In Constitutional Identity, Gary Jacobsohn highlights the tension both within constitutional systems and between constitutions and societal norms (culture). In this essay, we explore the first tension and glance at the second. One objective of the essay is to enumerate a set of “disharmonies” that appear with some frequency within constitutions and, employing historical data, identify the constitutional systems that contain them. Appealing to formal logic, we develop a taxonomy that helps us understand the kinds of disharmonies on display; a taxonomy that points to their sources. The essay thus generalizes Jacobsohn’s notion of disharmony and extends his insights from a small set of cases that begin with the letter “I” to a larger set.

In this chapter, I vet various criteria for a satisfactory account of agnosticism that have been proposed in the literature. I conclude that a satisfactory account of agnosticism should satisfy the following seven criteria: (1) Cognitive Contact, (2) Inconsistency, (3) Spontaneity, (4) Termination, (5) Neutrality, (6) Commitment, and (7) Appropriateness.

This chapter examines the way in which the Australian Constitution resolves inconsistencies between federal and State laws. The Constitution enables the Commonwealth to legislate concurrently with the States on many subject-matters. This means that both federal and State laws may apply to the same situation. Section 109 of the Constitution has the effect that where such federal and State laws are inconsistent the federal law prevails and the State law is inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. Inconsistency arises where a State law would alter, impair or detract from the operation of a federal law. Inconsistency may arise where it is impossible to obey both the federal and State laws, where the State law prohibits the exercise of a right granted by federal law, or where a State law purports to operate on a subject-matter on which a federal law has evinced an intention to cover exclusively. To the extent of any such inconsistency, State laws are inoperative.

In important contexts, people prefer option A to option B when they evaluate the two separately, but prefer option B to option A when they evaluate the two jointly. In consumer behavior, politics, and law, such preference reversals present serious puzzles about rationality and behavioral biases. They are often a product of the pervasive problem of evaluability. Some important characteristics of options are difficult or impossible to assess in separate evaluation, and hence choosers disregard or downplay them; those characteristics are much easier to assess in joint evaluation, where they might be decisive. But in joint evaluation, certain characteristics of options may receive excessive weight, because they do not much affect peoples actual experience or because the particular contrast between joint options distorts people’s judgments. In joint as well as separate evaluation, people are subject to manipulation, though for different reasons. It follows that neither mode of evaluation is reliable. The appropriate approach will vary depending on the goal of the task – increasing consumer welfare, preventing discrimination, achieving optimal deterrence, or something else. Under appropriate circumstances, global evaluation would be much better, but it is often not feasible.

This chapter outlines the ways in which the philosophy of science handles the problem of inconsistency in scientific theorising. After raising this problem in ,will summarise the standard view of inconsistency in the analytical philosophy of science (SVI). In , we will touch on the break with the standard view of inconsistency in the analytical philosophy of science as initiated by Kuhn and continued by Lakatos and Laudan.will discuss the most recent trends that re-evaluate the emergence and the presence of inconsistencies in scientific theorising.will draw the conclusions that serve as guidelines for the next steps of our train of thought.

The Introduction defines the aims of the book and raises the problems it will deal with. The first aim is that of the philosopher of linguistics, namely, to reveal basic characteristics of linguistic theory formation that have been unknown so far and would thus clarify important foundational issues. Second, the book also aims to show how our metatheoretical analyses will provide findings that are capable of substantially improving the practice of problem solving in theoretical linguistics. This aim is that of the linguist – however, supported and furthered by the metatheoretical findings of the philosopher of linguistics. In order to reach both aims, the book tackles the problem of how inconsistencies emerge in linguistic theorising, under what conditions they can be tolerated, and how they can be resolved. Since this Main Problem is very complex, we divide it into eight more easily accessible sub-problems, whose solution will in the long run lead, step by step, to the solution of our Main Problem.

This chapter reviews China’s BIT-related ISDS cases, in particular the awards on jurisdiction, and the tribunals’ varying techniques in interpreting the ISDS clauses in China’s BITs with a focus on jurisprudential analysis of these cases and the tribunals’ treaty interpretive techniques. In brief, the tribunals have tended to take an expansive approach when called upon to determine jurisdictional issues. Albeit largely jurisprudential, a sense of the tribunals’ treaty interpretation techniques may help shape some foundational underpinnings for China’s policy response to the proposals to reform the ISDS system made by the EU, the USA and others. This chapter also touches on two unique procedural rules in Chinese BITs: (1) those relating to the legal standing of investors originated from Hong Kong and Macau, and (2) those relating to SOEs. Chinese SOEs are often involved in public international law as the governmental instrument triggering state responsibility for breaches of international law due to the rules of state attribution.

As has been argued, Article 10(1) Berne mandates a quotation exception that we describe as global, mandatory fair use. It is global because of the reach of Berne and TRIPS. It creates a mandatory exception because of the clear language of the provision and its travaux. It relates to ‘use’ that is not limited by type of work, type of act, or purpose and which ‘quotation’ should be understood broadly. Finally, it is ‘fair’ use because the conditions of Article 10 – namely, the work having been lawfully made available to the public, attribution, proportionality, and fair practice must be satisfied. In particular, the requirement of ‘fair practice’ embraces a range of normative considerations relating to economic and moral harm, distributive justice, freedom of expression and, in limited situations, custom.

This opening chapter surveys the broad range of critical responses to the difficulties presented by DRN 1.44–9 (on the immortality and tranquility of the gods) from Renaissance accounts to the most recent discussions of the problem. The status of the passage as a locus nondum sanatus and its high-profile appearance in the poem’s proem render these verses the most difficult passage for the Lucretian editor. The present discussion weighs complex theories about the verses’ purpose against text-critical theories about the work’s composition and transmission.

This chapter focuses on the policy considerations weighing against shareholders’ claims for reflective loss, which are generally put forward in domestic corporate law regimes to justify the no-reflective loss principle. These policy considerations are analyzed in the context of international investment law and arbitration. In particular, this chapter successively critically assesses the potential floodgates of the courts and the disincentive to settle which shareholders’ claims for reflective loss can create, as well as treaty and forum shopping, which such claims can lead to. This chapter concludes that these concerns are sometimes exaggerated and not always justified in the context of international investment law, but, more importantly, that they can be cured.

Behavioral paternalists accept the neoclassical standard of rationality for normative purposes, even while questioning its descriptive accuracy. However, these standards do not have a strong normative justification. There are many perfectly reasonable ways the neoclassical norms can be violated without hurting the interests of individuals. Redescribing preferences or actions to fit the well-behaved mold is essentially arbitrary and without, in itself, any normative significance. Even demonstrating that individuals have inconsistent preferences does not tell us which preferences are better or represent “true preferences.” Behavioral paternalists commit a non sequitur when they use inconsistency to justify privileging some preferences over others.