South Korea implemented vertical as well as horizontal industrial policies in the 1960s and 1970s. Though they performed better than in other developing countries, the cost of the vertical policy outweighed its benefit. Industrial policies went side by side with the emergence of chaebol in a full-fledged form. Chaebol led the structural transformation of the economy, but they also led the production of non-performing loans, helping to deepen the 1979 crisis. In the 1980s, the government lifted vertical policy but strengthened horizontal policy while restructuring chaebol. In the 1990s, South Korea jumped into the newly-emerging information and communication technology industries with industrial policy. Meanwhile, the government began to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and introduced fair trade policies in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, chaebol emerged as global players in higher-technology industries; however, they had many problems, the financial market problem being the most serious, ready to precipitate a crisis.

In the second half of the 1960s, Austria seized on the Italian gas-for-pipe initiative and closed a deal with the Soviet Union. This presented a peculiar problem for the country’s small economy. Under the hegemony of convertibility of the US dollar, as well as the competitive, liberalizing impetus initiated in the establishment of the EEC, Austria feared that the coming large outlays in purchases of Soviet gas would not in turn be spent in Austria. The Soviets were pressuring Austria to liberalize its markets and do away with the strict balancing of trade that had been the norm during Bretton Woods through the technology of negotiated, long-term trade lists. They were right to fear. The Soviets were eager to spend the convertible currency earned through gas exports as profitably as possible. Years before military exports and Petrodollar recycling resolved a similar problem for the United States and Western Europe, Austria struggled to maintain the kind of accounts-balancing, barter exchange with the socialist world it had enjoyed in the postwar period. Market integration seemed inexorable. And the face of that inexorability was the Soviet Union.

This chapter explains the logic behind the choice of institutions that the book highlights. A liberal order is impossible without the capacity to form organizations able to act on behalf of private constituencies. Apart from providing shared goods, private organizations restrain entities capable of repression, including the state. Hence, a section of the book is devoted to exploring the political effects of Islamic and modern waqfs. Whereas the former played key roles in keeping civil society anemic, the latter is now invigorating civic life. Religious repression has been ubiquitous in the Middle East. In inducing preference and knowledge falsification in broad domains, it conceals doubts about policies promoted in the name of religion. In the process, it impoverishes and distorts public discourse. For these reasons alone, religious freedoms are also essential to liberal governance. Economic freedoms are pivotal because they shape political incentives and capacities. Private property rights, the freedom to invest, and predictable taxation are among the determinants of private political capacities. So are characteristics of the available forms of economic organization. Institutions that limit the scale, longevity, and complexity of Middle Eastern enterprises have reduced the political reach of private economic actors.

Islam’s historical institutional complex has delayed a liberal order in the Middle East, not blocked it permanently. The institutions primarily responsible for the region’s historical trajectory are either gone or, under new conditions, they no longer inhibit liberalization. The infrastructure for an effective civil society is in place. Apart from private associations, it includes perpetual enterprises. And no absolute barrier exists to reinterpreting illiberal readings of Islam. By and large, the institutions that sustain the region’s repressive regimes are mutually supporting. For example, religious illiberalism facilitates associational repression, and vice versa. In any one context, the interlinkages among various institutions may work against liberalization, because change depends on appropriate movements in complementary institutions. The half-full part of this glass is that altering a single institution can destabilize others, possibly unleashing a cascade of mutually reinforcing reforms. Yet there is probably no quick fix to the prevailing illiberalism. Many patterns must change for the Middle East to reach advanced standards of liberty. Although specific changes can stimulate one another, each involves adjustments to interpersonal norms, organizational rules, and state laws. Some would upset longstanding status rankings and hierarchies. Learning civic skills requires communal practice. Vested interests are already organized.

