Itonde Kakoma is the President and CEO of Interpeace. Prior to Interpeace, he served as the Permanent Representative of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to the African Union and International Organizations (2021–23). Previously, Mr Kakoma served in various leadership capacities on matters of international peace mediation, including as Director for Global Strategy and member of the leadership team at CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation. Additionally, Mr Kakoma was Assistant Director for the Conflict Resolution Programme at the Carter Center, managing a portfolio of the Center's peace initiatives and supporting former president Carter's back-channel diplomatic efforts. He is an experienced facilitator and moderator for high-level peace processes and dialogue fora and has expertise in mediation, negotiation, process design, humanitarian diplomacy and transitional justice.

Islamic veiling has attracted a remarkable degree of international and domestic attention in the current political climate. In the popular and political climate, the argument for social cohesion (or living together) is frequently invoked to justify bans on wearing Islamic veils. For example, the social cohesion argument was widely used in parliamentary debates leading up to the bans on wearing Islamic full-face veils (such as burqa or niqab) in France and Belgium. In response to the French and Belgian bans, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that a ban on wearing Islamic full-face veils is justified on the grounds of living together, rulings that many academic circles have criticized. Yet in this extensive commentary on the bans of Islamic veiling, one important question remains unanswered: Is social cohesion (or living together) a valid argument for banning the wearing of Islamic veils? The author explores this question through the lens of the European human rights framework and analyzes the ECtHR’s approach to French and Belgian anti-veil legislation enacted on the grounds of social cohesion.

Strategic narratives are employed by political actors as tools to pursue their goals, constructing a shared meaning of the past, present, and future in order to shape behaviour. Building on discourse analysis of the magazine Dabiq and from in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted between 2018 and 2019 with IS civilian employees and civilians living in IS-controlled territory, we analyse how IS organised its strategic narrative of governance and statebuilding around three main themes considered as central in the statebuilding literature – the provision of security, the provision of basic services, and social cohesion – and how such a strategic narrative was received by citizens living in IS-controlled territory. We argue that the study of strategic narratives of governance and statebuilding casts light on the factors leading to the success or demise of emergent statebuilding efforts, equally demonstrating how IS’s project is quite conventional when compared to other mainstream statebuilding narratives.

Behavioural public policy is increasingly interested in scaling-up experimental insights to deliver systemic changes. Recent evidence shows some forms of individual behaviour change, such as nudging, are limited in scale. We argue that we can scale-up individual behaviour change by accounting for nuanced social complexities in which human responses to behavioural public policies are situated. We introduce the idea of the ‘social brain’, as a construct to help practitioners and policymakers facilitate a greater social transmission of welfare-improving behaviours. The social brain is a collection of individual human brains, who are connected to other human brains through ‘social cues’, and who are affected by the material and immaterial properties of the physical environment in which they are situated (‘social complex’). Ignoring these cues and the social complex runs the risk of fostering localised behavioural changes, through individual actors, which are neither scalable nor lasting. We identify pathways to facilitate changes in the social brain: either through path dependencies or critical mass shifts in individual behaviours, moderated by the brain's property of social cohesion and multiplicity of situational and dispositional factors. In this way, behavioural changes stimulated in one part of the social brain can reach other parts and evolve dynamically. We recommend designing public policies that engage different parts of the social brain.

In the Bronze Age, warriors are probably the best-known social class. Evidence for warfare and other violent encounters links them to aggression and bloodshed that could be translated into social status. This made warriors a potential two-fold threat to the social cohesion of their communities: not only did they risk threatening the integrity of communities as agents of death but also they could challenge local authority and cause internal conflict. Here, the author presents evidence that suggests that internal conflict was a major concern for Nordic Bronze Age societies, in that warriors constituted an internal social challenge, and proposes that local communities may have mitigated this threat in rituals such as the sacrifice of weapons and the construction of social narratives through rock art.

The prevalence of overweight in Brazilian adults has grown in recent years. There is evidence indicating that environmental factors, especially social characteristics, may be involved in the aetiology of overweight, but few studies have investigated this association adequately. The main objective of this study was to identify residents’ perception of their social environment (social cohesion, security and violence) and assess its relationship with overweight in a central area of Porto Alegre, Brazil. The associations between socioeconomic characteristics and social environment perception were also explored. This cross-sectional study conducted in 2018–19 had 400 participants aged from 20 to 70 years living in low- and high-income areas of the city of Porto Alegre. Participants’ perception of social cohesion, security and violence were evaluated using a validated questionnaire. Participants’ body mass index (BMI) was measured, and those with a BMI ≥25 kg/m2 were considered to be overweight. Unadjusted and adjusted prevalence ratios (PRs) and 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs) were estimated through Poisson regression analysis; level of significance was 5%. The prevalence of overweight in the sample was 68.8% (95% CI 64.0–73.2). Individuals with a more positive social cohesion perception had a higher prevalence of overweight (PR 1.06; 95% CI: 1.00–1.12; p=0.02) than those with a less positive perception. Brown individuals also had a higher prevalence of overweight (PR: 1.08; 95% CI: 1.02–1.15; p=0.03) than those of other skin colour/race. No association was found between overweight and perception of security or violence. Therefore, social cohesion may be an important factor in overweight and the findings highlight the importance of considering social factors, and their perceptions, when planning actions for the prevention and control of overweight in a population.

Britain, like many other societies within the OECD, has been facing cumulative and interdependent social, political, and economic crises which came to a head shortly before COVID. The shock of COVID has accentuated these crises, creating a state of policy flux in which all long-established intellectual frameworks have proved inadequate: across the OECD, public policy has largely abandoned them. Fortunately, across the social sciences, history and philosophy there have been important new advances by major scholars which cohere and provide a more sophisticated account of society. While they will ultimately prove inadequate as new complexities emerge, for the present that offer the best guide available for policy. This essay provides an integrated review of this recent literature and relates it to some of the key policy problems.

This article argues that xenophobic acts towards black foreigners remain a human rights challenge in South Africa. Foreign nationals, mostly black Africans, continue to experience physical attacks, discrimination and looting of businesses, as well as targeted crime. Prevalent xenophobic attitudes continue to trouble the conscience of all well-meaning South Africans. There is ample evidence that xenophobia has morphed into afro-phobia, the hatred of black foreigners. Xenophobia continues to evolve and attackers are increasingly linking the presence of foreign nationals to socio-economic challenges facing the country. This article argues that, even though South Africa's Constitution does not expressly identify Ubuntu as a national value, it does recognize customary law and many of its provisions are anchored in Ubuntu philosophy. This article proposes Ubuntu, or African “humanness” whose “natural home” should be located in South Africa, as a pragmatic social intervention and a morally sustainable solution to address xenophobia that would be acceptable to both South Africans and foreign nationals.