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We study the association of shareholder returns with liberalization in government policy during Britain's railway run-up of 1844–5. The findings sustain two main claims. First, the railway returns during the run-up were associated with the advent of liberalizing policies, especially related to free trade, enhanced transparency and governance of firms, and industry consolidation. Second, analysis of cross-sectional variation reveals higher returns to large railways in the South and Midlands of England, several of which were leading consolidators. This study is the first to report an association between policy liberalization and run-up returns and to identify consolidators as the prime beneficiaries of the liberalization.
This article deals with a fiscal reform implemented in Chile during the late 1870s, when the country was suffering a severe economic and fiscal crisis, on the eve of the War of the Pacific. In 1879, the Chilean government introduced a new set of direct levies, taxing inheritance, income and wealth, despite the historic resistance of most of the economic elites to direct taxation in a highly unequal society. The process also shows that not all the economic elite avoided direct taxation. Despite other challenges faced by any developing country in extracting taxes from its population (e.g. lack of both proper information and human capital), during c.1879-1884 collection of these new direct taxes was successful, mainly on account of the improved extractive capacity built up during the preceding decades. Yet, by the mid-1890s all direct taxes (new and old) had been either derogated or transferred to local government (in some cases after being modified). Once again, Chilean central government depended entirely on indirect taxes, with export duties on nitrate being the most important. Nitrate provides a good example of an export boom shaping taxation for the worse; rather than increasing and diversifying the sources of revenue, a dominant sector of the Chilean economic elite decided to stop paying direct taxes and to make the state entirely dependent on the cycles of the international economy. However, some members of the economic elite, although defeated in their purpose, were aware of the wide range of benefits of keeping direct taxation: social justice, financial health and less vulnerability to trade cycles. Unfortunately, the balance of power favoured elite groups with enough power to hinder direct taxation.
Academic freedom is a cornerstone of modern academic life. It is not only implied by basic liberal principles but also contributes to scientific progress and economic growth. It is therefore important to better understand what affects how free scholarly pursuits are, and to that end, we ask whether economic freedom can help explain variation in academic freedom across countries. In our case, relating the Economic Freedom of the World index and its five areas to V-Dem's index of academic freedom and its five areas reveals that the rule of law is positively and robustly related to academic freedom in all its forms. This suggests that the rule of law, in its general and broad sense, can arguably serve as a guarantor of academic freedom. Where the rule of law is weakened, academic freedom can be at risk. There are some indications that regulatory freedom is similarly related to academic freedom, but less robustly so, maybe indicating that interventionism in one policy area (economics) can breed interventionism in another (academia).
This empirical study extends the public choice literature on the allocation of death during war by examining the political economy of foreign fighter deaths in the Russo-Ukrainian War since the 24 February 2022 invasion. The study explores the roles played by various demographic factors, military institutions, and international trade relations in determining the number of foreign fighters from a variety of countries who have died in support of either Ukraine or Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Unlike other related studies, this study also investigates the importance of, and finds evidence in support of, both economic freedom and a robust democracy in shaping the choices made by individuals around the globe to venture to, and die fighting on, the battlefields of Ukraine.
How do deported migrants engage in civic and political life after being forcibly returned to their home countries? Do experiences during the migration journey impact how deportees (re)engage? We explore how extortion experienced during migration alters political and civic engagement preferences. We utilize a multi-method approach combining original survey data of Guatemalans deported from the United States and a series of qualitative deportee interviews. We find that extortion during migration has a significant direct effect on increased citizen engagement. Economic hardship exacerbated by extortion may mediate this effect. Overall, extortion experienced while migrating has long-term financial consequences for deportees, with implications for their reintegration and the broader health of civic institutions in their home countries.
James Buchanan was a fervent advocate of a non-discriminatory politics. However, he translated his views on constitutional political economy into (de jure) constitutional design in an insufficiently thoughtful way. Simply writing non-discriminatory politics into a Constitution is unlikely to have the desired effect. All Constitutional language is open to interpretation and political entrepreneurs will be ready to push interpretation in their favoured directions. The history of US Constitutional law bears this out. This does not necessarily discount Buchanan's quest for constitutionalized non-discriminatory politics. However, it does mean that it must be tempered by realistic concerns regarding constitutional design. With this in mind, I suggest that focusing on procedural, rather than substantive, Constitutional provisions may be more fruitful.
