Last year the International Court of Justice (ICJ) marked its seventieth anniversary, and in the most recent issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law, Hugh Thirlway recognized this milestone with a look back through some key developments at the Court, focusing on the last few years. Here, we would like to undertake a retrospective of another sort, paying tribute to the ongoing connection between the Court and the Journal by taking a brief tour through the Journal's coverage of the Court over the years. It is hoped that this retrospective will not only bring back some fond memories but also – by viewing this material as a whole, and pointing out certain gaps in the Journal’s coverage of the Court's work – stimulate future analyses.

The article proposes an innovative theoretical framework outlining preconditions for Regional International Courts (RICs) to act as engines of supranationality in different institutional and socio-political contexts. In so doing, the article nuances the theoretical approaches to supranationality and supranational adjudication. The article focuses on the Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). Both courts have been branded institutional copies of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); they have even borrowed key jurisprudential principles from the Luxembourg Court with the goal of expanding the reach of Central American and Caribbean Community Laws. Yet, both the CACJ and the CCJ have thus far failed to foster supranationality in their respective systems. This is because the conditions allowing RICs to become engines of integration lie, for the most part, beyond the direct control of the judges, most notably, with other institutional, political, and societal actors, such as national judges, regional organs, legal and political elites, as well as academics. The article thus suggests that RICs can become engines of supranationality only to the extent to which they are supported by a set of institutional, political, and societal pre-conditions allowing for the concrete enforcement of the rulings of the RIC at the regional and national levels.

The EU's consistent policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been that Israel's presence in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip (prior to the 2005 disengagement) and the Golan Heights is subject to the laws of belligerent occupation, that any purported Israeli annexation is illegal and null and void, that Israel's settlements in the Territories are in breach of public international law and constitute a serious obstacle to peace, and that Israel and Palestine should settle their conflict on the basis of public international law and through the two-state solution. In recent years the EU attempted to concretize this policy through its trade and trade-related agreements with Israel, withholding the benefits of EU-Israeli co-operation from companies and research institutions based in the Territories or operating therein, as well as from products produced therein (the New Approach). Thus, from the EU perception, the New Approach towards the long-standing conflict and its reliance on international law may be seen as an instrument to reinforce internal and external legitimacy, buttress identity cohesiveness and as a manifestation of its more robust effectiveness. But this article seeks to conduct a more careful and balanced analysis of the New Approach and in doing so to reveal that the EU's (almost) exclusive focus on non-governmental entities, such as corporations situated in the Territories, and on Territories’ products, is misplaced in terms of public international law and effectiveness. The New Approach's deficiencies, in abstracto and in concreto, as evaluated in this article, are likely to prevent it from serving as a paradigm shift in EU-Israel relations.

In March 2014, a meeting of CARICOM states approved a ten-point plan of the Caribbean Reparations Commission to achieve reparatory justice for the victims of slavery, genocide and racial apartheid in the Caribbean. With assistance from the London-based law firm Leigh Day, the aim is to reach a negotiated settlement with the governments of Britain, France and the Netherlands. What makes this case different from previous discussions on Caribbean reparations is that the claim includes an indigenous component, with ‘native genocide’ included in the title and an ‘indigenous peoples’ development program’ included within the ten-point plan for reparations. Yet reparations are problematic in the Caribbean context due to the ongoing violation of indigenous rights internally. This article analyzes the various dimensions of the Caribbean reparations discourse with regard to contemporary indigenous communities in the region. It highlights the problems at regional level with regard to state responsibility and indigenous rights, particularly in relation to land, and argues that this presents a problematic element in the claim due to the fact that violations are being perpetrated against indigenous peoples by the same states who are representing them in the Caribbean Reparations Commission. Finally, it discusses the onus on European governments to acknowledge past wrongs and the potential of ‘cultural reparations’ to contribute to the Caribbean reparatory justice programme more generally.

In the South China Sea Arbitration initiated by the Philippines against China, the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law (CSIL) submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal established in accordance with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This article first analyzes the definition and legal nature of amicus curiae status, then introduces cases involving amicus curiae in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms. By analyzing relevant statutes and rules of procedure, this article assesses the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions by international courts or tribunals, in different dispute settlement mechanisms. Finally, the article describes the significance of the amicus curiae brief submitted by CSIL to the arbitral tribunal, concluding that the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal did take the amicus curiae submission into account, but exercised caution in its consideration.

On the basis of a thorough empirical analysis, the article comes to a number of theoretical conclusions which have never previously been discussed in the literature. In particular, it demonstrates that the Court's procedure is governed not only by ‘procedural law’ but also by norms which are non-legal. Moreover, it clearly circumscribes which norms in the documents relating to the functioning of the Court are procedural and which lack this character. In their entirety, provisions governing the Court's procedure form a ‘normative system’, with the law being only one of its elements. The Court's procedural norms originate both from the traditional sources of international law as well as from sources which, according to the usual classification, do not necessarily belong to that category. The procedural norms that are derived from all of these sources, while not tending towards uniformity in terms of their characteristics and effect, nevertheless form a system which operates as a whole. The procedure of the International Court of Justice does not fit neatly within the general scheme of ‘legal versus non-legal norms’; neither can one readily apply the theory of traditional sources of international law to a procedural system which brings together heterogeneous elements and must therefore be explained keeping in mind its own logic and nature.

