International pressures, Brexit and the resurgence of nationalism have created new divides in the regions of the United Kingdom. Brendan O’Leary examines the impact of Conservative policy in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales, focusing on how prime ministers have handled campaigns and support for Scottish independence, the ruling coalitions in Wales, and also the new post-Brexit framework and demographic pressures in Northern Ireland. The chapter ends with a dire overall evaluation of the condition of the union as a result of Conservative policy.

This chapter explores the diversity of theatre outside London in the post-war period with a particular emphasis on work produced in the four nations that make up the UK and in the regions of England. It argues that much of this work has been under-examined and undervalued, and that a persistent metropolitan bias has long distorted existing accounts of British theatre in the period. The recent re-animation of distinctive regional and national identities within the context of an increasingly fractured and unstable UK, makes the continuation of this critical approach untenable. The chapter aims to set the record straight, therefore but also to note that metropolitan bias has been similarly at work in cultural policy and the distribution of funding, with the result that audiences in some parts of the country have been much better served than others. My aim is to consider the impacts of this persistent unfairness in its multiple contexts.

Chapter 3 identifies the numerous strategies the contemporary liberal states have pursued to navigate the cross-pressures engendered by the migration trilemma during the post-Cold War period, and especially since September 11th. Contesting scholarly claims that the liberal states cannot avert unwanted immigration, its main argument is that they have considerably reconciled the tensions inherent in the trilemma by enlisting and coopting non-central state actors at the intersection of human mobility and security. Specifically, they have forged bilateral and multilateral policy agreements and devolved many of their responsibilities for implementing immigration and human mobility policy to international, subnational and private sector actors. In pursuing this multifaceted course, the immigration policies of states have converged, and their burdens in managing their immigration-related responsibilities have been partially alleviated. But in doing so, the liberal norms inspiring their once steadfast commitments to maintaining relatively open borders and safeguarding citizen and immigrant rights have been compromised.

The concept of federalism, and examples of federalism, are considered. Although, over 100 years ago, British Imperial federalists argued the empire must ‘federate or disintegrate’, the imperial federation movement did not succeed. Nor did its close relation, the ‘Home Rule All Round’ movement. Instead, the UK has become a devolved State, which transfers power from the centre without relinquishing sovereignty. The main obstacles to federalism in the UK appear to be the ‘England problem’ and parliamentary sovereignty. It has long been recognized that the disproportionate size of one federal unit can destabilize federalism by affecting the capacity of other territorial units to influence central government. However, the main obstacle lies with an insistence on preserving absolute parliamentary sovereignty in the UK. Dicey insisted that ‘limited sovereignty’ was a ‘contradiction in terms’ and that federalism was ‘absolutely foreign to the historical and, so to speak, instinctive policy of English constitutionalists.’ But this chapter argues there is no reason why sovereignty must be understood only as unlimited and indivisible. The obstacle is a lack of political will and not legal impossibility.

Unions take a variety of forms and it is not always clear what species of legal entity one is dealing with. They need not require a unitary State and may exist along a spectrum of State connectivity, from an affiliation of separate States, through to their complete fusion. This chapter examines other Unions – either past, for example Austria-Hungary, or present, such as the USA and EU. The UK Union itself only dates from 1707, is voluntary in nature, and (unlike some Constitutions) there is no legislation prohibiting secession by one part of the UK, nor any constitutional provision asserting and mandating constitutional integrity. This chapter argues it is preferable to understand the UK as a ‘Union State’ – that is, a State where the centre does not directly control every part of the territory – rather than unitary in nature, because there are different constitutional arrangements in different parts of the UK. Unions tend to do better if more elastic and less constraining. But current understandings of UK parliamentary sovereignty make such elasticity very difficult for the UK Union. The doctrine of unlimited sovereignty places an almost insurmountable barrier to resolution of issues threatening the Union today, particularly those of devolution.

The union of Scotland and England was the founding act of the UK in 1707, and consensually agreed between two sovereign parties. Scotland was never a colony of England and post-union retained considerable autonomy, including its distinct and separate legal and education systems and Church. As a result of the 1707 union, the UK Parliament (which was not simply the English Parliament enlarged) came into being. The doctrine of unlimited parliamentary sovereignty is not accepted by everyone in Scotland, where there exists an alternative Scottish tradition of popular sovereignty, and the belief that Scotland’s place in the UK Union rests on its consent. Since devolution in 1998, Scotland has developed some progressive constitutional forms, as well as more pro-European inclinations that challenge the unitary constitutional approaches of London. Brexit, however, has placed the UK union under strain, and there have been demands for a second Scottish Independence referendum. Surprisingly, despite the threat of Scottish independence, there has been little debate about what the ‘Union’ or ‘Britain’ is or should be.

