In the perennial debate over whether the dependence of international law on power is complete or whether international law maintains some independence for itself, the latter position is increasingly and at best marginal. Here that direction of the debate is reversed. The very dependence of international law on power is integral to a relation of mutual dependence between them. It is in this relation that power constituently depends on an international law which, in its turn, contains a primal efficacy. That efficacy is illustrated in its countering the claims of American empire.

The outbreak of the ‘war against terrorism’ has provoked a deluge of images. It is uncommon for lawyers to think of the impact of the media on the production of law, yet a specific set of images has had a considerable impact on how legal issues surrounding the use of violence have been framed. The article seeks to explore this novel area by focusing on international humanitarian law and how it deals with the recurring question of prisoners. Some of the distortions the media community imposes on the law are uncovered, but the law's inherent malleability to such distortions is also underlined.

The 1993/1999 Belgian Law on Universal Jurisdiction allows for prosecution before Belgian domestic courts regardless of the nationality of perpetrators or victims, the place where the breaches were committed, or the presence on Belgian territory of the alleged perpetrators. Is universal jurisdiction contrary to international law? Is universal jurisdiction in absentia permitted under Belgian law and under international law? What is the relationship between universal jurisdiction, as exercised by a national court, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court? This article provides an overview of the Belgian legislation and its future with regard to international law and the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

This article considers the Randal Decision, in which the ICTY Appeals Chamber established a qualified privilege from testimony for war correspondents before the ad hoc tribunals. It sets out the various arguments advanced by Jonathan Randal in support of such privilege and the privilege as formulated by the Appeals Chamber. Finally, it analyzes the possible impact of the Decision and its possible application by the ad hoc tribunals, other international courts, such as the ICC, and domestic courts.

This article focuses on three specific legal developments arising from the Martinović and Naletilić Judgement of the ICTY. The first issue is the possibility of prisoners of war consenting to perform otherwise prohibited labour under Geneva Convention III. The second relates to the legal definition of occupation within the meaning of Geneva Convention IV. The third issue concerns the trial chamber's analysis of the discriminatory requirement as an element of the offence of persecution.

In November 1994 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), indicted its first accused, Dragan Nikolić. It was not until over five years later, however, in April 2000, that he was finally arrested and transferred to The Hague. The circumstances of his arrest – which reportedly featured his being violently abducted from his home in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) by Serbian criminals before being transferred to the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, ultimately, to the ICTY in The Hague – were the subject of a pre-trial motion. Nikolić's defence counsel asserted that the nature of his capture was such that the appropriate remedy was to dismiss the charges against him and order his return to the FRY. They made this assertion despite an admission, for the purposes of the motion, that the captors lacked any connection with SFOR or the ICTY. The trial chamber rejected the motion. In reaching its decision, the trial chamber considered fundamental issues about what constituted an illegal capture for the purposes of the ICTY and, without explicitly doing so, appeared to reject the view of the Court in Eichmann that a person may not oppose his being tried by reason of the illegality of his capture.

The International Criminal Court has a different mandate – exercise of criminal jurisdiction over individuals – from most international organizations. It may help to develop the law of international organizations concerning structure and internal operations, relationships with states, and relationships with other international organizations, as well as concerning relationships with individuals. The ICC assigns its judicial and quasi-political functions appropriately. Notably, the power to make agreements is divided functionally among the judicial and prosecutorial Organs and the Assembly of States Parties. The relationship between the ICC and states that are not parties to its Statute is far more important to the ICC than to most international organizations. Where situations are referred to the Court by the United Nations Security Council, such states may be required to cooperate with the Court because of their duties under the UN Charter. Other situations require agreement to cooperate by the non-party state.

In Resolution 1373 the Security Council laid down a series of general and abstract rules binding on all UN member states. In doing so, the Council purported to legislate. This article discusses whether it is entitled to do so. In the light of the Charter and the past practice of United Nations organs, it argues that the Council can only exercise its Chapter VII powers in response to specific situations or conduct. In enacting Resolution 1373 the Council acted ultra vires. The article looks at the circumstances in which such an extension of the Security Council's powers might be acceptable, but concludes that unilateral attempts by the Council to legislate would be destructive of the international legal order.

On 3 December 2001, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued an Order in response to Ireland's request for the prescription of provisional measures in accordance with Article 290 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In its request, Ireland alleged violation by the United Kingdom of numerous provisions of UNCLOS. The scope of provisional measures requested by Ireland included, among others, the immediate suspension by the United Kingdom of the authorization of the Sellafield Mox Plant and a guarantee of no movement of radioactive substances or materials or wastes that are in any way related to the plant into or out of the waters of the Irish Sea. This article reviews the background to the dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom over the operation of the Sellafield Mox Plant. It focuses on the various jurisdictional challenges raised before ITLOS and critically assesses the conclusions reached by the Tribunal in its Order.

The jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to hear applications for the prompt release of vessels and crew was recently invoked by the Russian Federation against Australia in the Volga case. In determining whether the bonding arrangements set by Australia were ‘reasonable’ under Article 73(2) of UNCLOS, the Tribunal clarified several issues regarding prompt release applications, and most significantly, held that non-financial conditions and ‘good behaviour bonds’ were not permissible. In rendering its decision, the Tribunal adhered to the ‘guiding criterion’ of balancing the interests of the flag state and coastal state in determining the reasonableness of the bond. It is submitted that this test is inappropriate, and that this decision will create difficulties for coastal states seeking to control illegal fishing.

Books and Articles in the Field of the Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (Spring 2003).