This article takes stock of the contribution of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to the development of international environmental law. It examines in this regard the jurisdiction of the tribunal and provides an overview of its environmental jurisprudence. It then assesses the potential role of ITLOS in relation to some marine environmental challenges ahead. In particular, it considers the possibility of a request for an advisory opinion on climate change, the settlement of disputes regarding deep seabed mining, and the potential role of the tribunal under a new legal instrument on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.

The charm of maritime delimitation and its enigmatic lessons hardly surprise us, yet the reasoning behind them sometimes seems seductively elusive. On September 23, 2017, a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued its decision in Ghana v. Ivory Coast. The glamour of maritime delimitation is reason enough to note the judgment, but the case also addresses the equidistance principle for maritime delimitation, the standard for the acceptance of a tacit agreement, and international responsibility under Article 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets out the legal regime governing the novel ‘continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles’ or ‘the outer continental shelf’. As Article 76 contains a complex interface between law and science, its interpretation and application raises intricate issues, with which no international court or tribunal had dealt with substantively before 2012. The UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies were the first international tribunals to provide answers to long-standing questions surrounding the meaning and application of several important, but ambiguous or controversial, legal terms employed under Article 76. As such, the decisions rendered by the UNCLOS tribunals have been seen as playing an important role in elucidating the legal regime of the outer continental shelf. This article queries this assessment by critically examining whether and to what extent the relevant pronouncements made by UNCLOS tribunals have contributed to clarifying and developing the law governing the outer continental shelf regime under UNCLOS.

Recent international jurisprudence has shown considerable uncertainty with regard to the delimitation of the territorial sea. While international tribunals endorse a two-stage approach to territorial sea delimitation, there is a lack of judicial consensus on the practical implementation of such an approach. This article argues that the rule-exception relationship between equidistance and special circumstances, as reflected in the drafting history of LOSC Article 15 and in jurisprudence prior to 2007, should inform the delimitation of the territorial sea. Cases since 2007 which have strayed from the earlier jurisprudence on LOSC Article 15, should be seen as a misconstruction of the law applicable to territorial sea delimitation.

In the South China Sea Arbitration initiated by the Philippines against China, the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law (CSIL) submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal established in accordance with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This article first analyzes the definition and legal nature of amicus curiae status, then introduces cases involving amicus curiae in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms. By analyzing relevant statutes and rules of procedure, this article assesses the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions by international courts or tribunals, in different dispute settlement mechanisms. Finally, the article describes the significance of the amicus curiae brief submitted by CSIL to the arbitral tribunal, concluding that the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal did take the amicus curiae submission into account, but exercised caution in its consideration.

On 2 April 2015, the full International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) rendered its first advisory opinion in reply to a request of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission regarding illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Unlike any other court or tribunal with advisory competence, including the Seabed Disputes Chamber, ITLOS’ advisory jurisdiction is not explicitly enshrined in its constituent instrument, but was rather asserted in the Tribunal’s, homemade, rules of procedure. In spite of strong objections from various states, ITLOS affirmed a broad advisory jurisdiction ratione materiae and personae, and found that there were no compelling reasons to exercise its discretionary power to dismiss the request. The request and the Tribunal's handling thereof raise interesting questions regarding the opportunities and risks inherent to, and the outer limits of, the advisory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals. This contribution takes a look at the advisory jurisdiction of the full Tribunal, having regard to the experiences of other international courts and tribunals.

The article analyses the trends in continental shelf boundary agreements that extend beyond 200 nautical miles. The focus is on three issues: first, the delimitation method; second, whether States have acted on the basis that they have to delineate the limits between the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and the international seabed area before they engage in a boundary delimitation with neighbouring states; and third, how the end point of the boundary line has been defined. The goal of the analysis is to find out whether any rule of customary law has emerged which seems not to be the case.

