Humanitarian diplomacy emerged as a concept in the 2000s to describe the vital work effected by non-State humanitarian organizations to negotiate access, protect civilians and uphold humanitarian principles. This paper charts the rise of State-led humanitarian diplomacy in the Middle East, arguing for the need to expand the conventional lens that is focused on non-State actors. It does so through a detailed examination of Qatar, a case study that has emerged over the last two decades as a significant State actor engaging in a range of forms of humanitarian diplomacy. Following a brief theoretical examination of the concept of humanitarian diplomacy, the paper describes Qatar's role in humanitarian diplomacy in relation to the changing context of armed conflict and humanitarian response in the Middle East. It then presents a categorization of Qatar's humanitarian diplomacy, employing a framework structured around multiple levels including practice, policy and normative/ideational, carried out by both non-State and State actors. Finally, the paper reflects on the significance of Qatar's experience and the implications it may have on the conduct of humanitarian diplomacy in the region, and in particular what a niche small State can do to contribute to the protection of the humanitarian sphere.

Identifying the impact of remittances on household members remaining behind is difficult due to selection into migration. In this paper, we exploit an unexpected embargo on Qatar, the second major destination among Nepali migrants. Using longitudinal data on about 1,500 Nepali households with migrants prior to the embargo, we assess how this shock translates into changes in remittances and development outcomes. We find a 56% reduction in remittances for households with a migrant in Qatar. At least in the months immediately after the shock, such a fall in remittances does not seem to translate into recipient household's welfare. However, we cannot exclude that such effect might materialize in the medium run. That is particularly true for poor and credit-constrained households, especially vulnerable to the remittance windfall and lacking the ability to move their migrants or other household members to other destinations.

The aim of this paper is not to relitigate Qatar’s human rights record but to assess the effectiveness of its labor reforms: the principal concern is dispute resolution and enforceability. While Qatar instituted a broad suite of labor law reforms in the years preceding the World Cup, questions remain about whether they have improved access to justice for migrant workers. More attention needs to be given to the dispute settlement system established by Law No. 13 of 2017 to assess if new legal norms translate into enforceable rights. It is argued that the labor dispute system has largely failed by not taking into account the circumstances that define the employer-employee relationship in Qatar, especially the stark imbalance in power. While reforms might endure at the level of formal law, the dispute system will fail to deliver genuine justice to workers unless it is refashioned.

The language of human rights is a prominent tool of choice to push for moral principles such as justice, equity, and fairness in the social, economic, and political spheres. Simultaneously, the concept and practice of human rights have attracted critiques. Relativism is one such enduring critique. Relativists advocate due and reasonable consideration towards cultural diversity and specificity of diverse human communities, within the limits allowed by universality of human rights. The relativist critique featured prominently in the debates surrounding Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022. Commentators have spoken about Qatar’s scrutiny often moving beyond legitimate human rights criticism, uninformed activism being counterproductive; and the appropriateness of, largely, Western and maximalist ideals of human rights being applied without accounting for local needs and peculiarities. In this Article, I bring together the literature on the relativist critique and the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 as a case study, to examine the usefulness and limitation of human rights as a language of critique to achieve meaningful transformative change in sporting contexts. I focus on the debates surrounding the rights of migrant workers and the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community; and argue that while human rights advocacy had a notable impact in relation to FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, it is a tale full of cautions and lessons.

One year ago, the Qatar World Cup was in full swing, and Qatar was omnipresent in our public and private spheres. For many, the Qatar 2022 World Cup will forever be intimately connected with the plight of migrant workers. This Article dives into the confluence of spectacle, counter-marketing, international—labor and human rights—law, and local reforms, which came together in the long decade which followed FIFA’s fateful decision in December 2010 to give the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. It starts by situating the FIFA World Cup 2022 within Qatar’s drive for soft power and nation branding, before turning to re-counting how the 2022 World Cup was “ambushed” in the name of Qatar’s migrant workers and their rights, putting the issue on the global agenda and triggering the involvement of the ILO. Thereafter, the Article discusses the effects of this ambush counter-marketing by engaging with the labor reforms introduced by the Qatari government, while highlighting their limits in terms of scope and implementation. The Article concludes with a general discussion on the blind spots and shortcomings of the turn to counter-marketing as a strategy to vindicate international human rights or labor rights.

Among the many human rights and corruption concerns surrounding the Qatar 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup, two ultimately rose to the fore: labor and LGBTQ+ rights. A careful look at Qatar’s response to these issues reveals a sharp and provocative contrast. Though the World Cup organizers and the Qatari Government generally resisted Western criticism of its LGBTQ+ laws and practices, both bodies adopted systemic labor reforms. To the extent these reforms remain in place several years after the event, they can be said to constitute a human rights legacy. This Article explores one angle from which to understand this contrast. It distinguishes between principles, which are deeply rooted in a country’s political, cultural, or religious belief system, and practices, which find their support in convenience, profit, and the self-interest of entrenched powers but which lack a deeper cultural, philosophical, or religious grounding. It further argues that sexual morality is best understood in the context of Qatari law and culture as a principle, while the labor abuses are mere practices. This distinction helps explain the disparate levels of reform and legacy: to the extent human rights violations are rooted in principles, the likelihood of reform and therefore of legacy is relatively low; where these violations are rooted merely in practices, the likelihood may be substantially higher. This distinction can also help to predict how future host countries/cities will respond to the human rights standards that megasport governing bodies increasingly enforce.

