In Chapter 8, I deal with the threat that the present account strips arithmetical knowledge of all the important characteristics traditionally associated with it: apriority, objectivity, necessity and universality. I argue that apriority can be saved in the strong sense of arithmetical knowledge being contextually a priori in the context set by our cognitive and physical capacities. Objectivity can be saved in the sense of maximal inter-subjectivity, while necessity can be saved in the sense of arithmetical theorems being true in all possible worlds where cognitive agents with proto-arithmetical abilities have developed. Finally, universality of arithmetical truths is saved through arithmetic being universally applicable and shared by all members of cultures that develop arithmetic based on proto-arithmetical abilities.

This chapter provides a critical survey of six of the most important interpretations of Carnap’s Logical Structure of the World or Aufbau. I argue that the variety of interpretations of the Aufbau reflect a reasonable pluralism of approaches. This pluralism can be traced to two factors. First, an interpretation of a philosophical text is sensitive to both normative and descriptive elements. Second, there is a reasonable pluralism with respect to the normative elements of an interpretation, especially the philosophical aim that an interpreter attributes to the author of the text. This analysis builds on recent discussions by Beaney of how the history of analytic philosophy should be done. The upshot of the chapter is that a more reflective approach to writing the history of philosophy should help us to acknowledge the plausibility of interpretations of a text that we refuse to endorse.

The misconception of culture is responsible for many difficulties in comparative law. This chapter suggests that a general concept of culture is inevitably distorting or empty, and that any meaningful talk of culture can only take place upon microscopic elements. Cultural elements are different in their relevance to the constitution of the problem of life and accordingly the problem of law; the enquiries into the cultural impacts upon law must be based upon the relevance of a particular element to a particular law. The insider’s view to apprehend culture is a fallacy; the outsider’s view is the only way possible to know a culture. Taking culture as a purely subjective construction is another common misconception while the objectivity of cultural elements is essential for the proper understanding of culture and the methodological improvement of comparative law.

This chapter highlights the importance of newspapers as essential publishing venues for American essayists during the 1880–1920 period. During this time, newspaper columns or editorials were some of the most powerful manifestations of the American essay. A new kind of personal essay emerged, revealing tensions between various categories: the genteel and the modern, progressivism and prejudice, subjectivity and objectivity. While essayistic objectivity aspired to provide verifiable evidence and to be “truthful” in its interpretations of the world, essayistic subjectivity attempted to engage the reader by means of the essayist’s own perceptions and experiences. Significantly, during this period, the essay sought new vessels for authorial subjectivity, be it in the form of fiction or nonfiction, expanding the possibilities of the personal essay. Important essayists, columnists, and editorialists of the period included H. L. Mencken, Anna Julia Cooper, Robert Benchley, Ida B. Wells, and Heywood Broun. For many of these writers, the political and personal are inseparable, and the essay often functions as a form of authorial mediation, of narrative outrage, and a call to social action.

I argue that Either/Or contains a proposal for philosophy of science, and in particular, about the ultimate goal of science (i.e., the ideal epistemic state). Whereas the Cartesian-Hegelian tradition conceived of the ideal state as one of detached reflection – that is, “seeing the world as it is in itself” – the characters in Part I of Either/Or reveal this ideal as leading to practical absurdity. In contrast, Kierkegaard suggests that the ideal state consists in the achievement of equilibrium between the “spectator” and “actor” aspects of the human being. Kierkegaard’s proposal thus sets the stage for Niels Bohr’s “epistemological lesson of quantum theory.”

This chapter shows the limits and ambiguities of the concept of moral clarity even when it is applied with good intentions. Using concrete examples from contemporary politics, it warns that quite often claims invoking moral clarity are an expression of reductionist thinking and tend to overrreach.

Ethical self-formation and epistemic virtues have been a focus of attention in the history of science for over three decades, and yet, despite some important early contributions, anthropologists of science have only recently started to pay more sustained and explicit attention to the ethical. This chapter argues that anthropologists of science could benefit from taking a closer and more systematic look at recent developments in the anthropology of ethics. Conversely it suggests that anthropologists of ethics might gain from a closer consideration of some of the specificities of Euro-American science as an (internally and externally contested, multiple, and perhaps in part fictitious) ethical tradition. The first half of the chapter explores the rather fitful genealogy of an interest in the ethical in the history, sociology, and anthropology of science, and points to some of the elements from which the anthropology of science as an anthropology of ethics might be (re)built. The second half of the chapter gives one extended, ethnographically grounded example of what such a (re)building might produce, and suggests some of the ways in which anthropology’s exploration of both science and ethics might benefit.

