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Edited by
Ottavio Quirico, University of New England, University for Foreigners of Perugia and Australian National University, Canberra,Walter Baber, California State University, Long Beach
Carbon sequestration has become indispensable to achieving the sustainability objectives set out in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, within the framework of the concept of ‘net zero’ emissions targets. It includes different prospective techniques, which are nonetheless still in their infancy and not easy to implement. This contribution focuses specifically on carbon sequestration at sea as a test case, aiming to underscore the pros and cons of these measures. It is argued that implementing carbon sequestration at sea requires a cooperative approach, within a context whereby climate change necessitates a synergic rethinking of the Law of the Sea.
This article examines reactions to the South China Sea and Chagos Marine Protection Area arbitrations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in particular concerns about the potential widening of Part XV jurisdiction and its impact on the dispute resolution system's consent basis. It argues that assessing the impact of such cases involves a characterization of both the function of Part XV and of international judges. Ultimately, it suggests that the best test of whether UNCLOS case law has gone too far is the reaction of States in designing dispute settlement under the new Agreement under UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction.
This article explores the legal situation relating to the Sea of Azov in the light of the Russian suspension of shipping on 24 February 2022. While this act received little scholarly or political attention, there is a debate concerning the legality of the suspension of shipping, mainly whether it is governed by the law of naval blockade under the laws of naval warfare. The article analyses the situation from the perspectives of both international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of the sea (LOS) and examines how the interaction between the two legal regimes affects the analysis. The article supports the conclusion that the Russian conduct does not constitute a naval blockade but may be an accepted practice within the legal regime of naval warfare. In addition, it holds that LOS affects both the laws of naval warfare and the status of the Sea of Azov. Furthermore, the article raises doubts as to the relevance and applicability of the legal concept of naval blockade in modern international law.
The law of the sea is developed from centuries of national practices; China’s practice has also played a role in that process. International law was introduced into China in the late Qing dynasty. After the Opium War in 1840, the Qing dynasty government had to learn and accept international law, including the law of the sea, as created by the Western countries in order to negotiate and communicate with them. From 1840 until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, there were some practices in applying the law of the sea in China focussing on territorial sovereignty and fisheries interests. In the 1970s, the Chinese delegation participated fully in UNCLOS III, ushering in a new era in the practice of the law of the sea. China has made important contributions to the formulation of UNCLOS. It has actively implemented the law of the sea through domestic practices including legislation, law enforcement and judiciary, as well as bilateral consultations and cooperation on law of the sea issues with its maritime neighbours. China is committed to upholding the maritime order with the United Nations at its core and based on international law.
In this chapter, Richard Collins assesses the contribution of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s dispute settlement procedures to the resolution of maritime disputes. In particular, this chapter explains that recent decisions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) have grappled with a range of international legal issues that are not directly related to the law of the sea, such as sovereignty, human rights, and sovereign immunities. This chapter observes that this development has led some commentators to criticise ITLOS for jurisdictional overreach. This chapter pushes back against this criticism. It argues that ITLOS’ engagement with international law regimes going beyond the law of the sea is a necessary recognition of the integrated and interconnected nature of the modern international legal system and, ultimately, leads to a strengthening of the rule of law.
This chapter considers debates about the ‘common heritage of mankind’ during the 1973–82 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. Postwar jurisdictional claims over ever-larger portions of the world’s oceans raised the possibility of an unregulated and destabilizing scramble for maritime rights, resources, and territories, culminating in what was often described as the enclosure of the oceanic commons. It also lent urgency to developing countries’ calls for a new law of the sea treaty that would reflect their own rights claims. The result was a series of fractious negotiations spanning nine years, at the centre of which was the question of how the deep seabed and its resources would be managed. Third World states sought an international organization authorized to oversee the deep seabed’s exploration and exploitation, coordinating the global distribution of resulting benefits. Industrialized states proposed a licensing system in which states and corporations would be granted concessions to mine in the international zone. Ultimately, ‘common heritage’ rhetoric proved central to the resulting treaty, but the ‘parallel’ system of seabed mining it legalized had the effect of ensuring that the ocean floor’s resources would be controlled largely by those with financial wealth and technological means.
