human experience and nature are complex and multifocal and should therefore treated as such, rather than aim for an overarching framework to capture the lived experience.
Narratives and conventions have received considerable attention in recent discussions of the valuation of financial assets. Narratives and conventions, however, can only be effective to the extent that they attract and persuade audiences, and this article makes the case for paying more attention to those audiences. In particular, the article argues that financial assets can only be established as assets if there is a group of potential investors that has been persuaded to accept them as such: to take them seriously as potential investments. The article coins the term asset circles to refer to such groups and supports the argument with a discussion of venture capital and its role in the production of unicorns: private companies with extraordinary valuations. Venture capital firms may be thought of as value entrepreneurs, and much of the venture capital process is oriented towards constructing both value narratives for the companies they invest in and asset circles prepared to accept those value narratives. Their aim in these processes is a profitable exit, in which the venture capital firm converts its investment back into cash at a considerable profit through either an acquisition or a flotation.
Constitutions come in shapes and sizes. What do we actually mean by a constitution? Does this conception encompass all fundamental legal practices and norms for organising political societies’ legal and leadership systems – commonly denoted as ‘small c constitutions’? Or are we only referring to the so-called ‘large C’ constitutions: the official, formal legally binding document that countries proclaim as ‘Constitution. This chapter explores the different concepts, definitions and elements thereof. Whatever the definition or character of the document, a constitution will have to have a higher status than other forms of written law, Hans Kelsen held, otherwise it would not be a real constitution. Does that always hold true. The chapter also discusses constitutions as a belief system, and constitutionalism.
In this chapter we start by defining an intergenerational game and its equilibria. We then discuss conventions of behavior, their relationship to intergenerational-game equilibria, and what it takes to make such conventions stable. This is followed by describing the relationship between our use of the term “social learning” and what standard economic theory interprets it to mean. At the end of the chapter we discuss two other types of games, dynastic games (Anderlini, Gerardi, and Laguno, 2008) and overlapping generations games (Kandori, 1992), which also have generational structures.
This is a book on advice, its importance for decision making, and its influence on the evolution of conventions of behavior. The idea is simple. As societies progress, old generations of social agents die and are replaced by new ones. We are interested in what happens in this transition as the old guard instructs the new arrivals about the wisdom of their ways. Do new entrants listen to and follow the advice of their elders or dismiss it? Is intergenerational advice welfare-improving or can it be destructive? Many times wise advice is rejected only to have new generations repeat the mistakes of their parents instead of learning from them. The advice offered from one generation to the next allows for a type of social learning that leads to the creation of conventions of behavior.
With reelection secure, Lincoln calls for US House approval of Thirteenth Amendment, and campaign launched in early 1865 to win passage. Lincoln also suggests Reconstruction policy may change when war is over, and efforts to enact Reconstruction legislation is revived. Black political convention in New Orleans in January 1865 calls for political and legal equality, but also reveals tensions within free black community. Tennessee convention, although contentious, drafts amendments to state constitution abolishing slavery and creating loyalist government, but refuses to implement racial equality, despite petition from black Tennesseans. US House passes Thirteenth Amendment in late January.
Under Andrew Johnson’s policy, Mississippi begins process of Reconstruction, while governments of Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana extend and solidify their authority. Freedpeople mobilize and organize to articulate and instantiate freedom, underscored by black convention in Nashville in August 1865 that calls for political and legal equality. Mississippi Reconstruction convention in August is the first such convention held by unreconstructed state under Johnson’s policy. Convention highlighted by acrimonious debate over abolition of slavery. Some delegates express view – articulated by conservative Unionists – that Emancipation Proclamation had only freed slaves but had not abolished slavery, and that Mississippi is under no obligation to abolish slavery as a condition of restoration to the Union. Mississippi abolishes slavery, but process bodes ill for Johnson’s policy.
In protecting the marine environment from vessel-source oil pollution, compensation for victims of damage is of great importance. International conventions regarding compensation for such damage have been adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. This article analyses the extent to which South Africa has implemented the provisions of these international conventions into its domestic laws and identifies issues that remain in the South African legal system. The article reveals that, although South Africa has improved its legal system for compensation for damage from vessel-source oil pollution, claimants in respect of damage from large vessel-source persistent oil pollution and vessel-source bunker oil pollution are still not adequately compensated. This article finds that acceding to the 1996 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, the 2001 Bunker Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol would be of great interest and benefit to South Africa.
