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Mental imagery plays a key role in the onset and maintenance of psychological disorders, and has become the target of psychological interventions for the treatment of several anxiety-related conditions. However, there are currently no transdiagnostic measures designed to assess the varied dimensions of mental imagery relevant to psychopathology.
Aim:
To develop and validate a new measure assessing the experiences and appraisals of negative mental imagery.
Method:
The initial item pool was generated through a comprehensive literature review and interviews with subject-matter experts. An online community sample provided data for the exploratory (n=345) and confirmatory (n=325) factor analyses.
Results:
The new 16-item Negative Mental Imagery Questionnaire demonstrated four subscales (Intrusiveness, Controllability, Beliefs about Mental Imagery, and Realness). Reliability and validity were good to excellent for both the full- and sub-scales.
Conclusions:
Appraisals of mental imagery captured by the new measure are consistent with previous research on mental imagery and psychopathology.
Future events can spring to mind unbidden in the form of involuntary mental images also known as ‘flashforwards’, which are deemed important for understanding and treating emotional distress. However, there has been little exploration of this form of imagery in youth, and even less so in those with high psychopathology vulnerabilities (e.g. due to developmental differences associated with neurodiversity or maltreatment).
Aims:
We aimed to test whether flashforwards are heightened (e.g. more frequent and emotional) in autistic and maltreatment-exposed adolescents relative to typically developing adolescents. We also explored their associations with anxiety/depression symptoms.
Method:
A survey including measures of flashforward imagery and mental health was completed by a group of adolescents (n=87) aged 10–16 (and one of their caregivers) who met one of the following criteria: (i) had a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder; (ii) a history of maltreatment; or (ii) no autism/maltreatment.
Results:
Flashforwards (i) were often of positive events and related to career, education and/or learning; with phenomenological properties (e.g. frequency and emotionality) that were (ii) not significantly different between groups; but nevertheless (iii) associated with symptoms of anxiety across groups (particularly for imagery emotionality), even after accounting for general trait (non-future) imagery vividness.
Conclusions:
As a modifiable cognitive risk factor, flashforward imagery warrants further consideration for understanding and improving mental health in young people. This implication may extend to range of developmental backgrounds, including autism and maltreatment.
Imagery-focused therapies within cognitive behavioural therapy are growing in interest and use for people with delusions.
Aims:
This review aimed to examine the outcomes of imagery-focused interventions in people with delusions.
Method:
PsycINFO, PubMed, MEDLINE, Web of Science, EMBASE and CINAHL were systematically searched for studies that included a clinical population with psychosis and delusions who experienced mental imagery. The review was informed by the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines and quality appraisal of all included papers was completed using the Crowe Critical Appraisal Tool. Information from included texts was extracted and collated in Excel, which informed the narrative synthesis of results.
Results:
Of 2,736 studies identified, eight were eligible for inclusion and rated for quality with an average score of 70.63%. These studies largely supported their aims in reducing levels of distress and intrusiveness of imagery. Four of the eight studies used case series designs, two were randomised controlled trials, and two reported single case studies. It appears that interventions targeting mental imagery were acceptable and well tolerated within a population of people experiencing psychosis and delusions.
Conclusions:
Some therapeutic improvement was reported, although the studies consisted of mainly small sample sizes. Clinical implications include that people with a diagnosis of psychosis can engage with imagery-focused therapeutic interventions with limited adverse events. Future research is needed to tackle existing weaknesses of design and explore the outcomes of imagery interventions within this population in larger samples, under more rigorous methodologies.
Chronic pain is common and debilitating, and recommended treatments are only moderately effective for pain relief. Focus has shifted to refining targets for change within psychological therapy to improve pain management. Evidence has shown the role of intrusive images in many psychological disorders. However, only a few studies have advanced our knowledge of the presence and impact of mental imagery in chronic pain. This exploratory study aimed to increase our understanding of how people with chronic pain perceive intrusive visual images to influence their daily life. The study employed a qualitative design, using semi-structured interviews to explore the content, emotional valence, cognitive and behavioural impact of pain-related visual images of ten participants with self-reported diagnosis of chronic pain. Data analysis was conducted by performing an inductive thematic analysis. Three key themes were identified: (1) ‘I start to create images in my head’: pain-related mental images, which revolves around descriptions of participants’ most significant visual image; (2) metaphors for pain, related to the imagery as a means to conceptualise and give meaning to the pain; and (3) “With the pain comes the image”: a companion to pain, which focuses on the role of intrusive images in the experience of pain. Results show that pain-related mental imagery appeared to be an intrusive, uncontrollable, and vivid cognitive accompaniment for many pain sufferers. The findings suggest that mental images may serve as an additional target in cognitive behavioural therapy to enhance individuals’ cognitive, behavioural and emotional change.
