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People buy some goods that they do not enjoy and wish did not exist. They might even be willing to pay a great deal for such goods, whether the currency involves time, commitment or money. One reason involves signaling to others; so long as the good exists, nonconsumption might give an unwanted signal to friends or colleagues. Another reason involves self-signaling; so long as the good exists, nonconsumption might give an unwanted signal to an agent about himself or herself. Yet another reason involves a combination of network effects and status competition; nonconsumption might deprive people of the benefits of participating in a network and thus cause them to lose relative position. With respect to real-world goods (including activities) of this kind, there is typically heterogeneity in relevant populations, with some people deriving positive utility from goods to which other people are indifferent, or which other people deplore. Efforts to measure people's willingness to pay for goods of this kind will suggest a welfare gain, and possibly a substantial one, even though the existence of such goods produces a welfare loss, and possibly a substantial one. Collective action, private or public, is necessary to eliminate goods that people consume but wish did not exist. Legal responses here might be contemplated when someone successfully maneuvers people into a situation in which they are incentivized to act against their interests, by consuming a product or engaging in an activity they do not enjoy, in order to avoid offering an unwanted signal. Prohibitions on waiving certain rights might be justified in this way; some restrictions on uses of social media, especially by young people, might be similarly justified.
In this chapter, I lay out a theory cataloguing the conditions under which international courts may be expected to issue audacious rulings. This theoretical framework relies on previous literature and insights gathered from interviews with experts in and around the Court. The necessary condition for audacious courts is a wide discretionary space within which they may act without fearing repercussions from states. Yet, such a wide discretionary space is not always given; when it is given, states might still attempt to influence courts through direct or indirect means. Such means include closing down courts’ discretionary space and widespread negative feedback, as well as related threats. International courts, in turn, are compelled to realign their priorities to react to or pre-empt such measures. This is a form of trade-off whereby courts adjust their behaviour to ensure continued access to resources and to preserve their reputation and public image. The chapter also introduces additional factors that increase the likelihood of audacious rulings (i.e., proposed new understandings’ congruence with changing societal needs, legal developments external to the regime, and civil society campaigns).
A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are not capable of forming intentions. Accordingly, certain human behavior is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead. This solves our problem because if the function of A's behavior was to mislead, B's ending up misled was not an accident or a mere mistake even if A did not intend to deceive B.
This chapter organizes the review of our perspectives on Green Market Transformation into factors that predict and explain Green Market Transformation.First, we describe the conditions associated with this transformation.These are factors that supports the transformation occurring. To transform markets through voluntary mechanisms requires the strong rule of law, institutions to curtail fraud and to support property rights to encourage long-term investments. These boundary conditions become assumptions about the context that can help enable Green Market Transformation. Next, the catalysts are reviewed – those causal mechanisms that actually bring about the deep greening of the building sector markets – that previous chapters detail.Our theory of Green Market Transformation argues that the dissemination of information through voluntary mechanisms can help address the barriers and market failures that produce the Valley of Death. It is hypothesized that these mechanisms include, though are not limited to, well-designed ecolabels and iterative demonstration projects that overcome market barriers by disseminating information about the cost and performance of nascent technologies to the marketplace, lowering costs and risks associated with the adoption of greener technologies.These predictive conditions and causal mechanisms form the blueprint for those seeking to engineer green market transformation.
Ecolabeled green buildings can have a diverse array of characteristics. Their superior environmental performance can include things like energy efficiency or water efficiency; using cleaner and lower carbon energy sources; sourcing construction materials with sustainable practices; or site selection for the buildings so as to reuse and rehabilitate brownfields or encourage use of public transportation or bicycles. The multidimensional nature of “greenness” for green building is an essential feature of these ecolabels and the Green Building Movement more broadly. The holistic approach to greener buildings embraces flexibility, diversity, and innovation over strictly prescriptive or one-size-fits-all approaches. In this chapter we unpack the diversity of green buildings using attributes such as the publicness and the private marketing benefits of an organization’s ecolabeling strategy to provide improved understanding of the manner in which firms certify green. Green building strategies are classified as altruist, pragmatist, green club, and greenwash. By providing better understanding of green building strategies, our understanding of sustainability strategies by firms and organizations is enhanced.
