Is it consistent to maintain that human free will is incompatible with determinism in the natural world while also maintaining that it is compatible with divine universal causation? On the face of it, divine universal causation looks like a form of determinism. And the intuitions that lead to incompatibilism about free will and natural determinism also lead to incompatibilism about free will and divine determinism. W. Matthews Grant resists this conclusion. Grant contends that we can understand all of God’s activity as an exercise of divine “libertarian” free will and can construe God’s actions as nothing over and above the (created) effects brought about. I argue that Grant’s attempted reconciliation of human free will and universal divine causation fails, and on two counts. First, Grant’s account of the interaction of divine and created agency is occasionalist; second, even if we assume Grant’s account successfully avoids the charge of occasionalism, it fails to reconcile divine agency with created free agency. The latter is illustrated by exploring the nature of the determination relation required by incompatibilist, agent-causal accounts of free will.

If theological determinism is true, then everything that occurs in our world is willed by God. Since there is clearly much suffering and sin in this world, the theological determinist seems forced to accept that suffering and sin are willed by God as well. This seems to lead to a troubling conclusion concerning our ordinary reactions to extreme suffering and serious sin in the world. Plausibly, we should be horrified by sin and suffering, but it also seems that we should be thankful whenever we believe God’s will is fulfilled. This sort of double-mindedness might seem problematic, either because it is conceptually or psychologically impossible, or because it is immoral to be thankful for sin and suffering. In this chapter, I argue that the problem of double-mindedness is not as bad as it might first appear, both because such a mental state seems appropriate in certain cases even if theological determinism is false, and because thankfulness for sins will not be common even in the lives of virtuous divine determinists.

An important tradition of thinking about divine and human agency takes divine transcendence as key to reconciling human freedom with God’s universal causality. Proponents of this tradition, who often claim Aquinas as their inspiration, sometimes maintain that this “transcendence approach” (TA) offers a third way that defies classification as libertarian or compatibilist. I argue that, carefully defined, libertarianism and compatibilism are mutually exclusive and exhaustive options for those affirming free will, but that it is an open question whether a view that affirms free will alongside God’s universal causality is compatibilist or libertarian. I then consider the interesting strategies employed by proponents of TA and argue that they leave it unclear whether TA is a libertarian or compatibilist view. Finally, I argue that a consistent deployment of these strategies results in a version of TA that is clearly libertarian, but which maintains a strong view of divine sovereignty and providence.

This Introduction serves to familiarize the reader with theological determinism, explaining what the view is, why so many past and present authors have found it fascinating, and how the chapters of this volume aim to explore it. It begins with a discussion of the view itself, especially focusing on the presence or absence of divine causation and intention within the definition of theological determinism. It then turns to the issue of motivation, noting that the view has found support from religious texts, a belief in causal determinism, and commitment to certain divine attributes, such as providence, knowledge, or aseity. The view has also had its detractors, of course. Historically, most objections have been rooted in one or both of two objections: that the view would eliminate the possibility of human free will and moral responsibility, and that the view would make God the author of sin. Recent work on this topic, including work in this volume, has expanded the scope of arguments, suggesting new reasons to accept the view, and new reasons to reject it. Finally, this Introduction provides an overview of the chapters of this volume.

The problem of evil is often thought to be the single most important objection to theism. The most popular reply to (the logical version of) this objection is the Free Will Defense (FWD), but this seems to presuppose incompatibilism, and thus be unavailable to divine determinists. In this chapter I explore this worry at length. First I consider the claim, made by Steven Cowan, that FWD may be utilized even by those who deny some of the propositions it includes. I then turn to two authors who claim that compatibilists – at least compatibilists of certain types – can accept each proposition utilized in FWD. I conclude that the first defense of this claim, offered by A. A, Howsepian, is implausible, but that the second, offered by Jason Turner, does show that a certain sort of compatibilist can accept FWD. Unfortunately, I will argue, there is reason to think that many divine determinists will be wary of accepting this sort of incompatibilism. I conclude with a quick look at other options and a brief investigation of the evidential problem of evil.

In this chapter I continue the task, begun in the last chapter, of considering whether divine determinism undermines human free will. In this chapter I take up manipulation arguments. I begin by focusing on Derk Pereboom’s Four Case Argument. This argument moves from intuitions about cases in which humans are manipulated by other humans to cases in which they are determined by laws of nature, maintaining that the original intuition that the human agent was not morally responsible is preserved even when the case is modified in various ways. I propose a variant of this argument in which the final case involves divine determinism. I also consider an argument that makes a direct appeal to intuition, maintaining that it is obvious that the sort of manipulation involved in divine determinism undermines human moral responsibility. I consider replies to both arguments, noting especially replies that depend upon pointing to the radical differences between God and human manipulators. I close with an investigation of bullet biting in the context of rejecting the truth of common intuitions.

