This chapter explores the legality of the IMF’s shift in mandate, and considers the overarching question of whether the institution was legally entitled to expand its mandate over time through de facto legal doctrines rather than express or implied consent of the members. The analysis begins with a consideration of the legal basis of the Fund’s initiative by examining the international legal theory on the legal personality of international organisations. That is, whether the mandate of an international organization is strictly dependant on the wording of its constitutive instrument(s), or whether the mandate can evolve so as to accommodate new de facto attributions and competences. The Fund’s mandate shift is then tested by taking into account the power of soft law. A key aspect in the legal literature is whether the constituent doctrine of ‘separate will’ or ‘volonté distincte’, which allows an organisation to act independently – that is without the express or implied consent of members – would apply to the mandate expansion as the move ensured the Fund maintained relevancy in an ever-changing world. Finally, the chapter concludes that the Fund’s mandate expansion was in line with the standards of international law applicable to international organisations.

We are at war with life. The Earth ecosystem, our common home, is being destroyed by industrial technologies which have led to massive pollution of all ecosystems, greenhouse effect, deforestation, impoverishment of the soil, overexploitation of fresh water, acidification of the ocean. We are now engaged in a sixth mass extinction. It is time to recognise the ongoing ecocide, the destruction of our common home, as a crime. It is also time to relearn to live in harmony with Nature, to recognise its intrinsic value and its right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, in all its life forms. The Rights of Nature allow us to protect the rights of future generations, human and non-human. This chapter presents various new initiatives and legal cases from around the world to that end.

This chapter assesses the contribution of the ICJ to the law of international organisations. It emphasises the limited role of the Court in this field, setting out the multiple reasons for this: parts of the law were developed before the Court commenced its work; and the Court has only had intermittent opportunities to consider it through its cases. The author argues that the Court’s approach reflects a more general ambivalence of classic international law when it comes to international institutions: that it emphasises the centrality of States in the international legal system, notwithstanding the steps that have been taken by States to institutionalise significant areas of international law.

What role do international organizations play in international law? Similar to states, they have international legal personality, responsibilities, and immunities.  This chapter focuses on the preeminent global intergovernmental organization, the United Nations, and details the functions and limits of its principal organs.  Special attention is given to the General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice. The European Union is the leading example of a regional, supranational organization, and its authority and institutions are discussed in detail as well. The chapter concludes with brief considerations of other major international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and the World Health Organization.

How do we define the state in international law, and what is its relationship to individuals? We begin by outlining the state as a legal concept and differentiating it from similar concepts. We then explore the legal personality of the state under international law, including the elements of statehood, absolute and restrictive immunity, and state responsibility. The problems of state recognition (or non-recognition) of other states and governments is a key to understanding how states interact, as are changes in state status (e.g., secession or other consequential changes).  The last half of the chapter is devoted to the reciprocal responsibilities state and individuals have toward one another, focusing on nationality, citizenship, refugees, statelessness, and the state’s treatment of foreign nationals.

When considering ways for preventing Member States from hiding behind the institutional veil of the organization, two distinct approaches can be identified. The first focuses on the position of the Member State as a subject endowed with its own distinct personality and holder of its own rights and obligations. According to this approach, when the State acts as a member within or on behalf of the organization, it continues to be bound by its obligations and may be held individually responsible for their breach. The second approach focuses on the position of the State qua member of the organization. It relies on the institutional link binding together the organization and its members to affirm that, under certain circumstances, all members should be called upon to bear the consequences of the wrongful acts of the organization in a collective way. While much of the debate on the risk of abuse of the organization’s institutional veil tends to focus on the question of collective responsibility of members, the chapter argues that in practice it is through different forms of individual responsibility that the organization’s institutional veil has been pierced or circumvented.

This chapter will first discuss the main subjects of international law and explain their principal features. Second, this chapter will zoom in on states, the traditional and principal actors in the international legal system. It will discuss the criteria for statehood under international law, the role that recognition plays in this respect, and explain how new states emerge. Finally, this chapter will turn to an analysis of the right to self-determination, a notion that plays an important role in the creation of states and is considered to be the most prominent right of one of the subjects of international law: peoples.

This chapter will first discuss the main subjects of international law and explain their principal features. Second, this chapter will zoom in on states, the traditional and principal actors in the international legal system. It will discuss the criteria for statehood under international law, the role that recognition plays in this respect, and explain how new states emerge. Finally, this chapter will turn to an analysis of the right to self-determination, a notion that plays an important role in the creation of states and is considered to be the most prominent right of one of the subjects of international law: peoples.

Although the nature, organisation and behaviours of ‘non-State armed groups’ (NSAGs) are issues of increasing concern for the international community, in particular due to the participation of these entities in the majority of armed conflicts, relatively little is known about them within the legal realm. When compared to other actors affecting or being affected by different regimes, normative studies dealing with the way in which these non-State entities behave seem to be scarce. This chapter examines NSAGs’ limited position within the international legal architecture. This is because understanding what these actors are allowed to do, or rather are restricted from doing, is determined by a set of rules, the creation and further development on which NSAGs had, at least a priori, no say. This basis serves to assess later in the chapter how international law, political sciences, and different institutions and bodies address NSAGs. A typology of these actors is provided for the purposes of this book.

As AI systems operate with greater autonomy, the idea that they might themselves be held responsible has gained credence. On its face, the idea of giving those systems a form of independent legal personality may seem attractive. Yet this chapter argues that this is both too simple and too complex. It is simplistic in that it lumps a wide range of technologies together in a single, ill-suited legal category; it is overly complex in that it implicitly or explicitly embraces the anthropomorphic fallacy that AI systems will eventually assume full legal personality in the manner of the ‘robot consciousness’ arguments mentioned earlier in the book. Though the emergence of general AI is a conceivable future scenario – and one worth taking precautions against – it is not a sound basis for regulation today.

The increasing participation of armed groups in peace agreements, coupled with the relatively uncertain status of non-state actors under international law, raises a number of important but as yet unsettled questions. This chapter addresses three key issues. The first is the legal status of armed groups under international law. This has direct consequences with respect to the status of peace agreements, and whether they may be regarded as establishing binding international legal obligations or as mere political declarations of intent. The second is the designation of certain groups as ‘terrorist’, and the implications on their participation in peace processes. The third is the role of customary international law vis-à-vis the regulation of peace agreements. The focus of this component is on the potential role of non-state armed groups in the process of creating customary law. Of particular interest is the emergence of customary law regarding the inclusion of human rights considerations in peace agreements.