This chapter argues that participation in voluntary programs can facilitate ongoing quality competition, enabling a race. It advances a theory of self-regulatory competition that may sustain this race. From this perspective, programs can be designed to facilitate a race to the top despite tendencies for label managers to compete for the lowest common denominator or for firms to greenwash and strategically overrepresent their environmental performance. Building on the premise underpinning demonstration projects improving supply chains and facilitating uptake of new technologies, it highlights how ecolabel programs can help transform markets. Once a market becomes crowded, new standards can be set, raising the bar for building performance. Data from the LEED program demonstrate that, over time, organizations and especially private firms invest additional resources to attain higher certification tiers, becoming greener as part of a race to the top in a voluntary, green building certification program.
This chapter offers a theoretical framework to understand the variation of ecolabel design based on the content, governance, and context of the label.Drawing upon green clubs and signaling theories, we suggest that ecolabels vary based on the stringency of the certification program, measured by the number and criticality of required standards, and the extent to which the requirements of these certifications incentivize the provision of public goods. We characterize important dimensions of ecolabels such as their impact, the value of the signal, and the extent to which they address externalities and information asymmetries. To illustrate these concepts, we take a closer look at GreenCo, a business sustainability rating system in India, and a sample of over 50 different agricultural ecolabels. This examination shows the important variation in factors like types of requirements, stringency, and institutional processes that govern the labels. Perhaps unsurprisingly, broader stakeholder engagement is associated with more emphasis on public benefits, while more surprisingly industry sponsorship does not tend to be found among the more lax labels with less public benefit.
The introduction briefly summarizes the contrasts between traditional views about mind and communication, including the computer and code metaphors.It summarizes the central perspective of the book, that human communication is embodied in a biological sense, as well as in a social and cultural sense, and briefly explains the meaning of these terms. It presents a case for conceptual clarity as a basis for critiquing conventional terminology based on computer and code metaphors, and proposes a more direct and accurate set of terms.
The intentional communication of affective states is a central part of human sociality and cognition. Although nonhuman primates (henceforth primates) also signal intentionally, there is a perceived chasm between their intentional versus affective forms of communication. Whereas primate vocalizations and facial expressions are traditionally viewed as involuntary “read-outs” of affective states, gestures are considered as products of intentional control. However, this traditional view is increasingly contentious, given recent evidence of intentional signal production of primate vocalizations and facial expressions, as well as the general void of arousal-based explanations in gesture research. In this chapter, we challenge the perceived dichotomy between affective and intentional communication in primates and propose a dimensional approach, whereby primate signals can be both affective and intentional, regardless of signal modality (tactile, audible, visible) or component (gesture, facial expression, vocalization). We argue that a dimensional approach, which incorporates both affective and intentional components, would improve our knowledge on how affective and cognitive processes have jointly shaped the evolution of primate communication.
This chapter focuses on the behaviors employed by men in the service of attracting mates, which we discuss as having emerged to solve specific reproductive problems faced by women. We consider behaviors employed by men to attract mates in short-term mating and long-term mating contexts, given the differential valuation on certain behavioral repertoire that emerge. In short-term mating, we specifically consider behavioral displays of dominance with their dispositional and situational antecedents before discussing men’s pursuit of distinctiveness and humor use, behaviors ostensibly indicative of good genes. In long-term mating, our discussion centers around the desirability of different resource displays and benevolence. We further discuss cues ostensibly diagnostic of paternal investment ability and an interest in monogamy. Our final section addresses how modern mating markets present adaptive problems for men (e.g., online dating, appearance enhancing behaviors) and how men seek to solve the new problems that have emerged.
This comment discusses the impact of social media rule enforcement protocols on research on online data sources. It argues that the conclusions of the article ‘Do Islamic State's Deadly Attacks Disengage, Deter, or Mobilize Supporters?’ concerning the recruitment effects of deadly attacks cannot be assumed to hold when considering the timing of Twitter account suspensions. It highlights four ways in which suspensions can confound evidence of demobilization despite the introduction of control variables and fixed-effects model specifications. All change the composition of the sample in four non-random ways. First, suspending connected Islamic State accounts may result in follower loss. Secondly, Twitter suspension procedures may be tied to account characteristics, such as follower accrual rates. Thirdly, suspended accounts that re-emerge introduce replication bias. Fourthly, account closure may reflect user movement to other platforms in response to changing security environments following deadly attacks. In conclusion, caution is advised when platform-introduced variation risks altering the sample composition in non-random ways.
