The introductory chapter argues that the near universal rise of the radical Right is more than a series of national coincidences and that despite differences in their ideas and policies, a globally connected Right is emerging. One indication of this is the emergence of global networks and events such as the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), the NatCon Conferences, and the Madrid Forum. However, the globality of today’s radical Right goes beyond mere transnational networks, and requires a wider rethinking of its relationship to the global in two ways. First, the radical Right is constituted by transnational interactions operating at multiple scales. Second, it defines itself and is co-constituted by its relation to the global, not just to the national. The chapter also discusses the vexed issue of defining the Right and the difficulties of studying the Right.

This chapter examines how the refugee crisis was framed and portrayed by right-wing actors. Its main puzzle is how the initially sentimental, humanitarian approach to the coverage of the refugee crisis was gradually transformed to present refugees as an existential threat to European societies. We track the frames and themes utilized by mainstream and radical right parties in their official speeches, documenting that utilizing a framework focusing on security and identity, they slowly managed to shift the perceptions on immigrants arriving at European shores. Furthermore, their rhetoric aimed at actively downplaying the humanitarian element, claiming instead that the search and rescue operations had perverse effects, motivating immigrants to make the crossings into the EU and worsening the refugee crisis. Therefore, in Hirschman’s terms, a rhetoric of jeopardy and perversity dominated the right's reaction to the refugee crisis, slowly eroding sympathy toward migrants.

This chapter studies the dynamics of elite support, which varies considerably across time. This temporal fluctuations are explained by three different sets of variables: the changing political and problem pressure that governments face, the contextual characteristics that may moderate this relationship, and the endogenous dynamics unfolding between different elite groups. Far from the elite closing ranks behind government proposals as the “rally-around-the-flag” perspective may suggest, nongovernment elites rather use the strategic opportunity offered by mounting problem pressure to articulate opposition to these proposals and signal distance from governments as a result. This dynamic is mostly confined to destination and transit states, and it is more prominent during debates on border controls and in the early phase of the crisis. By contrast, the impact of political pressure is largely in line with our expectations: In response to the growing strength of the radical right, the elite steps up dissent, with the strongest effect found, again, in destination states. In addition to responding to external pressure, elite groups were also shown to engage in strategic behavior with respect to each other.

This chapter analyses the policies of populist radical right party-led local governments in Austria, France, Italy and Switzerland. It assesses the extent to which their party ideology is evident. The analysis concerns three forms of policy: policy agendas, budgetary spending and policy designs. Each enables a different form of comparison to be made, through which the impact made by the parties and its cross-national variation is assessed. First, analysis of agendas reveals their policy priorities once elected into local government. These are compared with mainstream parties in similar contexts. Second, analysis of budgets shows the extent to which these priorities were realized in the form of spending. Comparison here is made with the preceding mainstream party-led local government in the same context. Third, analysis of their policies’ framing of target populations, policy tools and policy rationales demonstrates the varying extent to which they generate social constructions that align with party ideology. The leadership of local government by populist radical right parties in Western Europe is shown to lead to contrasting degrees and forms of policy impact.

This chapter provides an explanation for the different approaches to local government taken by populist radical right parties in Austria, France, Italy and Switzerland, and their different degree of radicalism. It conducts a systematic exploration of the process by which these parties govern at the local level. The empirical basis for this analysis is interviews with 57 local government actors, semi-structured in order to investigate the two overarching themes that are theoretically expected to influence their approaches to governing. The chapter unveils the mechanisms through which moderation is imposed (or radicalism is facilitated) by, first, various institutional constraints, and, second, cross-level party linkages. As a final step, it reconstructs the process by which each populist radical right-led local government responded to the European migration crisis during the 2010s. The institutional constraints and cross-level party linkages particular to each of the four cases can explain the varied (multi-level) governance configurations that emerge, and as a result the varying degree of radicalism in their approach.

Integration into the democratic system may induce the moderation of radical parties. This chapter assesses the extent of mainstreaming of populist radical right parties that follows their entry into local power. It does so through analysis of their discourse before and after attaining the leadership of the local government and considers four dimensions of mainstreaming. First, programmatic expansion and the relative salience of issues outside of their ideological core. Second, de-radicalization, in terms of the positioning towards and framing of the issue of immigration. Third, a softening of anti-establishment discourse and behaviour, considering both conflicts with other political actors and institutional reforms. And fourth, the self-presentation as normal and responsible, as opposed to a prior reputation for extremism and/or incompetence. To analyse changes across these dimensions, it draws from a range of data sources: council meetings, Facebook posts and newspaper articles. The chapter reveals cross-national differences in the extent of mainstreaming and suggests that institutional and party-strategic differences are crucial determinants of the extent and form of such change.

This chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings for an analysis of the impact made by populist radical right parties in local government. This theoretical framework is grounded not just in theories particular to the party family, but also ones more general to the analysis of party politics and institutions. Four main questions are addressed. First, regarding the policy goals of the populist radical right: what do they want? Second, regarding partisan influence over government policy, do parties matter – even in local government? Third, regarding the mainstreaming of the populist radical right, are they tamed by power? And fourth, regarding the strategic uses of local government made by parties, are such localities laboratories of radicalism? Before the subsequent chapters analyse the different routes taken by populist radical right-led local governments in Western Europe, this chapter provides several explicit expectations for how their impact is likely to vary cross-nationally according to two main factors: institutional constraints and central party strategies.

