It is no longer news to argue that economics is performative, that it does not only describe markets, but takes part in producing or manufacturing them. Once accepted as close to a matter of fact, the performativity argument risks becoming too much of a general statement. So, what’s next for performativity? This chapter turns the performativity into an empirical research agenda which moves from demonstrating the existence of performativity to putting the performativity argument to the test and investigate sites and modes of performativity. We need to distinguish between the performativity of research as constitutive, that is how knowledge production has an effect on the world; while simultaneously being aware that this is not by itself enough to effectively shape actual markets. To find empirical and analytical ways to observe performativity in action, we go back to one of the original sites from where the performativity of economics argument was developed: economic and marketing experiments. We find that both much more is made in these settings than the making of actual markets, for instance the making of economics as a discipline and so also knowledge of markets, and much less, as the markets produced in these settings do not always move out of them.

This chapter provides a research agenda for pediatric climate distress. It is structured into five domains. First, it reviews the importance of delineating among existing definitions of climate distress, including distinguishing between normal and pathological stress responses and integrating concepts from existing anxiety literature. Second, it discusses the importance of researching the epidemiology of climate distress, including developing and validating measurement tools, identifying young people most vulnerable and resilient, and considering the effects of parental mental health and social determinants of health on youths’ psychological responses. Third, it highlights the need to explore the psychological meaning and sequelae of climate change, including moral disengagement, dialectics of climate distress, and moral outrage. Fourth, it points to conventional and novel interventions to address climate distress that require further investigation. Fifth, it reviews the need to assess how climate change may impact young peoples’ psychological distress on a biological level. It concludes with recommendations for how to foster interdisciplinary collaborations and increase funding for this research.

By integrating the fragmented research on emergency services, armed forces, and humanitarian organizations, this book identifies the components of a new theory on frontline crisis response. To begin with, the work of responders is characterized by persistent operational dilemmas. Since there are no universal solutions, they need to adapt their approaches and decisions to the situational contingencies of a crisis. These adaptations continue throughout the crisis response process as the situation evolves. Responders usually pragmatically act their way through operational dilemmas in the crisis response process. These experiences nevertheless have an existential effect on their identities and lives. Thus, the new theory comprises operational dilemmas, situational contingencies, response processes, pragmatic principles, and existentialist ideas. This theory offers a basis for crisis response improvements and contributes to the literature on strategic crisis management, frontline work in organizations, reliable organizing in risky contexts, and post-crisis operations. The chapter ends with a research agenda and a call for more academic engagement with frontline crisis response.

Taking such a stance inevitably shifts the analysis towards production or some soteriological notion of knowledge. Instead, I point to the relevant issues of practical choices: situations (which are not just exhausted by known distributions or unreflected habits or routines but which require constant attention to surprises) to the temporality of choice in which present, past, and future interact that explode the intentional paradigm of action) and the issues of judgement (Kant’s Urteilskraft), which is a critical ability but does not coincide with algorithms or of testing theoretical propositions but which can be acquired only by acting within the social world, or as Hume had it is acquired by ‘commerce and conversation’ rather than by observation from an ideal standpoint.

The concluding chapter summarizes the key insights vis-à-vis the TLC concept – how TLCs form, who they involve, and all other meaningful empirical points about them to know, for example, what makes them legitimate and effective. It discusses how the book’s findings contribute to wider debates in global governance and highlights the concept’s contribution to different strands of literature in international relations and international law, discusses the concept’s generalizability beyond the human rights regime, and gives incentives for future research.

A value reinforcement hypothesis expects that governance structures reinforce the values of the representative governments they serve.If a political system embraces pluralism and collective rationality as process values, its governance structures will enhance those process beliefs.If a government faces strong electoral accountability, its governance structures will emphasize accountability values, making identifiable managers likely to face sanctions for their performance.Correlations such as these would be observed if the hypothesis has potential for guiding a positive research agenda.The value reinforcement hypothesis has both institutional and behavioral mechanisms behind it.

The aim of this final chapter is to take stock of the current research on co-creation in the public sector and assess the prospect for co-creation to become a core principle of public governance. The chapter also sets an agenda for future research and identifies some disruptive steps that the key social and political actors must take in order to advance co-creation.

The final chapter summarizes the book’s findings, evaluates its contributions to the study of post-conflict democracy as well as the limitations of the research, assesses policy implications, and suggests additional avenues for future research.

The final chapter of the book compares the findings from the four issue areas and links them with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. The chapter then asks: Given the EU’s interventions, what have been the impacts on the functioning of private governance and the larger policy field? The chapter argues that the regulatory impacts are twofold: The interventions have both restructured the field of private governance and largely retained private actors’ governing authority and private governance space. The interventions impose baselines that cannot be undercut and that arguably have resulted in some sustainability improvements. At the same time, the interventions are relatively limited since the standards and procedural regulations are minimum baselines with several evident gaps. This situation allows for policy exports and spillovers from private to public governance, both within the EU and beyond, which can potentially strengthen public policy. The chapter then discusses the generalizability of the theory by discussing examples of public interventions at both the international and the domestic level beyond the EU. The book concludes with avenues for further research.

Globalization, accountability, and technology are changing important aspects of global governance. While coercion, enforcement, and material sanctions have often taken pride of place as major movers of interstate relations, scholars and policy agents alike have come to appreciate the multifaceted nature of power exerted more subtly and gradually.

The proliferation of global performance indicators (GPIs) is one example of such power. They contain ideas and worldviews, and they attempt to “regulate” through non-coercive but nonetheless powerful means. They do not merely measure qualities and practices in order to understand or inform, they pressure their targets to perform and conform. In wielding such tools, a diverse set of actors insert themselves in the governing process, in some cases even shifting policy parameters. When promulgated by authoritative actors, GPIs can name and categorize information in new ways and have what anthropologists like Merry and others have referred to as “knowledge effects,” or the ability to influence how people think about socially legitimate or best practice. Their proliferation and evolution define and contest what is worth knowing, measuring and achieving.