The disputes relating to prompt release constitute an important part of the case law of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The frequency of the use of prompt release proceedings may be explained by the fact that illegal fisheries have increased owing to the exhaustion of biological resources. Considering that the exhaustion of renewable resources entails a serious problem, conflicts regarding illegal fisheries and the detention of vessels and crews will increase. This study examines the procedure for prompt release under Article 292 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea by focusing on the case law of the Tribunal. In particular, this study addresses the issues concerning substantive and procedural requirements provided in Article 292, locus standi, the relation between proceedings of the Tribunal and of domestic courts, and criteria for evaluating ‘reasonable’ bond.

On 3 December 2001, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued an Order in response to Ireland's request for the prescription of provisional measures in accordance with Article 290 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In its request, Ireland alleged violation by the United Kingdom of numerous provisions of UNCLOS. The scope of provisional measures requested by Ireland included, among others, the immediate suspension by the United Kingdom of the authorization of the Sellafield Mox Plant and a guarantee of no movement of radioactive substances or materials or wastes that are in any way related to the plant into or out of the waters of the Irish Sea. This article reviews the background to the dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom over the operation of the Sellafield Mox Plant. It focuses on the various jurisdictional challenges raised before ITLOS and critically assesses the conclusions reached by the Tribunal in its Order.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is one of the “compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions” provided for in Article 287 of the Convention. The Tribunal is established by Annex VI to the Convention which is its Statute. Within the Tribunal is established the Seabed Disputes Chamber which has jurisdiction to deal with respect to deep-sea mining activities covered by Part XI of the Convention.

The Tribunal performs three different but closely related functions. The first is to offer a forum of choice for states parties to the Convention to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention. The second function is to provide a special, and largely mandatory, procedure for dealing with disputes in connection with the interpretation and application of the provisions of Part XI of the Convention. This is the function of the Seabed Disputes Chamber. The Chamber also has competence to give advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Assembly and Council of the International Seabed Authority. Thirdly, the Tribunal serves as a residual and compulsory mechanism for the settlement of certain disputes identified by the Convention as requiring expeditious decision, such as applications for the prompt release of arrested vessels and crew or requests for the prescription of provisional measures pending final decisions in cases. The Tribunal may also deal with disputes arising under other maritime agreements, if the agreements so provide.

The Tribunal commenced operations in October 1996. It has completed organizational work for its administrative judicial functions. It has adopted its Rules, the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Procedure and Guidelines to assist parties appearing before it. It has also established special Chambers. The Tribunal has already dealt with one application for the prompt release of a vessel and crew arrested in a foreign port and one request for provisional measures. Proceedings are in progress on the merits of the first case submitted to it.

The Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, adopted in October 1997 (together with the Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice and the Guidelines Concerning the Preparation and Presentation of Cases Before the Tribunal) follows the model of the Rules of the International Court of Justice with rather relevant differences. Some of these differences depend on the need of more expeditious and less expensive proceedings: in particular, the provisions introducing time limits and those in the Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice which eliminate in most cases the requirement of Notes by each judge. Others depend on the specific characteristics of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. These include the provisions on intervention, on preliminary objections and proceedings, on provisional measures, on prompt release of vessels and crews, and on activities in the international seabed Area. In this category can also be included the provisions on the participation in proceedings by international organizations and natural and juridical persons.

The article surveys the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea M/V Saiga cases which inaugurated jurisprudence of the 21 Member International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, Germany, with delivery of two important decisions on prompt release of the vessel and its crew (1997, Case No. 1) and on provisional measures of protection (1998, Case No. 2). The decisions provided precedential instances of application by the Tribunal of Articles 292 and 290 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea respectively, and of the relevant provisions of the ITLOS Rules. The prescription of provisional measures of protection formed the incidental proceedings of the pending M/V Saiga (Merits) case which is to be settled by ITLOS in mid-1999 (Case No. 2) and is to be the subject of a separate article. In view of the ITLOS Statute and the Rules being closely modelled in the Statute and the Rules of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), careful attention is given to comparison of the inaugural practice of ITLOS with the longstanding practice of the ICJ, and preservation of judicial consistency by ITLOS is particularly commended. A history of the M/V Saiga dispute, intertwined with domestic proceedings before Guinean courts, is for the reader's convenience outlined in a Chronological Table annexed to this article.