In this chapter, I explore the role of the concept of inner purposiveness in the final section of Hegel’s Logic and also the Philosophy of Nature. Hegel defends the claim that the concept is meaningfully applied to living organisms, particularly animals. The concept is actually used precisely where we should expect it, given the argument of ‘Teleology’, both when talking about the internal organisation of animals in parts-organs and when talking about the self-repair or regeneration processes by which they stay alive. By contrast, the concept no longer dominates the description of the natural process that Hegel designates ‘process of the genus’ (or ‘generic process’), in which he considers that natural life is ultimately submitted to externality. I argue that this application and lack of application taken together confirm my views on ‘Teleology’.

This chapter presents the general argument of the book and its main methodological assumptions. The book offers a close reading of the examination of the concept of purpose in The Science of Logic. The concept is understood abstractly, but nevertheless as a causal concept, by means of which we think about what the intrinsic reference to an end means and implies. The chapter clarifies in what sense the approach developed in this book is metaphysical and also what the importance of a better appreciation of Hegel’s chapter on this concept for a correct understanding of the goals and, particularly, the achievements of his entire Science of Logic is.

This chapter develops a novel reading of ‘Teleology’. The chapter shows why there is application for the concept of purpose if an objective process can be conceived of as realising an end. ‘Teleology’ examines what the relevant objective process must consist of. Hegel advocates that where there are causal processes that produce themselves by their peculiar configuration and dynamism, there are purposes that are carried out, provided that such self-production occurs at the expense of objectivity. The implication is that only where there is self-production and because of it, there is purposiveness – inner purposiveness, to be exact. As a consequence, the concept of inner purpose (or end in and for itself) captures the only paradigmatic meaning that the concept of purpose has. In light of Hegel’s argument, the claim that what is made of mechanical processes can truly be an end in and for itself becomes intelligible.

If we accept that transport barriers should be material features for experimental verifiability, we must also remember a fundamental axiom of mechanics: material response of any moving continuum, including fluids, must be frame-indifferent.This means that the conclusions of different observers regarding material behavior must transform into each other by exactly the same rigid-body transformation that transforms the frames of the observers into each other. This requirement of the frame-indifference of material response is called objectivity in classical continuum mechanics. Its significance in fluid mechanics is often overlooked or forgotten, which prompts us to devote a whole chapter to this important physical axiom. We clarify some common misunderstandings of the principle of objectivity in fluid mechanics and discuss in detail the mathematical requirements imposed by objectivity on scalars, vectors and tensors to be used in describing transport barriers.

This essay contrasts Rudolf Carnap’s and W. V. Quine’s responses to the challenge that their positions distort the social nature of inquiry. In Quine’s case, the challenge is the heart of Donald Davidson’s insistence that naturalized epistemology fails to capture the objectivity of thought. In Carnap’s case, the challenge may be detected in Charles Morris’s call for semiotic rather than syntax to ground scientific philosophy. Drawing out the challenge in Morris’s proposal requires considering a neglected influence on this neglected philosopher: his advisor George Herbert Mead’s social theory of mind. Meeting the underlying demand that objectivity be socialized, I argue, requires those of us who wish to pursue Carnap and Quine’s scientific vision of philosophy to recognize the ineliminable role other inquirers play in our own investigations.

