A typical characteristic of the wine supply chain in the Old World is the significant share of cooperatives in wine-making that coexists with investor-owned firms and on-farm wine-makers. This paper analyzes the determinants of whether grape growers deliver their grapes to a cooperative winery of which they are members, sell their grapes to outside wineries, or make their own wine on their farm. Our analysis is based on data from a typical wine-producing area in Northern Italy. The explanatory variables comprise the potential prices linked to the different grape allocations and various farmer and farm characteristics. The high share of farmers delivering their grapes to cooperatives can, to a large extent, be explained by their higher price relative to one of the spot markets. On-farm wine-making is favored by larger farms and more educated farmers.

Agricultural cooperatives’ economic performance and efficiency today have great economic and social relevance. Consistent with the recent literature, this article examines wine cooperatives and compares them with wine investor-owned firms, studying their innovation capabilities, Miles and Snow strategies, and performance. A survey was conducted in all the wineries in Spain, with 339 responses. The interactions between the independent variables and the dependent variable were analyzed using the logit regression model. The study points out that cooperatives do not have fewer innovation capabilities, nor are they more inefficient, than investor-owned firms, although the factors that modulate their economic performance are different. (JEL Classifications: L66, M10, P13, Q13)

Credit unions currently serve over 110 million members in the United States. This is surprising, given the challenges associated with forming cooperatives. This paper explains how grants were used to overcome these challenges and create the modern credit union sector. Edward Filene, a wealthy 20th-century department store owner, provided philanthropic funding and technical expertise to early credit unions, resulting directly in the creation of 26,000 American credit unions over a 45-year period. Filene's leadership helped overcome the various social dilemmas associated with creating cooperatives, reforming institutions, and establishing an institutional framework that enables and supports cooperatives.

Hundreds of indigenous Mayo ejidatarios became members of the SICAE (Sociedad de Interés Colectivo Agrícola Ejidal) sugarcane cooperative in North-West Mexico in the 1930s, gaining control of irrigated lands and marginalising non-members, called ‘individualists’, by the 1940s. This article focuses on how indigenous individualists of Los Goros and El Teroque ejidos navigated the SICAE's control of water and attempts to annex their lands. Mayo individualists’ resistance to corrupt ejidal leadership and the SICAE cooperative allowed them to influence local water development decisions. These individualist Mayo experiences exemplify how hydraulic social mobilisation became an indigenous people's strategy of survival in mid-twentieth-century Mexico.

We build on Hart and Holmstrom (2010) to analyze the strategic choice of organizational form among wine producers. They claim that a firm's organizational form, when agreed upon competitively, conditions the sense of entitlement of the involved parties. The sense of entitlement determines their feeling of grievance for the outcome of the contract and, if so, their shading efforts by partially withholding consummate performance, creating deadweight losses. We consider two main organizational forms: non-integration, where growers interact in the winemaking process and can highlight the quality of their individual contributions, and integration, where individual contributions to the process may not be explicitly acknowledged and the winemaker cannot exert quality control over the production chain. We present a formal coordination model that illustrates how cooperatives and private firms can coexist within a market. Furthermore, given the reasonable parameter constraints, it illustrates how an integrated cooperative can obtain a higher social surplus than a non-integrated private firm. (JEL Classifications: C72, L22, L66)

In comparison with other organizational forms, cooperatives have been found to offer poor product quality and suffer from low reputation. The main reasons discussed in the literature are information asymmetries, which leads to adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as the absence of profit orientation due to poorly specified and diluted property rights. However, although, in reality, many cooperatives indeed perform poorly, and some are apparently able to completely avoid or at least reduce the problems that are considered prototypical for this hybrid organizational form. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics required to reduce the problems resulting from poorly specified property rights and information asymmetries and, hence, to successfully compete in the market. The data we use to identify the characteristics that separate “good” and “bad” cooperatives encompass 136 organizations in Austria, Germany, and northern Italy. Our logistic regression estimations show that older and larger cooperatives (in terms of acreage) have a significantly higher probability to be listed in at least one of two highly respected wine guides. Moreover, German cooperatives have a significantly lower probability of being listed than either Austrian or northern Italian cooperatives. The findings suggest that differences in performance can be explained by the management of cooperatives. (JEL Classifications: D23, D82, D86, J54, L22, L25, L66, P13, Q13)

This article examines the survival rates of cooperatives in the French wine industry. Traditional theory claims that cooperatives are inefficient and consequently are prone to failure, but recent literature suggests a higher resilience. Can cooperatives cope better? We find that French wine cooperatives survive longer than corporations. This result is robust in semi-parametric and parametric models, even when we control for mergers and acquisitions. The higher survival rate of wine cooperatives seems to be associated with their ability to pass changes in their business environments on to their members. (JEL Classifications: C41, G30, Q13)

The paper presents the implications of farmer-owned processing cooperatives for pricing in the catfish industry and tests hypotheses about the nature of price transmission in the catfish industry. The results of the linear feedback model indicate that causal relationships exist between farm and wholesale prices in the catfish industry. The direction of causality for both frozen and processed whole catfish run from farm to wholesale level.

A credit scoring function incorporating statistical selection criteria was proposed to evaluate the credit worthiness of agricultural cooperative loans in the Fifth Farm Credit District. In-sample (1981-1986) and out-of-sample (1988) prediction performance of the selected models were evaluated using rank transformation discriminant analysis, logit, and probit. Results indicate superior out-of-sample performance for the management oriented approach relative to classification of unacceptable loans, and poor performance of the rank transformation in out-of-sample prediction.

Payment arrangements among members of a cooperative play a critical role in the performance of the cooperative. The impact of three payment systems is assessed for Florida sugarcane cooperatives through a bi-level programming model which incorporates both individual and collective behavior.

The judiciary has relied on a firm's market share to evaluate the presence of monopoly power for a Sherman Act monopolization violation. However, an allegation that a firm's market share constitutes monopoly power may be refuted by evidence that there exists a contestable market. Contestable market theory shows that there is no monopoly power where there exists a threat of entry of other firms. This theory thereby offers agricultural cooperatives, which may have a large market share by reasons of the antitrust immunity provided by the Capper-Volstead Act, an argument to overcome allegations of a Sherman Act monopolization violation.

A structural probit model is estimated to determine the change in the probability of selecting a milk handler. Cooperatives are thought to have lower prices and higher deductions than independent milk handlers and these factors reduce the probability that a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.39 and 0.32. Cooperatives are thought to have better services and an assured market and payment than independent milk handlers and these factors increase the probability that a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.20 and 0.26. This indicates that many cooperative members value monetary characteristics over non-monetary characteristics.