Key learning aims
(1) To understand the role of mental imagery in the daily life of individuals with chronic pain.
(2) To examine the impact of intrusive images on the emotions, cognitions, and behaviours of people with chronic pain.
(3) To consider clinical implications for CBT interventions targeting pain-related mental images to manage chronic pain.
Embodied imagery hypothesis proposes the activation of perceptual-motor systems during language processing. Previous studies primarily used concrete visual stimuli to investigate mental imagery in language processing by native speakers (NSs) and second language (L2) learners, but few studies employed schematic diagrams. The study aims to investigate mental imagery in processing prepositional phrases by English NSs and L2 learners. Using image-schematic diagrams as primes, we examine whether any mental imagery effect is modulated by target preposition (over, in), the abstractness of meaning (spatial, extended), and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; 1,040 ms, 2,040 ms). A total of 79 adult L2 learners and 100 NSs of English completed diagram–picture matching and semantic priming phrasal decision tasks. Results revealed interference effects on L2 processing of over phrases and under 2,040 ms SOA, but no such effects were observed in the NS group. The selective interference effects in L2 suggest different mental imagery patterns between L1 and L2 processing, and processing schematic diagram primes requires high cognitive demands, potentially leading to difficulties in integrating visual and linguistic information and making grammaticality judgments. The findings partially validate schematic diagrams as visual representations of concepts and suggest the need for further examination of schematic diagrams with varying degrees of complexity.
Mental imagery, or ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ (Kosslyn et al. 2001), provokes strong emotional responses (Ji et al., 2016). To date, there is a lack of data on the content and clinical characteristics (e.g. vividness, likelihood, emotional effects) of spontaneous mental images (MI) in people with bipolar disorder (BD) according to their thymic states.
Aim:
The current study sought to assess the characteristics associated with the contents of MI in people with BD.
Method:
Forty-two euthymic individuals diagnosed with BD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) were asked to self-report their MI during depression, (hypo)mania and euthymia. Participants also rated levels of vividness, likelihood and emotional activation related to MI (i.e. valence, arousal, type of emotion).
Results:
The contents of the MI revealed phenomenological aspects of BD. Different themes were associated with each thymic phase. In (hypo)mania and in euthymia, the mental images were assessed as being as vivid as probable (p>.05). (Hypo)manic and euthymic-related MI activated more pleasure than displeasure (p<.001) and were mainly associated with joy. In depression, MI were assessed as more vivid than likely (p<.05). In depression, MI activated more displeasure than pleasure (p<.0001) and induced mainly sadness.
Discussion:
Overall, a congruence between the contents of images and the three thymic phases was found. The content of the MI was related to self-reported emotional effects that were congruent with the thymic phases concerned. The results add new clinical information for the use of imagery-based cognitive therapy in individuals with BD.
Mental imagery is the experience of perceiving an object within one's own mind and is a subjective experience, leading to difficulties in the research and understanding of the phenomenon. This paper documents the development and verification of a framework for researching the elements of mental imagery. The framework was developed following a review of both psychology and design literature which signified three fundamental conceptual viewpoints of mental imagery: imagery modalities, dimensions of imagery ability, and imagery processes. The aim of this framework is to allow for structured research on mental imagery in any given research field. This is verified through discussion for the product design engineering discipline and provides a base for future work on this topic. The conclusions made in this paper reveal that mental imagery, and particularly visual mental imagery, is largely considered to be integral in design overlooking the different realities of designers and confirming a greater need to understand mental imagery experiences in product design engineering.
Determining objective measures for proof of consciousness in non-human animals has been helped by improved understanding of neural correlates of human consciousness. Functional imaging and neuropsychological studies have shown remarkable overlap between structures involved in actual perception of social and non-social objects and those involved in forming mental images of them. One area of particular interest is individual face recognition. This involves regions of the temporal lobe that are mainly only activated by actual perception or mental imagery of faces. Using behavioural, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological approaches in sheep, we have found that they have similar specialized abilities for recognizing many individuals from their faces. They have developed the same specialized neural processing regions in the temporal lobe for aiding such recognition. Furthermore, parallel activation of other brain regions controlling behavioural and emotional responses only occurs when they are overtly interested in the individuals whose faces they perceive. Such interest might therefore equate to their becoming consciously aware of them. Preliminary experiments have indicated that sheep may form and use mental images and that the regions of the temporal lobe that respond to faces can also do so under conditions where faces are suggested but do not actually appear. Such similarities between humans and sheep in this form of social recognition make it difficult to claim that humans can form mental images of faces whereas sheep cannot. While the ability to form and use mental imagery is not in itself definitive proof of consciousness, it is an important component part.
