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6 - Deciding Inconsistently

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2023

Cass R. Sunstein
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
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Summary

In important contexts, people prefer option A to option B when they evaluate the two separately, but prefer option B to option A when they evaluate the two jointly. In consumer behavior, politics, and law, such preference reversals present serious puzzles about rationality and behavioral biases. They are often a product of the pervasive problem of evaluability. Some important characteristics of options are difficult or impossible to assess in separate evaluation, and hence choosers disregard or downplay them; those characteristics are much easier to assess in joint evaluation, where they might be decisive. But in joint evaluation, certain characteristics of options may receive excessive weight, because they do not much affect peoples actual experience or because the particular contrast between joint options distorts people’s judgments. In joint as well as separate evaluation, people are subject to manipulation, though for different reasons. It follows that neither mode of evaluation is reliable. The appropriate approach will vary depending on the goal of the task – increasing consumer welfare, preventing discrimination, achieving optimal deterrence, or something else. Under appropriate circumstances, global evaluation would be much better, but it is often not feasible.

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Chapter
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Decisions about Decisions
Practical Reason in Ordinary Life
, pp. 96 - 122
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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  • Deciding Inconsistently
  • Cass R. Sunstein, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Decisions about Decisions
  • Online publication: 29 June 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009400480.007
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  • Deciding Inconsistently
  • Cass R. Sunstein, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Decisions about Decisions
  • Online publication: 29 June 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009400480.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Deciding Inconsistently
  • Cass R. Sunstein, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Decisions about Decisions
  • Online publication: 29 June 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009400480.007
Available formats
×