This chapter explores Tunisia's history as an authoritarian country that struggled with economic developing, ultimately resulting in a parasitic crony capitalist class closely allied with the regime. While the Arab Uprisings ushered in democracy, they failed to replace these crony networks as business engaged with parties in the new democracy. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia remained a democracy, but the presence of crony capitalists as party funders undermined reform efforts and the ultimate success of the democratic project.

This chapter concludes with thoughts about how democratic activists might be able to remove crony capitalism from institutions. The chapter argues that transparency about the depth of corruption is a necessary first step, especially in terms of understanding who controls rents in the regime. Only when these networks of influence are mapped can democratic accountability start to lead to lasting change.

This chapter puts forward a theory to explain how businesses engage in politics following democratic transitions in countries with significant issues with corruption. The most important variable is the centralization of the networks of brokers who supply companies with needed government privileges. If these rent networks are narrow, then businesspeople must work through a single gatekeeper. If they are broad, then business can engage with multiple brokers and obtain rent more easily.

The Strategic Value Framework developed in this book explicates the dominant sectoral patterns of market governance in Russia today. Historical process tracing from sectoral origins of labor-intensive textiles and capital-intensive telecommunication in this chapter shows how Russian state leaders intersubjectively respond to objective economic and political pressures. The political basis and evolution of the perceived strategic value of national security and resource management took root in the Soviet era through Soviet collapse and transition to and away from democratic rule. In the context of macro-liberalization and mass privatization at the founding of the Russian Federation, interacting perceived strategic value and sectoral structures and organization of institutions have shaped the centralized role of the state in market coordination and variegated property rights arrangements of centralized governance in defense-origin dual use telecommunications reenforced by the rise of Vladimir Putin aided by economic and political crises. The less strategic value of non-defense sectors, such as textiles, is governed by the decentralized coordination and dominant private property of private governance and decentralized governance since Gorbachev’s perestroika. The rise of bifurcated oligarchy in Russian-style capitalism are shaped by the joined imperatives of resource security nationalism and path-dependent sectoral organization of institutions.

In parallel to the centralized governance of strategic industries in Chapter 4, the lower degree and narrower scope of the perceived strategic value of labor intensive and less value-added sectors, represented by textiles, for national security and the national technology base, has shaped decentralized governance and private governance in nonstrategic sectors. In the context of sectoral structural and organization of institutions, less concerned about controlling products or services that have few applications for national security and low contribution to the national technology base, the central state introduced competition in textiles in the 1980s and devolved market coordination of quasi-state and private ownership to local governments and commerce bureaus by the early 1990s before China’s World Trade Organization accession. The cross-time sector and company case studies reveal the interacting strategic value and sectoral logics apply at the subsector. Capital-intensive and more value-added technical textiles experience more deliberate market coordination by local governments and the central state and are characterized by mixed property rights sponsored by and connected with state-run research and development institutions. Taken together the textile industry today experiences periodic overexpansion, environmental degradation, and reactive local state interventions in response to economic reverberations and central-level environmental and developmental mandates.

This chapter shows how in parallel to the regulated governance in telecommunications uncovered in Chapter 7, the perceived strategic value of labor-intensive industries dominated by rural small-scale producers, showcased by textiles, for national self-reliance and neoliberal development, shape the centralized governance by the Indian government. The cross-time sector and company case studies reveal that at a time when centralized market coordination in labor-intensive, less value-added textiles is eliminated around the world, India created a central ministry and other sector-specific bureaucracies in textiles associated with nationalist narratives of Gandhian Swadeshi self-reliance in the 1980s following internal political and economic crises. Endowed with limited resources and regulatory capacity, the centralized governance of the textile ministry has introduced extensive competition in the neoliberal era and deliberately intervened in market developments. In addition to subsidizing industrial upgrading and deregulating market entry, business scope, and trade, the textile ministry has nationalized large-scale textile mills of the organized sector during economic slowdowns. Moreover, fiscal and protectionist trade policies have also cushioned the survival of small-scale, labor-intensive handlooms in apparel and clothing and the highly polluting power looms dominant in more capital-intensive technical textiles even as the state promotes export-oriented industrialization.

