Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 June 2019
The problem of evil is often thought to be the single most important objection to theism. The most popular reply to (the logical version of) this objection is the Free Will Defense (FWD), but this seems to presuppose incompatibilism, and thus be unavailable to divine determinists. In this chapter I explore this worry at length. First I consider the claim, made by Steven Cowan, that FWD may be utilized even by those who deny some of the propositions it includes. I then turn to two authors who claim that compatibilists – at least compatibilists of certain types – can accept each proposition utilized in FWD. I conclude that the first defense of this claim, offered by A. A, Howsepian, is implausible, but that the second, offered by Jason Turner, does show that a certain sort of compatibilist can accept FWD. Unfortunately, I will argue, there is reason to think that many divine determinists will be wary of accepting this sort of incompatibilism. I conclude with a quick look at other options and a brief investigation of the evidential problem of evil.
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