Duncan Black, like Adam Smith before him, was trained at, and taught at, the University of Glasgow. Like Smith, Black followed the Enlightenment in appreciating the importance of theory and of its empirical applications. Black sought to apply the ideas of a schedule of preferences and a conception of equilibrium, to politics, as Smith had done in economics. Black believed that his median voter theorem could generalize to a theory of politics, much as Smith’s contributions did for market economics. Black did not complete that generalization, but William Riker did offer a theory of institutional politics, designed to complete Black’s project.
Does technological change fuel political disruption? Drawing on fine-grained labor market data from Germany, this paper examines how technological change affects regional electorates. We first show that the well-known decline in manufacturing and routine jobs in regions with higher robot adoption or investment in information and communication technology (ICT) was more than compensated by parallel employment growth in the service sector and cognitive non-routine occupations. This change in the regional composition of the workforce has important political implications: Workers trained for these new sectors typically hold progressive political values and support progressive pro-system parties. Overall, this composition effect dominates the politically perilous direct effect of automation-induced substitution. As a result, technology-adopting regions are unlikely to turn into populist-authoritarian strongholds.
Many governments across the world provide extensive funding to national sports teams and individual athletes in pursuit of success at international competitions such as the Olympic Games. One factor that motivates governments to fund national sports teams is the potential to exploit the elevation in nationalistic pride that attends international sporting success. Drawing on research in the psychology of sport, this article contends that politicians can access the ‘reflective glow’ of successful athletes for their political benefit. The statistical correlation between government funding and Olympic success is explored using the basic prisoners’ dilemma to represent the decisions of two governments competing for sports success. While the analysis is simple, we argue that it sheds some light on recent examples and represents a first step in understanding this complex issue.
The philosophical debate concerning political exchange has largely been confined to debating the desirability of vote trading; where individuals can sell their votes or buy votes from others. However, I show that the vote credit systems prevalent in public choice theory entirely avoid the common objections to political exchange that afflict vote trading proposals. Namely, vote credit systems avoid equality concerns and inalienability concerns. I offer an alternative critique to formal mechanisms that encourage political exchange by drawing on the role that impartiality and impartial moral judgements play in democratic and electoral institutions.
Large migrant inflows have spurred anti-immigrant sentiment, but can small inflows have a different impact? We exploit the redistribution of migrants after the dismantling of the “Calais Jungle” in France to study the impact of the exposure to few migrants, which we estimate using difference-in-differences and instrumental variables. We find that in the presence of a migrant center (CAO), the growth rate of vote shares for the main far-right party (Front National (FN), our proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment) between 2012 and 2017 is reduced by about 12 percentage points. This effect, which crucially depends on the inflow's size, points toward the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954).
We present two models that shed light on two issues in the political economy of populism: incumbents who refuse to give up office following a democratic election; and politicians gambling with major policy shifts when their consequences are uncertain. In the democratic transition of power, common knowledge about the veracity of the election process enables citizens to threaten incumbents with protests if they attempt to retain their seats in power. If doubt over electoral integrity prevails, office-seeking incumbents sometimes reject electoral rules. In considering policy gambles, politicians supply policy shifts in response to voters and elites vying for a greater share of economic output. When the mapping from policy to outcomes is uncertain, voters opt for policy gambles, even though these are detrimental to their ex ante welfare, to redress the division of output. These models underscore the importance of institutions that address the source of each coordination failure.
As internet penetration rapidly expanded throughout the world, press freedom and government accountability improved in some countries but backslid in others. We propose a formal model that provides a mechanism that explains the observed divergent paths of countries. We argue that increased access to social media makes partial capture, where governments allow limited freedom of the press, an untenable strategy. By amplifying the influence of small traditional media outlets, higher internet access increases both the costs of capture and the risk that a critical mass of citizens will become informed and overturn the incumbent. Depending on the incentives to retain office, greater internet access thus either forces an incumbent to extend capture to small outlets, further undermining press freedom; or relieve pressure from others. We relate our findings to the cases of Turkey and Tunisia.
