Following failure of the stimulatory policies post the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting instability of the Euro, national fiscal consolidation with real sanctions for non-compliance has become a key focus of most governments as they address escalating budget deficits and rapidly rising public debt. The problem is that agreement by central governments to adopt national fiscal rules, whether self-imposed or imposed by some supranational institution, leaves unaddressed how such rules and sanctions should be adopted by (or imposed on) sub-central and local governments. To date, the primary focus has been on whether the encouragement given over recent decades to fiscal decentralisation has worsened public debt levels and made national fiscal consolidation by central governments more difficult. This article argues that what is missing from this discussion is attention to the intergovernmental institutional arrangements and how they and their reform are potentially crucial to both national fiscal consolidation and ensuring retention of the benefits of fiscal decentralisation.

The great recession of 2008/2009 had a huge impact on unemployment and public finances in most advanced countries, and these impacts were magnified in the southern Euro area by the sovereign debt crisis of 2010/2011. The fiscal consolidation imposed by the European Union on highly indebted countries was based on the assumptions of so-called expansionary austerity. However, the reality so far provides proof to the contrary, and the results outlined in this article support the opposing view of a self-defeating austerity. Based on a model of the input–output relations of the productive system, an unemployment rate/budget balance trade-off equation is derived, as well as the impact of a strong fiscal consolidation based on social transfers and the notion of a neutral budget balance. An application to the Portuguese case confirms the huge costs of a strong fiscal consolidation, both in terms of unemployment and social policy regress. The conclusion is that too much consolidation in anyone year makes consolidation more difficult in the following year.

This article aims to set out some progressive, mainly post-Keynesian, macroeconomic policy ideas for debate and further research in the context of macroeconomic challenges faced by South Africa today. Despite some successes, including at reducing poverty, the South African economy has been characterised by low growth, rising unemployment and increasing inequality, which together with rampant corruption and governance failures combine to threaten the very core of the country’s stability and democracy. The neo-liberal economic policies that the African National Congress–led government surprisingly adopted in 1996 in order to assuage global markets sceptical of its historical support for dirigiste economic policy, have simply not worked. Appropriate progressive macroeconomic interventions are urgently needed to head off the looming prospect of a failed state in the country which Nelson Mandela led to democracy after his release from prison in February 1990. What happens in Africa’s southern tip should still matter for progressives all around the world. The article draws on both history and theory to demonstrate the roots of such progressive heterodox economic thinking and support for a more carefully coordinated activist state-led macroeconomic policy, both in general terms and in the South African context. It shows that such approaches to growth and development – far from being populist – also have a rich history and respectable theoretical pedigree behind them and are worthy of inclusion in the South African policy debate.

This paper critically examines the key empirical evidence used to support the fiscal consolidation argument, complemented by a brief assessment of the limitations of the analytical foundation of the growth promoting benefits of the fiscal consolidation thesis. It also reviews the evidence on the debt-growth relationship at some length. It finds that the negative relationship between debt and GDP growth is influenced by outliers or exceptionally high debt-GDP ratios. It also points out that the composition of public debt matters. Additionally, the debt-GDP relationship appears to be non-linear—positive first and turning to negative, but there is considerable variation in the estimated turning or ‘tipping’ point, which is not helpful as a policy guide. Historical evidence does not lend support to the concerns that the current situation is likely to cause rapid upward spiraling of public indebtedness. Finally, the argument that fiscal consolidation is possible without adversely affecting growth is not based on robust empirical evidence. This conclusion is reinforced by a succinct overview of some country-specific experiences (Denmark, Ireland and United States).

During the Great Recession, governments across the continent implemented austerity policies. A large literature claims that such policies are surprisingly popular and have few electoral costs. This article revisits this question by studying the popularity of governments during the economic crisis. The authors assemble a pooled time-series data set for monthly support for ruling parties from fifteen European countries and treat austerity packages as intervention variables to the underlying popularity series. Using time-series analysis, this permits the careful tracking of the impact of austerity packages over time. The main empirical contributions are twofold. First, the study shows that, on average, austerity packages hurt incumbent parties in opinion polls. Secondly, it demonstrates that the magnitude of this electoral punishment is contingent on the economic and political context: in instances of rising unemployment, the involvement of external creditors and high protest intensity, the cumulative impact of austerity on government popularity becomes considerable.

In this paper, we adopt a Ramsey optimal approach to identify the combination of income taxes, public expenditure, and inflation designed to achieve a fiscal consolidation. In contrast with empirical contributions that emphasize the benefits of expenditure-based consolidations, the optimal policy calls for increases in taxes and inflation. Strong monetary accommodation is quite beneficial relative to a situation where the Central Bank is only concerned with inflation stability and the inflation target is defined as a ceiling, as in the Eurozone.