Mental imagery often occurs during testimonial belief transmission: a testifier often episodically remembers or imagines a scene while describing it, while a listener often imagines that scene as it’s described to her. I argue that getting clear on imagery’s psychological roles in testimonial belief transmission has implications for some fundamental issues in the epistemology of testimony. I first appeal to imagery cases to argue against a widespread ‘internalist’ approach to the epistemology of testimony. I then appeal to the same sort of case to argue for an alternative, externalist view.
This paper reports a preliminary study (N=16) exploring vividness of visual mental imagery in product design ideation. Vividness was observed to vary across designers in the study, from high (68.8% of participants) to moderate (18.8%) to low (12.5%). A significant, strong positive relationship was found between vividness and creativity. Most participants reported using imagery always or sometimes, except one who has difficulties forming mental images. The results have several implications, including the possibility of other ‘ways of imagining’ not captured by visual reasoning models of design.
Sexual obsessions are common in adolescents with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), but how to address these obsessions in a developmentally sensitive manner remains under-explored. This report presents the case of an adolescent who experienced unwanted sexual imagery, undergoing conventional exposure and response prevention, which was subsequently augmented with imagery-based techniques. This approach was associated with remission in symptoms of OCD and marked improvements in symptoms of anxiety and depression. The imagery-based approach was well received and valued as key to treatment success by the adolescent. This raises the tantalising possibility that working directly with images can fuel treatment innovation in tackling sexual (and non-sexual) obsessions in youth OCD.
Key learning aims
(1) Sexual obsessions are common in adolescent obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD).
(2) Little guidance is available on how to conduct exposure and response prevention sensitively for sexual obsessions in adolescent OCD.
(3) Imagery-based techniques can be used effectively for reducing sexual obsessions.
(4) Imagery-based techniques delivered by videoconferencing can be acceptable for young people.
Mental imagery is a generative learning strategy that encourages students to construct a mental representation – a mental image – of the content of a text. Mental images are valuable tools for thinking and learning because they provide a framework for remembering, organizing, and elaborating text information. The research base indicates that mental imagery strategies facilitate not only recall, but also comprehension and transfer performance. An important boundary condition is that students need to receive appropriate instructional support for imagining. Instructional support has been found to consistently improve learning performance across outcome measures for children and adults. Types of support range from training students on how to imagine text content to providing specific instructions on what to imagine, or offering additional material like external pictures.
What is the mental representation that is responsible for implicit bias? What is this representation that mediates between the trigger and the biased behavior? My claim is that this representation is neither a propositional attitude nor a mere association (as the two major accounts of implicit bias claim). Rather, it is mental imagery: perceptual processing that is not directly triggered by sensory input. I argue that this view captures the advantages of the two standard accounts without inheriting their disadvantages. Further, this view also explains why manipulating mental imagery is among the most efficient ways of counteracting implicit bias.
Research into mental disorders has found mental imagery to be a maintaining factor for psychological distress. However, studies investigating mental imagery in eating disorders are scarce.
Aim:
The aim of the present study was to compare spontaneous mental imagery related to eating, weight and/or appearance and intrusive prospective imagery in women with an eating disorder with female healthy controls.
Methods:
Spontaneous mental imagery and intrusive prospective imagery were assessed in adult women with an eating disorder (n = 29) and in female healthy controls (n = 32) using a semi-structured interview and the Impact of Future Events Scale, respectively.
Results:
In comparison with healthy controls, the spontaneous mental images in individuals with an eating disorder involved more sensory modalities (U = 156.50, p < .001, r = –.51), were more vivid (t (52) = 2.04, p = .047, d = .55), negative (U = 103.00, p < .001, r = –.62), and anxiety provoking (U = 158.50, p < .001, r = –.49), and were experienced with a lower sense of control (U = 215.00, p = .009, r = –.36). The emotional impact of intrusive prospective imagery (U = 105.00, p < .001, r = –.66) was also higher in individuals with an eating disorder, as was the number of negative prospective images (U = 283.00, p = .016, r = –.31).
Conclusions:
Our findings are consistent with previous research on mental imagery in other psychiatric disorders, and provide possibilities for incorporating imagery-based techniques in treatment interventions.
Even in cases with complexity, simple techniques can be useful to target a specific symptom. Intrusive mental images are highly disruptive, drive emotion, and contribute to maintaining psychopathology. Cognitive science suggests that we might target intrusive images using competing tasks.