This chapter shows how the perceived strategic value of high-tech, globally integrated sectors, represented by telecommunications, for neoliberal development interacts with sectoral structures and organization of institutions. The resultant regulated governance by the Indian government of telecommunications are the micro-institutional foundations of Indian-style capitalism undergirding the globalization and development of such industries disconnected from the post-Independence legacies of the Indian nationalist imagination. The cross-time sector and company case studies show the initial introduction of competition in telecommunications occurred during Big Bang Liberalization supported by pro-liberalization industrial stakeholders disconnected from the existing telecommunications bureaucracy. Today a central-level ministry makes policy and an independent regulator enforces the market entry and business scope of a state-owned fixed-line operator and fiercely competitive mobile carriers and value-added service providers. The role of the state in market coordination and the dominant property rights arrangements vary by subsector as a function of interacting strategic value and sectoral logics. Nehruvian interpretation of Gandhian Swadeshi self-reliance has retained bureaucratic oversight of the development of state- and privately-owned equipment makers, which concentrated on rural automatic exchanges and low-tech inputs until the dominance of Chinese competition pivoted focus to indigenous development in new generation mobile consumer and terminal telecommunications equipment.

The Strategic Value Framework explicates the dominant sectoral patterns of market governance in India today. Historical process tracing from sectoral origins of labor-intensive textiles and capital-intensive telecommunication in this chapter shows how Indian state leaders intersubjectively respond to objective economic and political pressures. The political basis and evolution of the perceived strategic value of national self-reliance and neoliberal development are the successively elected governments’ interpretations of Independence legacies in response to external and sectarian conflicts and economic crises. The joined imperatives in the Emergency period through Big Bang Liberalization in the 1990s have profound implications for the Singh and Modi governments alike in 2004 and beyond. Interacting perceived strategic value and sectoral structures and organization of institutions shape the decentralized role of the state and the dominant distribution of public and private economic actors of regulated governance in high-tech, globally integrated sectors, such as telecommunications. The more centralized state coordination and numerically dominant small-scale industry and politically dominant business groups of centralized governance operate in more rural, labor-intensive sectors, such as textiles, associated with the nationalist imagination of Gandhian Swadeshiism. The dominant sectoral patterns of market governance have given rise to Indian-style capitalism of bifurcated liberalism shaped by neoliberal self-reliance.

The Strategic Value Framework explicates the dominant sectoral patterns of market governance in China today. Historical process tracing from sectoral origins of labor-intensive textiles and capital-intensive telecommunication in this chapter shows how Chinese state leaders intersubjectively respond to objective economic and political pressures. The perceived strategic value of national security and national technology base took root during foreign interventions and internal upheavals from the Qing dynasty to Chinese Communism and the 1978 Open Door Policy and beyond. The joined imperatives interacting with sectoral structures and organization of institutions shape the central state coordination of predominately state-owned and state controlled economic actors of the centralized governance of strategic sectors with application for national security and contribution to the national technology base, represented by telecommunications. Contrary to open economy politics, this is reenforced after China joins the World Trade Organization and enhances authoritarianism under Xi Jinping. The decentralized governance and private governance characterized by market coordination by local governments and nonstate actors and variegated property rights arrangements of nonstrategic sectors, such as textiles, reveal the limits of regime type and state capitalism explanations. These dominant sectoral patterns have given rise to Chinese-style bifurcated capitalism shaped by techno-security developmentalism in China today.

Chapter 7 explains rules on the duration of safeguard measures and the system of incentives for the establishment of safeguards with relatively short duration. Chapter 7 also explains the process of review for extension of safeguards and the requirements to that effect. It further explains the gradual liberalization process that is envisaged during the period of application of a safeguard measure and the concept of a mid-term review. Chapter 7 also explains the complex rules foreseen to avoid the reintroduction of safeguard measures that have been applied in the past.