This study aims to explore the dependencies on the cryptocurrency market using social network tools. We focus on the correlations observed in the cryptocurrency returns. Based on the sample of cryptocurrencies listed between January 2015 and December 2022 we examine which cryptos are central to the overall market and how often major players change. Static network analysis based on the whole sample shows that the network consists of several communities strongly connected and central, as well as a few that are disconnected and peripheral. Such a structure of the network implies high systemic risk. The day-by-day snapshots show that the network evolves rapidly. We construct the ranking of major cryptos based on centrality measures utilizing the TOPSIS method. We find that when single measures are considered, Bitcoin seems to have lost its first-mover advantage in late 2016. However, in the overall ranking, it still appears among the top positions. The collapse of any of the cryptocurrencies from the top of the rankings poses a serious threat to the entire market.

We measure crypto and financial literacy using microdata from the Bank of Canada’s Bitcoin Omnibus Survey. Our crypto literacy measure is based on three questions covering basic aspects of Bitcoin. The financial literacy measure we use is based on three questions covering basic aspects of conventional finance (the “Big Three”). We find that a significant share of Canadian Bitcoin owners have low crypto knowledge and low financial literacy. We also find gender differences in crypto literacy among Bitcoin owners, with female owners scoring lower in Bitcoin knowledge than male owners. We do not, however, find significant gender differences in financial literacy amongst Bitcoin owners. In contrast, non-owners show gender differences in both crypto and financial literacy.

There is substantial cross-national variation in the level of regulatory clarity surrounding cryptocurrencies. What explains these differences? And, more broadly, what drives the divergent historical development of market regulation in different jurisdictions? To answer these questions, we present a new conceptual framework centered on the concept of market legibility. This term, inspired by the sociological literature, refers to the extent to which markets are made legible to the state through standardization. We contend that state supply of, and market demand for, legibility drives the primary political-economic dynamics of market regulation. Specifically, these factors combine to produce ideal type states of legibility that correspond to both distinct stages of market development and the relative level of regulatory clarity in any one jurisdiction. This framework is utilized to conduct a comparative historical analysis of cryptocurrency regulation in the EU, US, UK, and Japan. By performing these tasks, this article corrects the common assumption that states are constantly striving to impose their authority on unwilling markets. It demonstrates instead that state and private actor preferences to make markets legible vary, conditioning, in turn, the political economy of regulatory governance.

This essay makes the case that current debates about the ‘moneyness’ of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are occurring at the incorrect scale. Rather than being some form of transnational digital money to be used alongside or compete with national fiat currencies, I argue that, instead, each cryptocurrency represents its own self-contained ‘money-world’. Put differently, a cryptocurrency is the uniquely specified unit of account and medium of exchange within the socio-technical bounds of its own blockchain. This new perspective can open new lines of intellectual dialogue and inform better policy choices for regulating cryptocurrencies.

How do applications of emergent technologies contribute to the social legitimacy of finance? To address this question, we examine a set of technologies that have received increasing industry, media, and scholarly attention over the past decade: blockchains. Harnessing the concepts of ‘moral economy’ and ‘scandal’, we identify both possibilities and limits for blockchain applications to legitimate a range of monetary and investment activities. However, we also find that a persistent individualisation of responsibility for failures and shortcomings with ‘live’ blockchain experimentation has undermined the potentially legitimating aspects of this technology. Combining a reliance on technological fixes with a persistent individualist moral economy, we conclude, works against efforts to confront head-on the tensions underpinning the on-going legitimacy crises facing finance.

Money laundering is a serious crime that is often associated with organized crime, terrorism, and other illegal activities, often by transferring them through a series of financial transactions and institutions. In this study, the researchers focused on detecting a specific type of money laundering called “smurfing”, which involves breaking up large amounts of money into smaller transactions. The growing market for banking services and the intense competition among banks has led to a shift towards electronic banking. This shift is driven by changes in the way that customers use banking services and the advancements in technology. Electronic banking offers several benefits, such as faster transaction processing and the ability to avoid waiting in line at physical branches. However, it also carries risks, including the potential for electronic payment systems to be used for money laundering. With the development of technology, money laundering can now be done through online betting and casino platforms, as well as through the buying and selling of cryptocurrencies. This article aims to explore the ways in which electronic payment systems, online gambling, and cryptocurrencies can be used to launder illegally acquired money.

