The All-Affected Principle (AAP) is a simple idea that captures a core democratic intuition: enfranchising the people who are governed. Yet democratic theorists have often shied away from the various conceptual challenges that explicating its meaning arises. This chapter therefore articulates a reformulation of the AAP that is (a) pluralistic, which means it is more flexible in terms of both the kind of effect it examines as triggering right for participation as well as the kind of influence and forms of participation that may be required and (b) refocuses the principle around social power rather than mere affectedness. The implications of this reformulation are briefly considered in the context of referenda as a tool for determining the boundaries of political communities and it is concluded that such referenda need to be institutionalized and built into democratic system, in the same way procedures for constitutional amendments allow for infrequent but crucial examination of the political communitys foundations.

This chapter presents key findings about people’s opinions on the EU as well as their participation in EP elections and referendums. It shows how evaluations of the EU have evolved from a permissive consensus in the early years of European cooperation to a constraining dissensus that has emerged since the 1990s. The chapter outlines the factors that determine people’s votes in EP elections as well as the different types of referenda that member states have organized with respect to EU affairs. Support for the EU can be explained by the benefits people derive from it, the beliefs they have about politics and identity and benchmarks. Citizens also take cues from political parties and politicians in making up their minds about the EU. Issues of identity have become more prominent in determining people’s stance towards politics, both at the national and at the European level. The more critical stance of EU citizens towards European integration has increased the support for Eurosceptic political parties, which want to see a smaller role for the EU.

TG must be carried out inclusively, and with due respect for the continuous principle of self-determination. The ‘inclusion cascade’ read in conjunction with this principle goes further than the procedural right to a constitutional referendum and general elections towards the end of the interregnum, yet requires less than substantive democracy. TA are expected to favour broad and progressively inclusive popular participation whereby answers to questions as to who to include, how and when are gaining precision. The concept of population is being redefined and inclusivity becomes a must for some techniques (notably constitution-making) and at some moments (notably towards the end) of the transition. In the same context, TA usually commit to some form of TJ and, subject to a few limitations, may choose how to do so. These practices contribute to custom formation in relation to TG. At the same time, the principle of self-determination gains in precision through such practices mostly seen as obligations of conduct.

This chapter examines populism in Latin America as a method of exercising power, rather than a specific set of substantive provisions. It explores the commonalities between left-populism and right-populism as illustrated by two ideologically opposing figures, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Álvaro Uribe in Colombia. Despite their contrasting social and economic policies, there were more similarities than differences in the legal architecture they deployed. In both cases, the preferred tools included the resort to referenda to circumvent and control the legislature, delegitimation of the opposition, and activation of mechanisms allowing the executive to legislate by decree. Their methods illustrate how populist leaders use tools to produce arguments of legitimacy for their selection of winners and losers in society.

This chapter explores longstanding debates over the government’s speech to influence the public’s views about ballot initiatives, referenda, and other political contests subject to vote by the people themselves or by their elected representatives. The chapter starts by explaining the constitutional objections to the government’s persuasive speech in candidate campaigns, and then considers whether those objections still hold as applied to the government’s persuasive speech in issue campaigns. One constitutional objection to the government’s political advocacy focus on the consequences of the government’s speech, positing that the government’s voice—with its advantages of resources and power—inevitably and unfairly distorts public discourse. Another focuses on the government’s objectives when speaking, maintaining that the government’s role as sovereign requires it to remain neutral in these contests. The chapter concludes that the government’s issue advocacy valuably adds to the marketplace of ideas so long as its governmental source is transparent, so long as the government does not hold a monopoly over the relevant information, and so long as counterspeech remains unfettered.