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Growth Regimes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2022

Peter A. Hall
Peter A. Hall*
Affiliation:
Krupp Foundation Professor of European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA
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Abstract

Although it has a durable institutional shape, the operation of capitalism takes different forms across space and time with varying distributive effects. This article contributes to a growing literature considering the successive forms taken by capitalism in the developed democracies since World War II. It develops a distinctive conception of these forms as “growth regimes” that are mutually constituted by the core practices of firms and reinforcing public policies specific to each historical era. The movement of firm practices and government policies is then examined with a view to identifying the growth regimes of three postwar eras of modernization, liberalization, and knowledge-based growth.

Keywords

growth regimescapitalismfirm strategiesEuropeliberalizationknowledge economy
Type
Research Article
Information
Business History Review , Volume 98 , Issue 1: Forms of Capitalism , Spring 2024 , pp. 259 - 283
Copyright
© 2022 The President and Fellows of Harvard College

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