The question with which this chapter grapples is the following: What kind of a concept is coherence and what is its content? The chapter begins by a general introduction on concepts. Three different concept types are identified: criterial concepts, natural-kind concepts, and interpretative concepts. As coherence is clearly not a natural-kind concept, the chapter analyses coherence as a potential candidate concept of the criterial kind. It identifies three elements often associated with, and deemed necessary for, the existence of coherence in a legal setting, namely: consistency, correctness, and comprehensiveness. Incidentally, these are also key concerns regarding the existing ISDS regime as expressed by state delegations and scholars. The section ultimately concludes that none of the three elements is necessary for coherence to exist in non-ideal practical situations. Based on this examination, the chapter then shifts perspectives and characterises coherence as a concept of the interpretative kind. In so doing, the chapter makes a preliminary case for the existence of a dual, substantive and methodological, dimension of the interpretative concept of coherence

This chapter analyses the development of IPCC policy for the communication of its reports, the content and style of IPCC communication, and how IPCC knowledge becomes reappropriated for alternative, often political, purposes. In doing so, we review IPCC policy documents, key literature on the IPCC and climate science communication, as well as providing a case study of a recent controversy in IPCC communication: the reappropriation of a paragraph from the IPCC 1.5 ºC special report to headline a political campaign that there were only 12 years to prevent dangerous climate change. This controversy highlights the huge transformations in the political and media landscapes since the IPCC’s formation in 1988 and opens up the question of whether its communication approach remains fit for purpose. We highlight how the IPCC’s communication dilemma stems from the historic decision to design it to be an authoritative voice rather than a deliberative space.

This chapter compares Heidegger’s transcendental approach to social ontology with that found in Husserl. I argue that Husserl and Heidegger are united by the idea that ’the world’ or ’transcendence’ constitutes the most basic form of intersubjectivity, but that their different understandings of the concept of the world lead to divergent conceptions of both subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In short, Husserl takes the world to involve irreducible references to others since perceptual objects can only appear as real or as transcendent if we assume that they possess an inexhaustive number of unperceived aspects that are, in principle, available to other (transcendental) subjects. Heidegger, on the contrary, rejects both Husserl’s interest in objectivity and his notion of the transcendental subject. Instead, he claims that Dasein’s relation to the world must be understood in terms of practical and affective engagement within a field of possibilities, that is, in terms of existential projections. Accordingly, the most basic form of intersubjectivity is found in the transcendental necessity that the same field of entities can be subjected to a multitude of existential projections.

This chapter turns to the second ‘universalisation strategy’ developed by courts to conceal legal indeterminacy when environmental protection and human rights collide. It shows how courts rely on the authority and supposed objectivity of experts when interpreting conflicts and justifying their decisions. The argument unfolds in two parts. The first part analyses the role played by scientific experts in cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union. It critically assesses this expert-based managerial approach to conflict adjudication and highlights the risk of obstructing the protection of certain rights that do not fit a particular epistemic framework. The second part analyses the role played by specialised human rights experts in regional human rights courts in cases concerning Indigenous peoples and cultural minorities. A network of experts with particular institutional ties gets involved in such cases. These experts share a specific (legal) vocabulary and imaginary when speaking on behalf of the applicants, which courts replicate through cross-jurisdictional and cross-cultural referencing. This essentialises certain ways of living determined by artificial binaries of ‘traditional’ versus ‘modern’. What emerges is an empirically rich understanding of regional human rights courts’ reliance on specialised expertise with both bright and dark sides.

This second part delves into concrete cases of conflicts between environmental protection and human rights decided by regional human rights courts. Instead of focusing on the outcomes of each case, the analysis attends to the legal reasoning and justifications articulated by judges when decisions are reached, and courts come to a resolution of adversarial argumentations. How do regional human rights courts balance individual or collective human rights against the interest in environmental protection, when environmental protection and human rights collide? What emerges is a process where parties counter legal indeterminacy by granting weight to specific legal, political and normative goals in an idiom of universality – namely through justifications in the name of ‘universal interests’ or ‘universal truth claims’. Two strategies of ‘universal justification’ are induced from the cases. First, conflicts between environmental protection and human rights tend to be solved though a ‘universalisation strategy’ that rests on an invocation of the ‘general interest’. Second, a ‘universalisation strategy’ is visible when courts settle disputes by relying on the ‘objectivity’ and ‘authority’ provided by scientific or human rights experts. New argumentative dynamics are induced from a critical case-law analysis that reveals particular understandings of the human–environment relation, which engenders specific world-making effects.

This fragment’s argument refutes leading theoretical assumptions informing comparative law to the effect that comparatism can be objective and access truth, on one hand, and that it must be objective and access truth, on the other. Through a biographical sketch, this argument shows that there cannot be a comparison that is not informed by the comparatist’s predispositions and predilections, themselves having much to do with the cultural world that the comparatist embodies.