We formulate an overlapping-generations model with household heterogeneity and productive and nonproductive government programs to study the macroeconomic and intergenerational welfare effects of risk premium shocks and government debt reductions. We demonstrate that in a small open economy with a high level of debt, a small increase in the risk premium of the interest rate leads to a substantial contraction in output and negative welfare effects. We then quantify the effects of reducing the debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratio using a wide range of fiscal austerity measures. Our results indicate trade-offs between short-run contractions and long-run expansions in aggregate output. In the short run, spending-based austerity reforms are worse than tax-based reforms in terms of lost income. However, in the long run, spending-based reforms produce higher output than tax-based reforms. In addition, welfare effects vary significantly across generations, skill groups, and working sectors. The current old and middle-aged generations experience welfare losses, whereas future generations are beneficiaries of the reforms.

This paper examines China's optimal fiscal policy in a general equilibrium model, in which the government finances its budget through both a special instrument, an implicit tax on the residential land, and a typical conventional instrument, the value-added tax (VAT). By solving a Ramsey problem, we find that (i) the optimal policy suggests a much lower land tax rate than the existing rate in China, and (ii) a substantial part of debt stabilization should come through an adjustment in the VAT rate, instead of relying on land financing. Switching from the existing policy to the Ramsey policy generates significant welfare gains.

Using the standard real business cycle model with lump-sum taxes, we analyze the impact of fiscal policy when agents form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations (RE). The output multipliers for government purchases are significantly higher under learning, and fall within empirical bounds reported in the literature, which is in sharp contrast to the implausibly low values under RE. Positive effects of fiscal policy are demonstrated during times of economic stress like the recent Great Recession. Finally, it is shown how learning can lead to consumption and investment dynamics empirically documented during some episodes of “fiscal consolidations.”

We construct an endogenous growth model that includes productive public capital and government debt. We assume that the government debt-to-GDP ratio is gradually adjusted to a target level, reflecting the permanent commitment rules in the Stability and Growth Pact or the Maastricht Treaty in the European Union (i.e., the well-known 60% rule). These rules affect government borrowing and public investment. Here, we examine the welfare implications of the permanent commitment rules. We find that fiscal consolidation based on the rules improves social welfare. Moreover, the improvement in welfare accelerates as fiscal consolidation progresses more rapidly. Last, we also discuss and derive the optimal long-run debt-to-GDP ratio.

This paper examines the capacity of governments to implement fiscal reforms in times of austerity. Unlike existing studies, which mostly focus on gradual policy changes like government spending, this analysis distinguishes between consolidation events and consolidation size to examine fiscal reforms. This strategy clarifies contradictory results in previous research and yields new insights into the underlying mechanism of fiscal reform. Based on an action-based data set that includes information about discretionary changes in taxation and government spending policies from 1978 until 2009 for 16 advanced (OECD) countries, the study shows that left and right governments are equally likely to implement cuts. Strategic considerations play a major role for the timing of fiscal consolidation, as the probability of fiscal cuts is highest at the beginning of the legislative term. When governments reform, the left cut as much as necessary, whereas right governments take the opportunity to reduce spending more.

The comparative study of debt and fiscal consolidation has acquired a new focus in the wake of the global financial crisis. This paper re-evaluates the literature on fiscal consolidation that flourished during the 1980s and 1990s. The conventional approach to explanation is based on segmenting episodes of fiscal change into discrete observations. We argue that this misses the dynamic features of government strategy, especially in the choices made between expenditure-based and revenue-based fiscal consolidation strategies. We propose a focus on pathways rather than episodes of adjustment, to capture what Pierson terms ‘politics in time’. A case-study approach facilitates analysis of complex causality that includes the structures of interest intermediation, the role of ideas in shaping the set of feasible policy choices, and the situation of national economies in the international political economy. We support our argument with qualitative data based on two case studies, Ireland and Greece, and with additional paired comparisons of Ireland with Britain, and Greece with Spain. Our conclusions suggest that the conventional literature, by excluding key political variables from consideration, may distort our understanding and result in misleading policy prescription.

OECD projections for European countries imply that the crisis will have no long-term effect on trend growth. An historical perspective says this is too optimistic. Not only is the legacy of public debt and its requirement for fiscal consolidation unfavourable but the experience of the 1930s suggests that much needed supply-side reforms are now less probable – indeed policy may well become less growth friendly. Whereas the 1940s saw the Bretton Woods agreement and the Marshall Plan pave the way for the ‘Golden Age’, it is unlikely that anything similar will rescue Europe this time around.

This paper studies the evolution of European fiscal policies in three periods: the pre-Maastricht phase (to 1991); the runup to monetary union (1992–1997), and the stability pact phase (1998 onward). Using three separate indicators, we search for structural breaks that could signify a change in the average level of discipline in these periods. We find increased fiscal discipline only up to 1997. We conclude the new fiscal discipline was a temporary phenomenon, a product of the sanction of being denied entry to the Euro. After EMU, fiscal policy gradually loosened. A single structural break test will miss these dynamic effects, and could easily generate the false conclusion that fiscal discipline had tightened since the start of phase two of EMU.