In most accounts, the modern American “tax revolt” begins with Proposition 13, passed by California voters in June 1978. In this telling, the revolt represents an antigovernment, antiliberal shift among white homeowners instrumental in the “rise of the right” and the fall of the “New Deal order” that culminated in Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 and his subsequent tax cuts. This article challenges that account by demonstrating that the revolt began more than a decade before Prop 13 as approval rates for local levies and bonds reached all-time lows. This local revolt was not limited to whites, nor did it portend rising conservatism. Instead, it was rooted in lower- and middle-income Americans’ frustrations with steep rises in unfair, regressive taxes during the post–World War II decades. The Kennedy-Johnson “Growth Liberals,” who were busy cutting progressive federal taxes at the same time that regressive state and local taxes were soaring, missed this pocketbook squeeze, thereby setting the stage for later events like Prop 13.

Milton Friedman’s idea of flexible exchange rates was heresy for Americans until the mid-1960s. However, by the late 1970s the idea became embedded in academic thought, policymaking, and business practices. This article analyzes how floating currencies, once eschewed, became embraced as legitimate in the US through the late 1960s and early 1970s. It demonstrates how business leaders’ economic interests and laissez-faire economists’ framework for causes of and solutions to business hardships contributed to society’s acceptance of currency flexibility. Increasing societal support of flexible currencies strengthened the power of float-advocates within the US government, facilitating the transition of the international monetary system from fixed exchange rates to floating. This study highlights how material interests and policy discourses contributed to America’s new policy orientation. It also addresses the origins of the neoliberal international financial order by documenting how American elites reconstituted the state-market balance in global finance while navigating monetary crises.

This article argues that federal labor policy was a factor in causing the Great Compression, the dramatic compression of skill-based wage differentials that occurred in the 1940s, and in bringing it to an end. By giving the National Labor Relations Board the power to determine the appropriate collective-bargaining unit, New Dealers gave industrial unions the means with which to build a more egalitarian wage structure. Unskilled and semiskilled workers seized the opportunity and voted themselves big pay raises. Skilled craftsmen responded by petitioning the NLRB for permission to form their own craft bargaining units, a process known as “craft severance.” As conservatives gained influence in Washington in the 1940s, the board adopted a bargaining-unit policy more favorable to craft unions. By the early 1950s, skilled craftsmen had regained control of their wage demands and thereby helped bring the Great Compression to a halt.

In 1981, around fifty conservative southern Democrats in the House of Representatives, the so-called Boll Weevils, played a crucial role in the enactment of President Ronald Reagan’s economic agenda. The significance of this episode has thus far been underappreciated. This article illustrates the importance of the Boll Weevils’ support to the early success of Reagan’s presidency, as well its implications for both the South’s political landscape and for the national Republican Party.

Though short-lived, this coalition would prove to be a significant rupture in the Democratic Party’s superiority in the South at the congressional level and highlighted the partisan fragmentation the region was undergoing. As this article will demonstrate, the events of 1981 returned southern conservatism to the center of power in Washington for the first time in over a decade and acted as a catalyst for a number of southern Democratic congressmen to move toward the GOP.