This article explores how the International Labour Organization (ILO) introduced management development programs in Argentina as a pilot project in developing countries in the late 1950s. By studying how the ILO worked together with actors at the national level, the article reveals how the ILO’s original idea to focus on top management development was reshaped through a dialogue with local actors within the context of tripartite cooperation between the government, business organizations, and unions. While the initiative was successful during the project period, it collapsed when Argentina’s government closed down the national productivity center with which the ILO was cooperating. While the tripartite principle was valuable for the first achievements, it was extremely vulnerable without the support of all partners.

One year ago, the Qatar World Cup was in full swing, and Qatar was omnipresent in our public and private spheres. For many, the Qatar 2022 World Cup will forever be intimately connected with the plight of migrant workers. This Article dives into the confluence of spectacle, counter-marketing, international—labor and human rights—law, and local reforms, which came together in the long decade which followed FIFA’s fateful decision in December 2010 to give the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. It starts by situating the FIFA World Cup 2022 within Qatar’s drive for soft power and nation branding, before turning to re-counting how the 2022 World Cup was “ambushed” in the name of Qatar’s migrant workers and their rights, putting the issue on the global agenda and triggering the involvement of the ILO. Thereafter, the Article discusses the effects of this ambush counter-marketing by engaging with the labor reforms introduced by the Qatari government, while highlighting their limits in terms of scope and implementation. The Article concludes with a general discussion on the blind spots and shortcomings of the turn to counter-marketing as a strategy to vindicate international human rights or labor rights.

At its founding in 1919, the International Labour Organization (ILO) selected its Governing Body from eight ‘states of Chief Industrial Importance’. The ILO’s attempt to define industrial importance was predicated on its seemingly expert-driven and statistical impartiality. As a technical organization, this standard was created to depoliticize the selection of its Governing Body. Yet, with its utilization of relative economic indicators, the standard ended up recreating a highly Eurocentric Governing Body. Resistance to these metrics by aggregately large but relatively underdeveloped economies, such as colonial India, reveals the inherently political nature of attempting to define industrial ‘importance’. This article examines the little-known history of how the Indian delegation to the ILO challenged the ILO’s Eurocentric metrics, constituting what it meant to be industrially important. In doing so, this article questions to what extent ‘technical’ international organizations can remain apolitical spaces and how our contemporary international institutions are responding to the increasing politicization of their function.

The ‘question of labour’ and its exploitation in the Third World has not been given ample consideration by contemporary international legal scholars in their historical examinations of the making of the international order. This article revisits the history of the interwar institutions of the League of Nations, particularly the International Labour Organization (ILO), to argue that international law reformulated imperialism through its re-articulation of labour relations, beginning with its quest to suppress slavery and ultimately regulate forced labour in Africa. International institutions contributed to the valorization of ‘free wage labour’ in Africa and the Third World through its international ‘native labour’ policies, the development of international labour standards, and especially the passing of the 1930 Forced Labour Convention. The article argues that international institutions safeguarded the processes of capitalist racial/colonial accumulation and labour exploitation by ideologically dis-embedding the violence of slavery and forced labour from ‘free wage labour’, veiling the structural unity and totality of the international legal order with racial capitalism. Drawing on the ‘Black radical/internationalist tradition’, I propose an expansive critique of the international order as a form of ‘enslavement’ to the structures of capitalism, so as to adequately expose international law’s structural embeddedness with labour exploitation, white supremacy, and racial capitalism.

In 2019, Thailand ratified the International Labour Organization Work in Fishing Convention to protect migrant fishers. The Thai government vigorously promoted the Convention among its constituents. Yet, despite the government’s proactivity, such norms have been weakened upon local translation. This phenomenon is not readily explained by existing norms research that pays scant attention to norms in the domestic space. To address this oversight, this article unpacks domestic processes of norm validation and makes a two-step argument. First, it argues that norm validation is crucial for instigating domestic implementation by allowing stakeholders to deliberate and contest the ‘appropriate’ application of norms. Second, it argues that the locally acquired normative understanding, as influenced by norm antipreneurs, or actors who defend the status quo, weakens norm implementation while the norms’ discursive strength is retained. In presenting the findings, this article contributes to the norms literature by illuminating a new life given to validated norms. The contribution also interrogates norms’ global–local dynamics by scrutinizing norm contestation and the extent to which it generates an internalized sense of legal obligation to implement international norms.