The inspiration for this article came from a call for amicus curiae briefs issued in April 2016 by the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The call sought guidance on: whether, under customary international law applicable between 1975 and 1979, an attack by a state or organization against members of its own armed forces may amount to an attack directed against a civilian population for the purpose of constituting a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the ECCC Law. We argue that customary international law justifies a finding that an attack on members of the armed forces can constitute crimes against humanity. In particular, the article focuses on the importance placed on the persecution element of crimes against humanity in the post-Second World War jurisprudence, and the broad interpretation of the term ‘civilian’. The article also examines the jurisprudence of contemporary international courts, finding that in some cases the courts have interpreted the term ‘civilian’ as incorporating hors de combat. However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Court (ICC) have moved towards a more restrictive interpretation of the term ‘civilian’, potentially excluding members of the armed forces. We argue that this move is regressive, and against the spirit in which the offence of crimes against humanity was created. The ECCC has an opportunity to counter this restrictive approach, thereby narrowing the protection gap which crimes against humanity were initially created to close.

On 16 March 2016, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) rejected on jurisdictional grounds a victims’ request to investigate a case of environmental destruction by Chevron in Ecuador. A little over a year later, on 15 September 2016, the Prosecutor released a policy paper indicating that her office would consider hearing cases of environmental destruction. This article examines how the ICC can prosecute environmental destruction as a crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. It presents a survey of the potential jurisdictional and substantive issues of prosecuting environmental issues and uses the victims’ request asking the Prosecutor to investigate environmental destruction by Chevron in the Ecuadorian Amazon as a backdrop. The article proceeds in three parts. Firstly, it discusses the request by the victims in Ecuador asking for the Prosecutor to investigate. Secondly, it sets out the basic jurisdictional framework of the ICC and analyzes why the Prosecutor rejected the victims’ request. Thirdly, it examines Article 7 and concludes that while peacetime environmental destruction committed by a non-state actor that results in a humanitarian atrocity can qualify as a crime against humanity, the factual circumstances alleged in the Ecuadorian victims’ request did not amount to a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established with the aim of prosecuting individuals for the gravest crimes of concern to the international community. Yet some provisions of its Statute (the Rome Statute) recognize the need for temporarily setting aside criminal investigations or prosecutions in favour of different considerations. Two of these provisions are Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Statute. They allow the Prosecutor of the Court to use his or her discretion in deciding not to initiate an investigation or a prosecution in the ‘interests of justice’. Nonetheless, the ambiguity of this phrase, coupled with an absent definition, have given rise to a polarized debate about its meaning and the Prosecutor's ensuing margin of discretion: some consider matters of peace and security and alternative justice mechanisms as possible ‘interests of justice’, while others exclude them. Among those adopting the latter view is the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), as can be inferred from a 2007 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice and a 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, which continue to be upheld by the Office. Against this backdrop and amid new developments at the ICC which call into question the OTP's position, the purpose of this article is to develop a comprehensive interpretation of Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Rome Statute, using all the interpretative tools provided by Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The increased use of information and communication technologies arguably represents important opportunities for the field of transitional justice, notably with respect to the optimization of existing mechanisms and the development of new ones. This article focuses on state-based and typically very formal mechanisms, namely international, internationalized and national criminal tribunals as well as truth and reconciliation commissions. These institutions often apply and engage with international law and operate with the involvement or under the close scrutiny of the international community. Moreover, they can be expected to be the first ones to embrace insights from the field of cyberjustice to a significant extent.

Enhancing access to and participation in such mechanisms, rendering them more cost-efficient and facilitating information-sharing would correspond to generally accepted norms relating to both international human rights and justice. However, cyberjustice initiatives may also entrench an already common ‘toolkit approach’ in the field of transitional justice. This article builds on recent critiques of the dominant legalistic and normatively driven transitional justice paradigm and argues that transitional justice + cyberjustice hence risks furthering a technocratic top-down approach that unduly limits creative solutions. By adopting a critical legal-pluralistic approach that conceives individuals as law-creative actors and that is cognizant of the close relationship between means and ends, the article imagines ways of benefiting from the promises of transitional justice + cyberjustice.

The world as a whole has not been at peace since 1914, and it is definitely not at peace today. David J. Dunn argues that this state of affairs may be due, in no small part, to aspects of the conventional wisdom that informs practical foreign policy and diplomacy. For example, the ancient notion si vis pacem, para bellum [if you desire peace, prepare for war] (Vegetius) or the nineteenth century idea that argues ‘[w]e have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow’ (Lord Palmerston). These ‘insights’ neatly summarize the intellectual core of political realism; in particular, the ‘balance-of-power’ doctrine.