To gain insight into the experiences and perspectives of registered dietitians (RD) in Canada regarding their interactions with commercial actors and actions undertaken to manage these interactions.

Qualitative study using semi-structured interviews combined with a document analysis.

Quebec, Canada

RD aged ≥ 18 years (n 18)

All participants reported interacting with commercial actors during their careers, such as receiving continuing education provided or sponsored by food companies. RD in Quebec perceive these interactions as either trivial or acceptable, depending on the commercial actor or interaction type. Participants discussed how certain interactions could represent a threat to the credibility and public trust in dietitians, among other risks. They also discussed the benefits of these interactions, such as the possibility for professionals to improve the food supply and public health by sharing their knowledge and expertise. Participants reported ten mechanisms used to manage interactions with commercial actors, such as following a code of ethics (individual level) and policies such as partnerships policy (institutional level). Finally, RD also stressed the need for training and more explicit and specific tools for managing interactions with commercial actors.

RD in Quebec, Canada, may engage with commercial actors in their profession and hold nuanced perspectives on this matter. While some measures are in place to regulate these interactions, they are neither standardised nor evaluated for their effectiveness. To maintain the public’s trust in RD, promoting awareness and developing training on this issue is essential.

To identify the corporate political activity (CPA) strategies used by food industry actors during the development of two public health nutrition policies in Central America: Law #570 (taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages) in Panama and Bill #5504 (labelling and food marketing regulations) in Guatemala.

We triangulated data from publicly available information from 2018 to 2020, (e.g. industry and government materials; social media material) with semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders.

Guatemala and Panama.

Government, academia and international organisations workers in health and nutrition.

CPA strategies were categorised according to an existing internationally used taxonomy into action-based, instrumental strategies (coalition management, information management, direct involvement and influence in policy, legal action) and discursive strategies.

Instrumental strategies included the establishment of relationships with policymakers and direct lobbying against the proposed public policies. Discursive strategies were mainly criticising on the unfounded ground that they lacked evidence of effectiveness and will imply negative impacts on the economy. The industry pointed at individuals for making their own food choices, in order to shift the focus away from the role of its products in contributing to ill health.

We provide evidence of the political practices used by the food industry to interfere with the development and implementation of public health nutrition policies to improve diets in Central America. Policymakers, public health advocates and the public should be informed about those practices and develop counterstrategies and arguments to protect the public and policies from the vested interests of the food industry.

To assess corporate electoral campaign contributions from industries related to sugary drinks production and the characteristics of the elected officials financed by the sector.

Cross-sectional analysis of electoral campaign contributions from corporations related to sugary drinks production (sugary drink industries and sugary drink input industries) to candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil.

Elections to the 55th Congress (2015–2019), held in October 2014.

Candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil.

Forty-nine companies or corporate groups that produce sugary drinks and fifty-two corporations that produce inputs for sugary drinks manufacturing contributed to electoral campaigns of candidates in the 2014 Election. Contributions from this industry sector represented 7·3 % of all corporate contributions and helped finance 11·7 % of the candidates and 46·2 % of the elected officials. The transnationals Ambev and Coca-Cola were the first and second biggest donors, respectively. Revenues mediated by political parties, from sugary drink industries and from corporate members of some industry associations (Abir, Unica and CitrusBR), were more prevalent. Among elected officials, a significant association was found between being financed by the sector and representing the south-east region, having higher education level and referring themselves as being professional politicians. In the multivariate model, financed candidates were 27 % more likely to be elected.

Corporations related to sugary drinks production have contributed to the electoral campaigns of almost half of the Federal Deputies in Brazil in 2014. This possibly facilitates access to decision-makers and could help buy influence on legislative proposals, including health-related food policies.

To analyse the process for the development and implementation of mandatory nutritional warning labels in Uruguay, in order to inform future nutrition policy making and strategic engagement by public health actors.

The study design drew on policy analysis methodology and case study research methodology. Two main sources of information were selected and analysed for the current study: eighteen official documents from the Uruguayan government and 259 news reports, published between June 2017 and February 2021.

Uruguay, Latin America.

The Uruguayan Ministry of Public Health led a cross-sectoral working group composed of diverse governmental stakeholders, international organisations and the academia to develop the front-of-package nutrition labelling policy. A robust evidence-based approach, based on rigorous scientific knowledge generated in the country, was followed. However, changes in the systemic governing coalition as a consequence of a change in government led to a delay in the entry into force and changes in the regulation. The food industry was the main opponent to the warning label regulation and relied on widely reported corporate political activities to influence the policy process: information and messaging, legal action, policy substitution, opposition, fragmentation and destabilisation.

Key insights to inform future policy action in Uruguay and other jurisdictions were derived. Results stressed the importance of an evidence-based approach for policy design and the early engagement with actors from all the political system.

To assess the strategies, practices and arguments used by the industry to lobby legislators against sugary drinks taxation in Brazil.

We performed a content analysis of arguments put forward by sugary drink and sugar industries against sugary drinks taxation, using the framework developed by the International Network for Food and Obesity/Non-Communicable Diseases Research, Monitoring and Action Support to assess corporate political activity of the food industry.

Two public hearings held in 2017 and 2018 in the Brazilian Legislature.

