Is There a Third Way in the Debate over Theological Determinism?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 September 2022
An important tradition of thinking about divine and human agency takes divine transcendence as key to reconciling human freedom with God’s universal causality. Proponents of this tradition, who often claim Aquinas as their inspiration, sometimes maintain that this “transcendence approach” (TA) offers a third way that defies classification as libertarian or compatibilist. I argue that, carefully defined, libertarianism and compatibilism are mutually exclusive and exhaustive options for those affirming free will, but that it is an open question whether a view that affirms free will alongside God’s universal causality is compatibilist or libertarian. I then consider the interesting strategies employed by proponents of TA and argue that they leave it unclear whether TA is a libertarian or compatibilist view. Finally, I argue that a consistent deployment of these strategies results in a version of TA that is clearly libertarian, but which maintains a strong view of divine sovereignty and providence.
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