Constitutionally, the twenty-first century begins in 1997 with the election of the New Labour government, a government committed to constitutional reform. Most of the New Labour reforms will probably prove to be irreversible. Indeed, the Labour government of 1997–2010 may well be more remembered for these constitutional reforms than for anything it did in the social and economic sphere. And the reforms did not end with Labour’s defeat in 2010. They were continued by David Cameron’s Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government (the first peacetime coalition since 1931), which ruled Britain between 2010 and 2015.

The legislature has been one of the central institutions in the UK’s constitutional history, a forum in which major political events occurred and decisions were taken. The legislature projects constitutional values: its practice is based on the significance of representation, accountability, transparency, deliberation, contestation, and collective action. Moreover, the UK Parliament is the focus of the fundamental norm around which the constitution is structured.

By the early twentieth century, democracy was in the ascendant. Not all observers and practitioners were enthusiastic about this development. But, whether favourable towards it or not, they came to accept the predominance of the concept that the people were the ultimate source of political authority.1 An example of a grudging acknowledgement that confirms the strength of the conceptual transition that had occurred came from the constitutional historian, William Sharp McKechnie. He observed in his 1912 work of contemporary analysis The New Democracy and the Constitution that the public pronouncements of politicians suggested ‘the triumph of Democracy in Great Britain is now assured’ McKechnie noted a tendency as common to ‘Conservatives and Liberals as’ as it was among ‘Socialists and Labour leaders’ to display ‘[a] fervent and almost servile eagerness to interpret and to execute “the people’s will”’.2

The UK is an ‘evolved’ state1 that has become a devolved state. It was created by a series of bilateral arrangements to become a ‘state of unions’.2 The centre is key to how any state develops, extending its authority over a wider geography, whether by enforcing uniformity or permitting diversity. The rationale for each union has changed over time, reflecting the changing views on how the UK should stay together as a multi-national state.

The constitutional union between England and Scotland created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and is central to our understanding of the nature of the British state today. It was a union long in the making, unveiling itself in two significant moments one century apart: the union of crowns in 1603 and of parliaments in 1707. These moments of union, which were indeed constitutional rather than merely political in nature, both signalled and helped to maintain over the following centuries, albeit in subtle ways, plural patterns of nationhood beneath the veneer of unitary statehood. The United Kingdom, which also includes Northern Ireland, that troubled relic of the Acts of Union with Ireland of 1801, has in recent times been called plurinational;1 but this is no more than a recognition of the plural national fact that has characterised the social nature of the state from its inception, albeit that the political salience of its multinational character has only in recent times come to the fore.

This chapter examines the potential impact of Brexit on the future of the Union, providing a snapshot of public opinion and attitudes as the full implications of the UK’s departure start to become clear. In the first section, an overview of devolution in the UK is provided. In the second section, data on public opinion are provided from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as consideration of attitudes to the Union in England and to Irish unification in Ireland. In the third section, the case of Northern Ireland is examined in more depth. In conclusion, it is argued that the future of the Union depends upon a combination of factors: the UK government’s policy towards Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; the economic impact of Brexit; demographic change in Northern Ireland; and attitudes in Ireland to unification.

The parameters of British literature, much like the bonds of British unionism, are becoming increasingly mutable and open to renegotiation. As a multinational state, the United Kingdom is looking more like a disunited kingdom in the wake of independence referendums, withdrawal from supranational constellations and the emergence of post-pandemic nationalisms. Given such tumultuous geopolitical developments, not least the EU referendum result of 2016, the question of whether British literature is still capable of synthesising English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish and wider transnational affiliations into a coherent whole becomes more urgent. Drawing on the diverse perspectives of major literary voices, this chapter will question the purpose and value of British literature in a divided cultural landscape and consider whether writers are anticipating the disintegration of the United Kingdom or seeking ways of reimagining a national structure of feeling.

This chapter focuses on challenges to the constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom, from the period of the breakaway of the Irish Free State through to the contemporary campaigns for Scottish independence and for a united Ireland. The centrifugal forces prompted by the Brexit referendum are explored, together with the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic and other contemporary crises. The fundamental complexities of nation-state formations within a multinational kingdom are considered. The fundamental question posed is whether the United Kingdom, as a conceptual, constitutional and cultural unit, can survive the pressures currently being brought to bear on it.