This paper explores the role played by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the consultations and stocktaking during 2017 and the negotiations during 2018 leading up to the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). It examines selected parts of the text of the GCM, with particular reference to the ILO's mandate of securing social justice and decent work, as well as the protection of migrant workers and governance of labour migration. The final part of the paper looks ahead to the ILO's role in the implementation of the GCM, with specific reference to the Arab states region, where migration for employment is significant and the governance challenges, particularly in relation to the protection of low-wage and low-skilled workers, are especially acute.

This analysis investigates changing mobilization at the ILO in response to the labour and social rights shock created by EU and IMF demands in the EU sovereign debt crisis (Crisis Europe or euro-crisis). Mobilization means the purposeful use of legal norms and institutions by social movements and civil society groups to advance identified policy goals. It can be contrasted with the use of legal norms and institutions by individuals or entities to settle disputes affecting them. After introducing relevant features of euro-crisis and the ILO, the article develops an analysis that measures changing mobilization at the ILO during euro-crisis. It then shows how such an analysis makes two key contributions: first, to our understanding of the ILO and, second, to how we approach mobilization. First, by viewing the ILO as a rights mobilization structure, it shows the vitality and interest of doubted or neglected ILO supervision and complaints mechanisms. Five elements are underlined: the ILO is more than existing literature assumes; it questions the depiction of the ILO as a ‘toothless tiger’; the sharp divide between unions and NGOs is overstated; certain institutional design features make the ILO a good venue for transnational mobilization; the ILO is not transparent in terms of access to documents relevant to mobilization and compares poorly in this respect with UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies. Second, by setting it against existing literature, it is shown how measuring mobilization is distinctive within the broader human rights mobilization scholarship. The most important insights it introduces are: rejecting the assumption that mobilization inevitably follows a significant rights shock such as euro-crisis; addressing the puzzles of union ‘mobilization’ and motivation; operationalizing measurement of mobilization against the backdrop of venue choices; considering how to deal with an international organization which is both a mobilization venue and an engaged actor.

Official histories suggest that the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted the term ‘informal sector’ as a replacement for ‘traditional sector’, which, in its pairing with the ‘modern sector’, had fallen out of favour. This article argues that the adoption of the informal sector concept is better understood as arising out of a different context: the ILO’s post-war efforts to generate a globally operational concept of unemployment for use in the ‘developing world’. ILO officials abandoned this project in the late 1960s when they realized that, where work for wages did not constitute a widespread social norm, an accurate measure of what they called ‘disguised unemployment’ was impossible to construct. That led the ILO to develop alternative constructs, including ‘employment in the informal sector’. However, it proved difficult for the agency to operationalize those, too, and it soon found itself losing control of the policy implications of the measures that it was producing.

The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) states that workers in the informal economy can be legally empowered by bringing them within the framework of effective legal regulation, in particular, international labour standards. This paper acknowledges the value of extending rights to workers in the informal economy, but argues that CLEP's recommendations are impractical and unrealistic. It shows that neither international standards nor recent national legislation designed to promote the legalization of informal enterprises offers unqualified positive answers to resolve the plight of workers in the informal economy. Given the poverty of prevailing regulatory structures and the pervasive impact of inadequate structures of governance, workers in the informal economy justifiably distrust legal institutions and, as a consequence, do not, in the first instance, resort to legal institutions in their quest for empowerment. This paper offers examples of strategies that have successfully enhanced the social, political and economic power of workers in the informal economy. It concludes, however, that although the legal system has a role to play in consolidating the gains achieved by these strategies, law and legal institutions do not necessarily offer the best point of departure towards effectively empowering workers in the informal economy.