Lockeans regard taxation as a—perhaps sometimes permissible—infringement of moral property entitlements. This essay discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth and the limits of the conventionalist reply of Murphy and Nagel to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent of the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. Because taxation can be a part of property conventions, taxation as such is not an infringement of moral property entitlements. But the essay will also argue that some taxation—excessive taxation—does infringe on moral property entitlements. This is because the moral rationale for property conventions sets some standards for what owners should be entitled to, and so excessive taxation will infringe upon moral entitlements that are partly not convention-based.
Conventions are ubiquitous in human life. Conventions are certain regularities in human actions and interactions, such as commonly observed practices, customs, and traditions. Conventions also reflect the less observable, namely, the underlying beliefs and implicit theories about the world that people come to share. They are often taken as conventional wisdom or common sense. What is attempted in the chapter is an exploration of conventions as knowledge commons; conventions will be presented as the necessary consequence of the human predicament of decision making in the face of uncertainty given the human ability to imagine, learn and communicate. The exploration of the nature of convention attempted here turns upside down the theory of the dominant tradition in economics, focusing on the logic of choice, taking as given the ends and means. Instead, we take the logic of choice as given (as non-problematic) and focus on how human beings cope with uncertainty (with the knowledge problem).
With the digital revolution of the turn of the century, fast internet, widespread digital and mobile devices such as tablets, smart watches, smartphones and the increasing functionality of the web-based tools that we use have combined to bring some amazing geographical technologies into our homes and classrooms. Tools such as Google Earth, handheld GPS units and mobile smartphones have changed the way geography teachers bring the world to our students, and the smartphone, tablet, virtual reality (VR) and whatever technology is coming next will continue to make the subject even more relevant and useful to students. The Australian Curriculum: Geography and all state syllabi require geography students to use geospatial technologies from early primary school onwards, so interest in geospatial tools is at its highest and these tools will only become more widespread in geography as these trends continue. All this background information brings us to you and your geography teaching. Through this chapter, we will explore the following questions: ● Why should you use geospatial tools in your classroom? ● What geospatial tools are appropriate? ● What will you do with your students to help them use these tools effectively to enhance their geographical learning?
The introductory chapter describes the notation, concepts, and conventions in relativity theory that is used in this problem book. The main purpose of this chapter is to help the reader to relate to the notation and conventions used in textbooks at hand.
Chapter 3 examines the intriguing question of how contrasting pragmatic data is possible. We argue that not every instance of interaction can be contrastively examined – rather we need to identify our tertium comparationis. In so doing, it is fundamental to consider the phenomenon of conventionalisation, i.e. the degree of recurrence of a particular pragmatic phenomenon in the language use and evaluations of members of a social group or a broader linguaculture. We argue that the cross-cultural pragmatician needs always to consider whether the phenomena to be compared are sufficiently conventionalised in the respective linguacultures or not. We discuss various situations, such as lingua franca contexts, in which conventionalisation can be a particularly complex issue to consider. We point out that conventionalisation manifests itself in two intrinsically interrelated types of language use, namely, convention and ritual, which play an important part in our analytic framework.
Section 4 of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (EPM), “Political Society,” treats a seemingly eclectic collection of subjects. A key to understanding this section lies in Hume’s understanding of the relationship between history, context, and politics. One of the most significant changes he made to his presentation of the political virtues when he recast it for EPM was to drop the conjectural history that had figured prominently in the account he published in the Treatise. This change reflected his deep appreciation of the importance of history and context in the development of conventions of political society and sharpened his critique of social contract theory and republican political thought. On Hume’s account, all of the virtues necessary for life in society are valued for their utility. However, though humans share a universal need for rules to govern their interactions, the specific rules that emerge in particular contexts are rarely objectively necessary. The conventions of political society are not the products of rational calculation but, instead, often arise from historical accidents and develop through a process of habituation. For this reason, the conventions of any particular society, even those that promote universal interests, can only be fully understood contextually.
This paper examines the perceptual and reasoning processes that underpin regularities in behaviour. A distinction is made between situations as they are, or as described by an omniscient external observer, and situations as agents see or frame them. Different frames can stem from differences in culture, experience and personality, as well as from other context-specific factors. Drawing upon David Lewis’s Convention (1969), I show that consistency between reasoning and experience does not preclude individuals from understanding the same state of affairs differently, and that agents’ beliefs about others’ beliefs may well be wrong. As a result, cases may occur in which conventions are sustained by false but mutually consistent and self-confirming beliefs.