In this chapter I begin consideration of the claim that divine determinism undermines human free will. I begin with Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. This argument claims that since humans have no choice about the distant past and the laws of nature—which together determine human actions—humans likewise have no choice about any of their own actions. I argue that although some divine determinists are not threatened by this argument, a revised version of this argument does pose a threat to all divine determinists. This revised argument maintains that since humans have no choice about divine determining activity, they likewise have no choice about their own actions, which are determined but it. After laying out this revised argument, I consider several possible responses to it. In particular, I consider the reply that God’s unique causal activity allows actions to be determined while remaining contingent and the reply that divinely determined agents possess the highest sort of ability to do otherwise that is coherent. I argue that both replies fail, and briefly consider other options for the divine determinist, including semi-compatibilism and hard divine determinism.

In this conclusion of the book, I begin by offering some advice on evaluating the positions of others, especially concerning what we might think of as their willingness to reject clear and obvious intuitions we have in the defense of their positions. I especially call attention to doing so in a way that suggests that all those who reject our intuitions about divine determinism must be willing to do anything to preserve irrational religious beliefs. Intuitions, of course, are not universally shared, and the willingness to accept what others view as implausible is not limited to religious issues. I close by reviewing the challenges to divine determinism that I have explored in this work, noting what I view as the best responses to each and highlighting those that I find the most problematic.

The Introduction begins with a cursory overview of divine determinism, which will be further refined and nuanced in Chapter 1. It then provides an overview of the scope of the work. In short, this work sets out to examine the challenges, rather than the benefits, of adopting divine determinism. It does not, then, propose to settle the question of whether this view should be accepted or not, but merely attempts to ascertain how costly such an acceptance would be by an examination of arguments against this view together with an analysis of possible responses to such arguments. Finally, the Introduction provides a summary of each chapter so that readers may gain a bird’s-eye view of the work and so that those interested solely in particular arguments or issues may direct their attention to specific chapters.

One of the most difficult worries about divine determinism is that it makes God worthy of blame for all the evil in the history of the world. In this chapter, I explore this worry as an objection, which I call the blameworthiness objection, beginning with possible formulations depending upon universal moral principles, but finally settling upon a formulation taking the form of an analogical argument. I then turn to a thorough investigation of two possible replies, one based upon denying that God intends the evil of the world, the second relying on the claim that God has the moral authority to do anything to creatures. I then quickly consider five other replies to this objection, briefly outlining each and considering some possible costs that each one might impose. Finally, I outline a disjunctive reply to the original objection, which draws force from each possible reply without committing to any of them.

Divine determinists face several problems related to divine commands, the divine will, and divine blame. First, if God sometimes wills that divine commands are broken (which seems to be the case if divine determinism is true) then the original act of command seems to be deceptive. Two other problems come from further considering the conflict between divine commands and the divine will. First, if there is such a conflict, then the deliberating agent who aims to obey divine commands and fulfill the divine will seems to face a problem, and if the divine will is followed above all, then the agent seems able to justify any course of action. Second, contrition ordinarily seems to include a desire that the previous bad action had not been performed, but given divine determinism, this seems to amount to a wish that the divine will had not been fulfilled. This seems impious. The final worry to be considered is that in determining agents to perform evil actions, God seems to have lost the standing to blame and punish them for these very actions. In this chapter I investigate each of these four objections, considering possible lines of response to each.

According to many theists, God loves humans and humans ought to strive for love of God. Divine determinism threatens to overturn both of these claims. First, given the suffering and evil in the world, if divine determinism is true, then it seems we have reason to think that God does not love everyone, at least not with the sort of perfect parental love that theists often claim. Second, if divine determinism is true, then humans love God only if God determines them to do so. But it seems that love – at least union-seeking love – cannot arise in this manner. If all love of God ultimately arises because of something like divine manipulation, then love of God seems thin and worthless. In this chapter I take up both of these worries, first carefully formulating them and then articulating and examining several responses to each.

Critics of divine determinism sometimes claim that determinists make God the author of sin. This chapter takes up the question of whether this is true. I begin by disambiguating the claim, focusing on reading the charge as equivalent to the claim that God causes sin. I begin by considering a reply to this objection rooted in the claim that evil is a mere privation. According to this particular reply, sin is composed of the positive act of being (which God does cause) and a defect, which is a mere privation. This defect, the reply claims, is not caused by God, nor by an act of a human agent, but instead by a privation. I present three arguments for thinking that this reply is insufficient. I then suggest that divine determinists consider a more robust reply built off of the same analysis of evil and sin, but which claims that privations, lacking all being, cannot be caused at all.

In this chapter I explore a number of different proposals for how to define ‘divine determinism.’ I settle on one to guide the rest of the book, which was first offered by Heath White. On this account, divine determinism is the conjunction of two claims: (i) The facts about God’s will wholly determine every other contingent fact and (ii) the facts about God’s will explain every other contingent fact. I then turn to a brief overview of some motivations for divine determinism. I begin with philosophical motivations, including motivations arising from consideration of the principle of sufficient reason, divine sovereignty, divine power, divine knowledge, divine aseity, and divine providence. I then turn to motivations that are more closely tied to particular religious traditions, including ones related to prophecy, scriptural authorship, and specific scriptural passages. Finally, I investigate two different varieties of divine determinism: primary divine determinism and Edwardian divine determinism.