Aims:
We describe an imagery competing task technique within cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) with a patient with bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. The intervention – including Tetris computer game-play – was used (1) to target a specific image within one therapy session, and (2) to manage multiple images in daily life.
Method:
A single case (AB) design was used. (1) To target a specific image, the patient brought the image to mind and, after mental rotation instructions and game-play practice, played Tetris for 10 minutes. Outcomes, pre- and post-technique, were: vividness/distress ratings when the image was brought to mind; reported intrusion frequency over a week. (2) To manage multiple images, the patient used the intervention after an intrusive image occurred. Outcomes were weekly measures of: (a) imagery characteristics; (b) symptoms of PTSD, anxiety, depression and mania.
Results:
(1) For the target image, there were reductions in vividness (80% to 40%), distress (70% to 0%), and intrusion frequency (daily to twice/week). (2) For multiple images, there were reductions from baseline to follow-up in (a) imagery vividness (38%), realness (66%) and compellingness (23%), and (b) PTSD symptoms (Impact of Events Scale-Revised score 26.33 to 4.83).
Conclusion:
This low-intensity intervention aiming to directly target intrusive mental imagery may offer an additional, complementary tool in CBT.
We spend large portions of our inner lives imagining social events and situations that fall under the umbrella of moral cognition. For example, we may simulate in our mind a future scenario in which we have to decide whether to withhold the truth to protect a colleague or a friend and wonder if it is the right thing to do or not. Or we may do the same for a past event or situation. This chapter briefly introduces the field of moral cognition with a focus on dual processing approaches, and then provides a critical review of recent empirical studies about the effect of various forms of mental simulations on a subset of moral cognitive processes. A number of behavioral studies show that imagination can affect moral cognitive processes in multiple ways, from enhancing our emotional responses to personal moral dilemmas and guiding our moral judgments, to facilitating theory of mind simulations and perspective-taking in prosocial scenarios. Ideas for future directions in the field are discussed in the final section.
The experience of mental imagery is a common part of everyday life for most people, and much of this mental imagery has an emotional tone. For example, we may enjoy anticipating an upcoming holiday in our imagination, or an unpleasant image we saw on the television the previous evening may suddenly flash into our mind and bring with it a feeling of sadness or disgust. Scientific research into mental imagery has demonstrated its capacity to evoke emotion, and this is likely to play a role in the important functions that mental imagery appears to have in everyday life. However, the experience of emotional mental imagery is not always helpful, and dysfunctions in emotional mental imagery are observed across a range of areas of mental health, such as depression and anxiety disorders. At the same time, the properties of emotional mental imagery can be deliberately harnessed, for example in psychological therapies. The research presented in this chapter highlights the importance of being aware of the capacity of mental imagery to evoke emotion and the properties of emotional mental imagery when studying the imagination, and raises a number of suggestions for furthering interdisciplinary research in this area.
Mental imagery is perceptual processing that is not triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. Temporal mental imagery is perceptual processing that is not triggered by temporally corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. We aim to show that temporal mental imagery plays an important role in explaining a number of diverse mental phenomena, from the thickness of temporal experience and the specious present to episodic memory and postdictive perception.
Mental imagery is what we experience when we imagine seeing a specific object, hearing a particular sound, or feeling a particular touch, and it is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of our imagination. Historically, research on mental imagery has explored the phenomenological and neurological similarities between mental imagery and sensory perception to understand the quasi-perceptual nature of these conjured “images” we experience in the “mind’s eye.” However, this line of research has traditionally focused on the similarities of mental imagery and perception within each sensory modality, and the relationship between mental imagery in one sense and its effects on perception in another sense or on our perception of the world around us as a whole has largely been ignored. This chapter will extend the study of the relationship between mental imagery and perception into a multisensory context, and utilize insights from research in neuroscience and multisensory perception to explore how mental imagery in one sense can affect ongoing perception in another. The chapter will also examine the similarities in how the brain processes and integrates imagined and real crossmodal sensory stimuli. Lastly, the chapter will discuss how the integration of mental imagery and real sensory stimuli can lead to brain plasticity across the senses and change how we perceive the world around us in the future.
When we are invited to imagine an unacceptable moral proposition to be true in fiction, we feel resistance when we try to imagine it. Despite this, it is nonetheless possible to suppose that the proposition is true. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of imaginative resistance are unable to explain why only attempts to imagine (rather than to suppose) the truth of moral propositions cause resistance. My suggestion is that imagination, unlike supposition, involves mental imagery and imaginative resistance arises when imagery that one has formed does not match unacceptable propositions.