The first article written about psychiatric services in Qatar was published in BJPsych International in 2006. Since then, the health system in Qatar has undergone significant transformation in the areas of service delivery, research and education. International accreditations are sought in all these fields to emphasise the standard achieved. In this article, we follow up on the mental health services currently available in Qatar, their strengths and the associated challenges.

In response to a forced labour review by the International Labour Organization (ILO) that threatened to turn into a formal international inquiry,1 the government of Qatar commenced an ambitious programme of labour reforms aimed largely at addressing concerns about its treatment of migrant workers. About 2.4 million men and women,2 an estimated 88.4 per cent of the small Gulf nation’s population,3 are migrant workers. It has the second largest known gas reserves in the world, and its airbases are home to the largest United States military installation in the Middle East.4 Yet, the small Gulf emirate garnered little international scrutiny until it was awarded in 2010 the right to host the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) men’s Football World Cup tournament in 2022.

This cross-sectional study was designed to establish diagnostic accuracy of the Patient Health Questionnaire 2 in Qatar’s primary care population. The data required for the study were anonymously extracted from Qatar’s primary care electronic medical record system. The sensitivity, specificity, predictive values, negative values and optimal cut-off points were calculated for the tool. A total of 6921 individuals met the study’s inclusion criteria. The diagnostic accuracy of cut-off values was calculated for scores 1–6. Based on the Youden’s index (0.58), a score of 2 was identified as the most optimal cut-off. It offers a sensitivity of 88.73% and specificity of 69.31%. Further studies should aim to confirm the results using alternative study designs and to report them in accordance to population characteristics both in Qatar and internationally.

As part of the roundtable “The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order: Twenty Years since Its Inception,” this essay examines the issue of norm entrepreneurship as it has been used in conjunction with the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), twenty years after the emergence of The Responsibility to Protect report produced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It examines norm entrepreneurs with enough drive, motivation, and resources to keep RtoP on the international agenda in a changing world order, after Western middle powers, such as Canada and some European Union member states, had previously acted as indispensable norm entrepreneurs. An examination of both Western and non-Western entrepreneurship efforts to date reveals three key observations. First, RtoP champions are now facing additional challenges in today's transitional global order, where nationalistic foreign policy agendas are replacing liberal agendas, such as RtoP. Second, the drive and adaptability of non-Western norm entrepreneurs with regional ambitions mean that small states can emerge as rather-unexpected RtoP champions. Third, giving non-Western states a visible regional or international platform allows them to display leadership in reframing prevention under the RtoP framework. The last two observations point to the increasing role of non-Western states in global governance and in the promotion of prevention measures to protect the most vulnerable, which in turn increases the legitimacy of the RtoP norm itself.

There is a paucity of evidence about the prevalence and risk factors for symptomatic infection among children. This study aimed to describe the prevalence of symptomatic coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and its risk factors in children and adolescents aged 0–18 years in Qatar. We conducted a cross-sectional study of all children aged 0–18 years diagnosed with COVID-19 using polymerase chain reaction in Qatar during the period 1st March to 31st July 2020. A generalised linear model with a binomial family and identity link was used to assess the association between selected factors and the prevalence of symptomatic infection. A total of 11 445 children with a median age of 8 years (interquartile range (IQR) 3–13 years) were included in this study. The prevalence of symptomatic COVID-19 was 36.6% (95% confidence interval (CI) 35.7–37.5), and it was similar between children aged <5 years (37.8%), 5–9 years (34.3%) and 10 + years (37.3%). The most frequently reported symptoms among the symptomatic group were fever (73.5%), cough (34.8%), headache (23.2%) and sore throat (23.2%). Fever (82.8%) was more common in symptomatic children aged <5 years, while cough (38.7%) was more prevalent in those aged 10 years or older, compared to other age groups. Variables associated with an increased risk of symptomatic infection were; contact with confirmed cases (RD 0.21; 95% CI 0.20–0.23; P = 0.001), having visited a health care facility (RD 0.54; 95% CI 0.45–0.62; P = 0.001), and children aged under 5 years (RD 0.05; 95% CI 0.02–0.07; P = 0.001) or aged 10 years or older (RD 0.04; 95% CI 0.02–0.06; P = 0.001). A third of the children with COVID-19 were symptomatic with a higher proportion of fever in very young children and a higher proportion of cough in those between 10 and 18 years of age.

An undercurrent of change is occurring in Qatar's approach towards mental healthcare. In the past 5 years, significant attention has been given to community care initiatives. There is much progress to be made, but the provision of psychiatric support outside of hospitals, the launch of several community services and the tackling of the associated social stigma represent a marked step away from the norm that has usually pervaded in the region. This article analyses these changes and identifies the challenges that remain.