Recent scholarship in law and society has engaged in novel ways with maritime spaces, articulating how they inform legal theory more broadly. This essay builds on such scholarship, and on a broad-brushed survey of maritime history, to make two basic arguments. First, a look at political and legal processes regarding maritime spaces reveals that law is transnational ‘all the way down’. Legal theorists often assume that transnational legal processes are an added layer beyond domestic and international law. But the maritime perspective reveals that transnationalism comes first, both analytically and historically, as a constant negotiation of the relationship between what is ‘inside’ and what is ‘outside’ a polity. Second, the maritime space begins, at least in dominant legal traditions, as an absolute exteriority – imagined as outside or beyond polities and jurisdictions. But with the climate crisis and the emergence of the Anthropocene we may observe an inversion, the sea now appears as a record of harmful human activity; a mirror showing a troublesome collective portrait of humanity. The inversion from a maritime exteriority to the intimacy of ubiquitous environmental harm defines the parameters of law and politics today. The essay concludes with reflections on how the maritime perspective may best be engaged today in responding to that image through political action. It conceptualizes what I call the ‘commonist lifeboat’ – a model of bottom-up universalism for tumultuous times.
The chapter discusses the basics of the law of the global commons (seas, air, outer space), by concentrating on what states can do in which zones or spaces
Through symptomatic reading, we analyze the visible and the invisible – the explicit and the implicit – in the works of Filipino international legal scholar Merlin Magallona (1934–2022). We argue that Magallona's international legal thought was rooted in Marxist theory and practice and honed through the mode of production debates in the Philippine communist movement during the 1960s. Specifically, he developed a critique of the neocolonial division of labour and produced a materialist reading of international legal doctrines through “Postcolonial Self-Determination” – a synthesis of the antinomy of positivism and self-determination. In practice, his Third World Marxism led him to support the NIEO and resist UNCLOS through constitutional litigation based on the imperialist Treaty of Paris of 1898. Magallona's critique and praxis suggest new forms of resistance to the new imperialisms and underscore the imperative of a practice turn in Marxist international legal theory.
The law of the sea has long been a rich source of examples of the interplay, and occasional entanglement, of treaty and custom. This article discusses whether claims to close off the waters of ‘offshore archipelagos' by non-archipelagic States are consistent with international law against the background of this perennial issue. Analysis of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) demonstrates quite clearly that there is no basis for such claims. ‘Going beyond the LOSC’ the article examines whether the matter remains subject to customary international law; whether subsequent practice may have established the agreement of the parties that the relevant provisions of the LOSC are to be interpreted as allowing their invocation by non-archipelagic States with offshore archipelagos; and whether there is ‘supervening custom’ that may have emerged since the adoption of the LOSC and that permits such claims by non-archipelagic States. Identifying and critically assessing the current state of international law on these fundamental questions of the relationship between treaty and custom, it is concluded that there is no basis for arguing that non-archipelagic States are able to claim any sort of special status for ‘offshore archipelagos’.
The EUNAVFOR MED anti-smuggling mission, Operation Sophia, ended in March 2020 and is largely viewed to have failed in its objective of ‘disrupting the business model’ of migrant smugglers in the Mediterranean region. The mission relied on purported enforcement powers in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol to seize and destroy stateless smuggling vessels on the high seas. Despite repeated claims to such powers by the European Union, neither treaty provides a strong jurisdictional basis for seizing stateless smuggling vessels outside territorial waters. However, ambiguous drafting in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol viably permits some claims to extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction over stateless smuggling vessels on the high seas, and the European Union has relied on this ambiguity to tackle migrant smuggling. This article argues that the recent European Union anti-smuggling operations, most notably Operation Sophia, have reinterpreted the ambiguous term ‘appropriate measures’ in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol as permitting the states parties to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over stateless smuggling vessels at sea.
Maritime environmental crimes are one of the main causes of destruction of marine ecosystems and devastation of marine life. Although no single State is able to tackle the causes and consequences of maritime environmental crimes, there is little international cooperation in combating these crimes, mostly due to the perception that they are a matter exclusively subject to national law. Thus far, joint law enforcement operations to combat maritime environmental crimes are rare and take place on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, few States have passed legislation on maritime environmental crimes. In order to resolve the inadequacy of available legal tools to tackle maritime environmental crimes, a new global paradigm for protection and preservation of the marine environment is required: one that supports this concept within international law.
This Chapter is aimed at analysing options to integrate the ecosystem-based approach (EBA) with Arctic Ocean governance. Today there is a clear global trend of replacing traditional sectoral regulation of different maritime activities with the EBA. This approach entails regulation of all types of economic activities in sea areas where they might have negative impacts on the marine environment. Since the boundaries of ecosystems in the Arctic do not generally overlap with the limits of the coastal States’ national jurisdiction and cover areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), several crucial challenges arise. How to make regional measures in ABNJ binding and ensure compliance by non-Arctic States? How will the EBA correlate with sectoral environmental measures regarding, in particular, fisheries, exploitation of resources in the Area and vessel traffic in the Arctic, adopted by relevant sectoral international organizations? The Chapter focuses on finding answers to these and other relevant questions.