Representatives from two prominent industry associations – one representing Big Soda and the other representing the main sugar, ethanol and bioelectricity producers.

The ‘Information and messaging’ and ‘Policy substitution’ strategies were identified. Five practices were identified in the ‘Information and messaging’ strategy (four described in the original framework and an additional practice, ‘Stress the environmental importance of the industry’). Mechanisms not included in the original framework identified were ‘Stress the reduction of CO2 emissions promoted by the industry’; ‘Question the effectiveness of regulation’; ‘Suggest public-private partnerships’; ‘Shift the blame away from the product’ and ‘Question sugary drinks taxation as a public health recommendation’. No new practices or mechanisms to the original framework emerged in the ‘Policy substitution’ strategy.

The strategies and practices are used collectively and complement each other. Arguments herein identified are in line with those reported in other countries under different contexts and using different methodologies. Future research should address whether and under what conditions lobbying from this industry sector is effective in the Brazilian Legislature.

To understand if, and how, Australian ultra-processed food industry actors use Twitter to influence food and health policy debates and produce a conceptual framework to describe such influence.

Twitter data of prominent industry actors were defined through purposive sampling and inductively coded to investigate possible influence on food and health policy debates. These are described using descriptive statistics and coded extracts.

Australia.

Twitter accounts of nine prominent ultra-processed food industry actors, including major trade associations.

Ultra-processed food industry actors actively used Twitter to influence food and health policy debates. Seven overarching strategies were identified: co-opting public health narratives; opposing regulation; supporting voluntary, co- or self-regulation; engaging policy processes and decision-makers; linking regulatory environments to the need for ongoing profitability; affecting public perceptions and value judgements; and using ignorance claims to distort policy narratives. Each lobbying strategy is underpinned with tactics described throughout and captured in a framework.

The current study creates a framework to monitor how food industry actors can use social media to influence food and health policy debates. As such, social media appears to be not only an important commercial determinant of health for brand marketing, but also an extension of lobbying practices to reshape public perceptions of corporate conduct and policy-making.

To analyse the arguments used by the food industry during the early development of the new nutrition front-of-pack labelling (FOPL) in Brazil.

A thematic qualitative analysis was performed using an inductive approach. All data were collected and analysed between December 2018 and April 2019. Data included documents published by the Brazilian government, including industry’s contributions to a technical public consultation, as well as industry material and newspaper articles.

Brazil.

Seven trade associations and one industry group.

During the early stages of the FOPL policy development, food industry actors presented themselves as legitimate actors, by highlighting their economic contribution to the country, their role in safeguarding consumers’ right to choose and their range of solutions in addressing the non-communicable disease epidemic. They also questioned the policy process by criticising the role of the Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency and the science that informed the policy. Finally, food industry actors highlighted the supposedly lack of coherence between national, regional and international policies, as well as other socio-economic risks. A small set of evidence published in non-academic, non-peer-reviewed reports was used by industry actors to support these arguments.

Collectively, these arguments reinforced the position of the food industry as a necessary part of the discussion on FOPL and shifted the blame away from unhealthy products to individual behaviours. It is crucial that public health initiatives, such as the introduction of a new FOPL, are no co-opted and negatively influenced by economic actors who may try to delay the policy process.

To identify and monitor food industry use of political practices during the adoption of nutrition warning labels (WL) in Colombia.

Document analysis of publicly available information triangulated with interviews.

Colombia.

Eighteen key informants from the government (n 2), academia (n 1), civil society (n 12), the media (n 2) and a former food industry employee (n 1).

In Colombia, the food industry used experts and groups funded by large transnationals to promote its preferred front-of-pack nutrition labelling (FOPL) and discredit the proposed warning models. The industry criticised the proposed WL, discussing the negative impacts they would have on trade, the excessive costs required to implement them and the fact that consumers were responsible for making the right choices about what to eat. Food industry actors also interacted with the government and former members of large trade associations now in decision-making positions in the public sector. The Codex Alimentarius was also a platform through which the industry got access to decision-making and could influence the FOPL policy.

In Colombia, the food industry used a broad range of political strategies that could have negatively influenced the FOPL policy process. Despite this influence, the mandatory use of WL was announced in February 2020. There is an urgent need to condemn such political practices as they still could prevent the implementation of other internationally recommended measures to improve population health in the country and abroad, nutrition WL being only of them.

To analyse the evolution of the soft drink industry’s use of self-regulation as a response to obesity and examine the motivations driving its development and the strategies used to promote it to policy makers.

We used a data set of industry documents published by the Australian Beverages Council (ABC) between 1998 and 2016. We analysed how the ABC voiced its political motivations about self-regulation and what internal nutrition policies it developed prior to its public launch of self-regulation. We also analysed two promotional strategies: funding research and writing policy submissions.

Australia.

Between 1998 and 2006, the ABC shifted from a defensive strategy that denied the role of its products in obesity to more conciliatory strategy that emphasised the role of the soft drink industry in solutions to obesity. The ABC deliberately timed the launch of its self-regulation to coincide with an international public health congress. Following its launch, the ABC funded research demonstrating the efficacy of self-regulation and wrote submissions to government nutrition policies arguing that further regulation was unnecessary.

The soft drink industry uses self-regulation to bolster its reputation and influence nutrition policy. Strategic timing plays a key role in the political influence of self-regulation.