Two states in a dispute refuse to back down. One ties its own hands to strengthen its stand and gain advantage; the other tries to untie the tied hands to preempt disadvantage. Tying hands is a well-studied strategy, but it tells only part of the story, and the response strategy of untying hands remains unexplored. Can a state untie the tied hands of its opponent to give freedom back to its opponent—the freedom to concede? I identify three strategies of untying hands: counterthreat, reassurance, and normative framing. I show experimentally that these strategies can reduce the public costs of backing down and the perceived reputational damage from backing down. Tied hands and audience costs are not static and immutable, but dynamic and malleable by the other side.
Cognitive load theory (CLT) and the cognitive theory of multimedia learning (CTML) offer empirically supported instructional solutions to the frequent problem of cognitive overload during learning from multimedia materials. Until recently, these solutions have relied completely on instructors creating high quality learning materials and learners having access to those materials. However, in practice learners frequently have to deal with digital and printed multimedia learning materials that have not been designed with any consideration of cognitive load. The self-management principle has emerged from research using the vantage point of the learner, and is based on empowering learners to apply CLT or CTML principles themselves to manage their own cognitive load. In this chapter we present the rationale for the principle, empirical evidence, and theoretical and practical implications.
A wave of recent scholarship has breathed new life into the study of reputation and credibility in international politics. In this review article, the authors welcome this development while offering a framework for evaluating collective progress, a series of related critiques, and a set of suggestions for future research. The article details how the books under review represent an important step toward consensus on the importance of reputation in world politics, elucidating scope conditions for when reputational inferences are likely to be most salient. The authors argue that despite the significant accomplishments of recent studies, the scholarly record remains thin on the psychology of the perceiver and is instead focused on situational factors at the expense of dispositional variables and is rather myopically oriented toward reputation for resolve to the exclusion of other important types. Despite its contributions, the new literature still falls short of a full explanation for how actors draw inferences about reputation. These remaining theoretical challenges demand scholarly attention and suggest a role for psychology in filling some of the gaps.
How should we undertand the role of norms – especially epistemic norms – governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green (2009) has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability – and so the stability (the continued prevalence) – of assertive speech acts. But though norms of assertion conceived of as social norms do indeed play this stabilizing role, these norms are best understood as deterrents and not as handicaps. This paper explains the stability problem for the maintenance of animal signals, and so human communication; the mechanics of the handicap principle; the role of deterrents and punishments as an alternative mechanism; and the role of social norms governing assertion for the case of human communication.
Under what conditions would Japanese leaders visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and why? Previous studies have focused primarily on the domestic benefits and effects of such visits, claiming that leaders employ visits to follow their own conservative ideology and gain domestic political support. Given the harsh international criticism that tends to ensue, however, political leaders should also consider the cost and international effects of such visits. This study proposes three necessary conditions for such visits: a conservative ruling party, a government enjoying high popularity, and Japan's perception of a Chinese threat. With regard to the latter, a security threat from China has allowed Japan to use these visits as a credible signal of its resolve against China. Comparative analyses of Japanese cabinets after the mid-1980s support this argument.
This is an Element surveying the most important literature using game theory and evolutionary game theory to shed light on questions in the philosophy of biology. There are two branches of literature that the book focuses on. It begins with a short introduction to game theory and evolutionary game theory. It then turns to working using signaling games to explore questions related to communication, meaning, language, and reference. The second part of the book addresses prosociality - strategic behavior that contributes to the successful functioning of social groups - using the prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and bargaining games.
This article investigates how Canadian voters react to a perceived lack of quality provided by their most preferred parties and how the anticipated election outcome conditions the reactions. The central argument is that a lack of quality motivates voters to signal their discontent by voting insincerely—that is, they cast a protest vote. The effect is expected to be moderated by the anticipated constituency result. The arguments are tested with two-wave panel survey data from the 2015 Canadian federal election, collected by the Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project. The results support the central argument but remain inconclusive about the expected moderating effects.
The uncertainty and information asymmetry that surround initial public offering firms (IPOs) often introduce difficulties for potential investors to discern organizational value, thereby leading to ‘underpricing’. Using the signaling theory, we investigate the role of organizational reputation in the underpricing of IPOs. We analyze 463 initial public offerings in China from the period of 2010 to 2016 and find that being known for quality and generalized favorability dimensions of reputation are negatively related with underpricing on the first day of trading. In addition, we find that the negative effects of organizational reputation on underpricing are mediated by investor attention.