This concluding chapter discusses the findings of the study and its contributions to the analysis of populist radical right parties and their impact on (local) government. It goes into further depth regarding the novel perspectives it offers regarding the study of three topics in particular: the policies of populist radical right parties in government, party politics at the local level of government and the threat to liberal democracy from populist radical right parties, as well as the restraints imposed upon them at the local level of government that mitigate such a threat.

The entry of populist radical right parties into positions of power has generated anxieties regarding the potential consequences for liberal democracy. Yet while these parties have also gained control of local governments, activities at that level have been largely overlooked. This longstanding neglect is surprising when we consider the development of populist radical right parties in Western Europe, which has been a provincial phenomenon from the beginning. Prior to their breakthrough on the national stage, crucial strategic innovations and electoral successes took place at the local level of politics. This chapter introduces the topic of populist radical right parties in local politics and positions the book in existing debates on their impact on government and strategies for governing. It provides a clear conceptualization of impact, in both indirect and direct forms, and summarizes the various strategies that they have pursued in government. It then outlines the various forms of populist radical right-led local government, distinguished by the radicalism of their impact and the involvement of the central party. The chapter ends by presenting a plan for the chapters to follow.

This chapter introduces the cases of populist radical right parties in local government in Austria, France, Italy and Switzerland that are the empirical focus of the book. It outlines the contextual background to their entry into local government, showing the multiple pathways they took to attain power. To do so, the chapter first considers long- and short-term contextual factors that led to an increased demand for populist parties in localities that had previously been strongholds of the centre-left. Then the chapter turns to the electoral campaigns, and the internal and external supply-side factors behind the populist radical right successes. It also considers the strategic position of these localities for the central parties, and the central-local party relations during the campaign. Finally, it details the election results and the subsequent formation of governments, including the formation of coalitions and allocation of executive responsibilities. Ultimately, the chapter shows the different forms of ‘local power’ that populist radical right parties held after their election victories in these cases and the reasons behind the cross-national differences.

This chapter analyzes the complex interplay of economic and cultural issues that provoked discontented movements on both the left and right in Spain. Initially, resentment over EU-backed austerity policies allowed the left-populist Podemos party to break into Spain’s party system. But the rise of a populist left that embraced multiculturalism, exacerbated by continuing economic struggles, provoked a powerful reaction on the other side of the aisle when Catalonia attempted to declare independence. This threat to national unity led to the reemergence of right-wing nationalism in the form of a new radical right political party, VOX. Using original data collected as part of the Political Systems Attitudes Study, the chapter shows that support for VOX was driven primarily by cultural discontent, but as argued throughout the book, cultural discontent itself was driven by the ongoing economic crisis.

Latin America differs from our other cases in crucial ways. It did not suffer as badly from the Great Recession as did many other regions, although it experienced its own crisis when the boom in commodity prices burst. And historically, cultural issues over race and ethnicity had not been as politicized as in Europe and North America. Nevertheless, we see a similar causal process in this region as in our other cases. As regional economies suffered, antagonism towards politics as usual increased. The nature of discontent, however, differed radically depending on the details of the dominant political order it opposed. In Brazil, discontent came to resemble Trumpism, with a focus on cultural issues that had been addressed by the formerly dominant Workers’ Party, while also addressing rampant corruption. In Chile, discontent centered on the elitism of Chile’s democracy, and the institutions that reinforced it, placed insurmountable barriers in the path of political outsiders and insurgent parties; as a result, discontent in Chile manifested as mass contention. This chapter uses analysis of existing datasets (including LAPOP and national election studies) to show how economic concerns, exacerbated by democratic deficits, drove discontent over cultural discontent, corruption, and elitism.

This chapter begins applying the theory to the core cases, starting with Trumpism in the USA and Euroscepticism and Brexit in the United Kingdom. It traces the evolution of the populist radical right in both countries; throughout the process, economic trauma, compounded by inadequate or imprudent political responses to the unfolding crisis, stoked and inflamed cultural tensions. Yet in both cases, discontent failed to break through the political status quo as radical right antecedents like the Tea Party and the UK Independence Party (prior to Farage’s ascension to leadership) failed to embrace their supporters’ cultural radicalism. Only when Trump and Farage began to explicitly connect economics, culture, and politics did radical right populism manage to provoke a rupture. We support these arguments using original survey data in the USA, the British Election Study, and analyses of Trump’s rhetoric.

This chapter serves two primary purposes. First, it establishes the book’s conceptual schema of political discontent. It identifies three ways in which discontent can manifest: against regime institutions (low regime support/regime antipathy), against the political elite (anti-elitism and populism), or even against reality (conspiracism). This section addresses conceptual debates in the study of each type of discontent, selecting or developing definitions according to set criteria. It also discusses the two primary ways discontent can influence behavior: through support for political outsiders and through contentious politics. Second, the chapter summarizes existing approaches to the study of discontent. It discusses shared elements of the global political order, especially neoliberal capitalism, liberal democracy, and more recently multiculturalism. Political discontent varies in form from case to case but is generally shaped by a rejection of one or more elements of this order. Reviewing the scholarship on each subtype of discontent, the chapter finds a recurring debate between economic and cultural origins. Neither approach can fully explain discontent, but neither can be ignored or disproven. As a result, the chapter concludes that a comprehensive theory must synthesize these two approaches.