The chapter considers the contribution of the ICJ to the law of the sea, highlighting four areas where the Court has made a key contribution to the development of the law: maritime delimitation cases, the status of islands and rocks, navigational rights in straits and lastly, the conservation of natural resources. The author notes that the Court’s influence is not equal in all of these areas, but emphasises the significant rule that the Court has played in developing the principles and rules of international law applicable to maritime boundary delimitations.
The international law of the sea is one of the oldest branches of public international law. Thus, it must be examined from the perspective of the development of international law in general. Originally, the law of the sea consisted of a body of rules of customary law. Later on, these rules were progressively codified. The Third United Nations (UN) Conference on the Law of the Sea, which successfully adopted the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (the LOSC) in 1982, is of critical importance in the codification of the law. Furthermore, the international community and the situations that surround the oceans are constantly changing. Accordingly, it is also necessary to examine the evolutionary process of the law after the adoption of the LOSC. As a general introduction, this chapter will address the following issues in particular: (1) the principal functions of the law of the sea, (2) the sources of the law of the sea, (3) the principles governing the law of the sea (4) procedures of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), (5) the principal features of the LOSC, and (6) the evolutionary process of the LOSC and the law of the sea.
This chapter looks at reciprocity in the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, and the differences in the role reciprocity plays in inter-State dispute settlement, and in dispute settlement procedures that involve non-State entities such as individuals. It looks at the well-developed role that reciprocity plays in the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, before turning to the system of compulsory dispute settlement in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The chapter then analyzes three types of instance which concern individuals: the International Criminal Court; human rights courts and complaint mechanisms; and investment tribunals, specifically the issue of the extension of jurisdiction on the basis of an MFN clause.
In this chapter Germany’s position on Antarctica, the law of the sea, as well as air and space law will be examined. Concerning the law of the sea, Germany’s critical position on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, expressed on many different occasions, will be addressed. Besides that, it will be addressed that Turkey accused Germany of illegally boarding its merchant vessel on the high seas in the Mediterranean. Yet, it will be concluded the boarding and search of the vessel even against the expressed will of Turkey was not illegal under international law. Regarding Turkey’s conduct of seismic surveys in the eastern Mediterranean, Germany’s calls on Turkey to respect international law will be criticised as lacking a legal basis. That Germany joined the UK-led Global Ocean Alliance, will be evaluated as a way for Germany to lobby for greater parts of the ocean being assigned Marine Protected Area status. In the last part, Germany opposing Russian initiatives on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space will be assessed a sign of its increasing frustration with the double standards displayed by Russia and the other major space powers.
This new edition has been revised and updated to provide current and comprehensive coverage of essential issues of the international law of the sea in a systematic manner. This book presents two paradigms of the law of the sea: the law of divided oceans and the law of our common ocean. It covers contemporary issues, such as protection of the marine biological diversity, marine plastic pollution, the Arctic, and impacts of climate change on the oceans. Following the clear and accessible approach of previous editions, with many illustrations and tables, The International Law of the Sea continues to help students to best understand the law of the sea.
In January 2021 the Human Rights Committee determined that Italy and Malta had both failed to protect the right to life of more than 200 migrants who perished in a shipwreck in 2013. The Committee tackled for the first time the question of extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to persons in distress at sea. While finding the decision against Malta to be inadmissible, the Committee engaged in a significant analysis of the concept of jurisdiction in both decisions. This article analyses how the decisions interpret the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ and juxtaposes this analysis against the approaches taken in other international legal regimes. The article then theorises on the impact of these two decisions in helping to crystallise a new ‘right to be rescued at sea’.
Although the subject of law of naval warfare was first in modern treatymaking in international humanitarian law (IHL), further treatymaking efforts that comprehensively deal with all matters of the law of naval warfare never really took off. This particular part of IHL has always been primarily governed by custom. Scholarly calls for revision have not pressed States into further treatymaking efforts, which gives the law of naval warfare a semblance of being continuously in a state of crisis. Conveniently for States, the San Remo Manual solved a significant portion of this crisis, but perhaps too successfully, as it may have taken away incentives for States to further develop the law. While the law of the sea has been steadily growing as a – codified – legal regime and protective rules of IHL garnered much attention, the law of naval warfare seems somewhat forgotten and crumbling in its details.