Decentralized finance, including cryptocurrency and other blockchain-based applications, promises participants benefits such as financial freedom, security, privacy, and wealth accumulation. More recently, it has also offered the promise of participation, lowering financial barriers, and empowerment—especially to women, the poor, and those residing in the Global South. I argue that the rise of decentralized finance as an alternative development platform is explicitly gendered and calls for feminist analysis. I discuss how cryptocurrency-based approaches to development rest on foundations that are gendered, interacting with hierarchies of race/ethnicity and class. I also explore how they are part of a lineage of neoliberalism, leveraging neoliberal beliefs about entrepreneurialism, financial inclusion, and gender roles. The discussion further introduces the concept of neolibertarianism as an extension of neoliberal logics that advocates for bypassing states entirely in favor of private actors. The current analysis compares this new model of decentralized finance to similarly problematic development trends and assesses how it has—as of yet—failed to deliver on the promises of participation, lowering financial barriers, and empowerment. This analysis concludes with a call to action for feminist and critical scholars, encouraging further work on the topic.

The COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown pushed several groups of traders to rely on cryptocurrency as one of the chosen tools for commercial transactions. India is no exception. Because of its notorious misuses by criminal gangs, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) declared cryptocurrency as derecognized. Consequently, the Indian parliament also created a draft bill titled Banning of Cryptocurrency & Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019 (the Bill), which not only derecognizes the currency or the use of it for any commercial purposes, it also makes the investors, exchanges and agencies dealing with cryptocurrency criminally liable. Later, the Supreme Court of India in 2020 set aside the above-mentioned RBI guidelines banning cryptocurrency. But this has not nullified or suggested any amendment for the Bill. This article argues that due to this legal confusion, cryptocurrency investors, traders, exchanges and agencies, etc. have become guardian-less victims who may not be eligible to claim basic rights of victims as has been established by the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. In such a legal tangle, it is necessary to analyse the issues from cyber-victimological perspectives for providing functional suggestions for restitution of justice.

Institutional economists have analyzed permissionless blockchains as a novel institutional building block for voluntary economic exchange and distributed governance, with their unique protocol features such as automated contract execution, high levels of network and process transparency, and uniquely distributed governance. But such institutional analysis needs to be complemented by polycentric analysis of how blockchains change. We characterize such change as resulting from internal sources and external sources. Internal sources include constitutional (protocol) design and collective-choice processes for updating protocols, which help coordinate network participants and users. External sources include competitive pressure from other cryptocurrency networks. By studying two leading networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, we illustrate how conceptualizing blockchains as competing and constitutional polycentric enterprises clarifies their processes of change.

Currency is the fundamental economic technology that makes promises credible among actors within and across societies. From shells, to metals, to paper, the technology of money has continually evolved to meet the changing needs of human society. The twenty-first century is witnessing yet another evolution in the technology of money: digital currencies. Although political economy scholarship has begun to focus on digital currencies, this research has largely focused on single early examples like Bitcoin. I argue that this generally narrow focus has obscured important degrees of variation among digital currencies and, by extension, has omitted important lines of research on digital currencies as a familiar evolution in the technology of money. In this article, I revisit the history of digital currencies with explicit attention to not only economic inefficiencies but also political power structures and offer a new typology for theoretically organizing digital currencies along dimensions relevant to practitioners of political economy. I illustrate that variation along these typological dimensions produces important differences among different digital currencies and, relatedly, I explore the implications this has for digital currencies’ externalities and governance demands. Drawing on this typology, I conclude with a proposed research agenda for the political economy of digital currencies.