This paper explores Alexis de Tocqueville's thought on fiscal political economy as a forerunner of the modern school of preference falsification and rational irrationality in economic decision making. A good part of the literature has misrepresented Tocqueville as an unconditional optimist regarding the future of fiscal moderation under democracy. Yet, although he initially shared the cautious optimism of most classical economists with respect to taxes under extended suffrage, Tocqueville's view turned more pessimistic in the second volume of his Democracy in America. Universal enfranchisement and democratic governments would lead to higher taxes, more intense income redistribution and government control. Under democracy, the continuous search for unconditional equality would eventually jeopardise liberty and economic growth.
We develop a theory of state formation shedding light on the rise of the first stable state institutions in Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Our analysis suggests that the mix of adverse production conditions and unforeseen innovations pushed groups favored by old technologies to establish the state by granting political and property rights to powerless individuals endowed with new and complementary skills. Through these reforms, the elite convinced the nonelite that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public spending and, thus, to cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation. Different from the main alternative theories, we stress that: (1) group formation is heavily shaped by unforeseen shocks to the returns on both risk-sharing and innovation; (2) complementarity in group-specific skills, and not violence, is key determinant of state formation; (3) military, merchant and, especially, religious ranks favored state formation and culture accumulation.
This paper empirically investigates the effect of transnational migrants on gender equality in the country of origin measured by the share of women enrolled in the lower chamber of National Parliaments. We test for a “migration-induced transfer of norm” using panel data from 1970 to 2010 in 10-year intervals. Total international migration has a positive and significant effect on female political empowerment in countries of origin conditional on the initial female parliamentary participation in both origin and destination countries. Endogeneity issues are taken into account and results are tested under specific geo-political subsamples.
This paper investigates the long-term impact of historical missionary activity on HIV in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, missionaries were the first to invest in modern medicine in the region. On the other hand, Christianity influenced sexual beliefs and behaviors that affect the risk of contagion. We build a new geocoded dataset locating Protestant and Catholic missions in the early 20th century, as well as the health facilities they invested in, that we combine with individual-level Demographic and Health Survey data. With these data, we can address separately these two channels, within regions close to historical missionary settlements. First, we show that proximity to historical missionary health facilities decreases the likelihood of HIV; persistence in healthcare provision and safer sexual behaviors in the region explain this result. Second, we show that regions close to historical missionary settlements exhibit higher likelihood of HIV. This effect is driven by the Christian population in our sample. This suggests conversion to Christianity as a possible explanatory channel. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications addressing selection.
Are institutions a deep cause of economic growth? This paper tries to answer this question in a novel manner by focusing on within-country variation, over long periods of time, using a new hand-collected data set on institutions and the power-ARCH econometric framework. Focusing on the case of Brazil since 1870, our results suggest (a) that both changes in formal political institutions and informal political instability affect economic growth negatively, (b) there are important differences in terms of their short- versus long-run behaviour, and (c) not all but just a few selected institutions affect economic growth in the long-run.
This article studies the political activities of individual cotton farmers and cotton political action committees (PACs) by exploiting a vote to amend the 2008 Farm Bill. Using a simultaneous model, I estimate reduced form equations for donations from cotton farmers and cotton PACs using tobit models, which instrument donations in the probit vote equation to control for the hypothesized endogeneity between campaign contributions and legislative votes. I find evidence that cotton farmers, like cotton PACs, contribute to legislators representing a median cotton farming constituency. I find no evidence that contributions from cotton farmers or cotton PACs significantly affected the vote decision.
Economists commit a category mistake when they treat democratic governments as indebted. Monarchs can be indebted, as can individuals. In contrast, democracies can't truly be indebted. They are financial intermediaries that form a bridge between what are often willing borrowers and forced lenders. The language of public debt is an ideological language that promotes politically expressed desires and is not a scientific language that clarifies the practice of public finance. Economists have gone astray by assuming that a government is just another person whose impulses toward prudent action will restrict recourse to public debt and induce rational political action.