As they were just coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, Southern European nations were confronted with a new shock to their economies – this time in the form of a steep rise in prices. This article describes and typifies the social policy responses and measures adopted in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain in response to rising inflation. We find that Southern European (SE) governments have put forward a substantive fiscal response – which compares well with that of its neighbours, and even with the previous crisis. The thrust of the response was targeted at limiting the pass-through of international energy prices to consumers. This was complemented, albeit to a lesser degree, with direct support to families. Nevertheless, we do find important differences concerning the weight given to (traditional) welfare transfers, and the role given to indexation mechanisms and wage increases. We also find important continuities with the model of crisis-response adopted during the pandemic.

This article analyses the impact of the Great Recession and radical labour market deregulation on employer associations’ (EAs) membership levels and composition in Southern Europe. It also reviews the literature and advances it in four relevant aspects. First, it verifies a general decrease in membership of EAs in Southern Europe, almost to the point of collapse in Greece. Secondly, it identifies the greater importance of large companies (more than Fordist economic sectors) in the composition of this membership. Thirdly, it confirms that sectoral bargaining (as a major determinant) and union representation (an element weakened by reforms) are strong company-level incentives for membership in EAs. Finally, it re-examines the reasons put forward in the scholarly literature to explain why EAs in Southern Europe have not been in favour of these significant institutional changes.

Despite the development of empirical research on the relations between parties and interest groups, the topic is still understudied and presents several shortcomings. On the one hand, this relationship has been studied mostly from the political parties' point of view. On the other, there is a lack of consensus regarding the determinants of party–group connection. This study aims to advance our knowledge on the topic by examining the relationship between interest groups and political parties in Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). By relying on new data collected through an expert survey, we focus specifically on the strength of the linkage established between parties and interest groups, as well as their determinants. The results suggest that there is a great variation in party–group links, which is explained mostly by party characteristics, namely the type of parties, ideology, and their electoral strength.

The footwear industry in southern Europe has faced several periods of strong crisis since the 1970s. This paper analyzes these crises and the resilience strategy developed by the sector in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the major producing countries. Although many common features are observed in the three countries, both in the chronology and the nature of the crises and in the measures to overcome the difficulties, significant differences in the characteristics of the industry and the behavior of the companies are also appreciated. These differences have determined the degree of resilience of the sector in each country.

Over the past years, parties often described as populist, such as SYRIZA in Greece, the Five Star Movement (FSM) in Italy and Podemos in Spain have made significant electoral breakthroughs, unsettling well-established party systems. In the literature, inclusionary populism has primarily been applied to Latin America whereas the three Southern European parties have been examined individually, but not in comparative perspective. The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative analysis, based on an original electoral manifestos content analysis, aimed at unveiling the ‘inclusionary populism’ features of the ‘new’ political parties that have emerged in Southern Europe. By focusing on the 2012–16 period, the article shows that the inclusionary category can be fruitfully applied also to European political parties; it finds different degrees of inclusionary populism (namely between SYRIZA and Podemos); and it proves that the FSM falls between the two exclusionary vs. inclusionary poles.

Within the context of the economic downturn in southern Eurozone countries and the imposition of new constraints on national policy-making, this article examines the congruence between party issue prioritization, during and after the electoral phase. This is done through a longitudinal analysis of four countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and use of party manifesto and parliamentary question data. We found that between the electoral and parliamentary arenas, parties tend to emphasize different issues. However, this occurs in different ways across time, countries, and parties. We propose a measurement of issue congruence in agenda framing between the pre- and post-electoral phases to assess to what extent elections provide a guide for public policies. Moreover, we propose arguments to explain different results in the analyzed countries and across parties. We show that the crisis magnified the capacity of the opposition to maintain programmatic coherence – a helping hand for opposition parties (including the radical ones) that succeeded in boosting the relevance of their signature issues.

During the economic crisis, the radical left, especially in countries of the European South, continued its course from marginality to mainstream while social democracy found itself trapped in its previous strategic orientations. This article examines the two political families in a relational and comparative perspective, focusing on the interaction of social democratic and radical left parties that evolved in a series of national cases (Greece, Portugal, Spain and France) and in particular within the political and electoral cycle of 2015–17. The ideological, programmatic and strategic responses of these parties to the critical juncture of the crisis, which mark a convergence or deviation in the paths of the two ‘enemy brothers', shed light on their political and ideological mutations, transformations and/or adaptations.

Within the Neogene-Quaternary evolution of the Mediterranean intermountain basins, the eastern Tiberino Basin provides new multifaceted chronological, biostratigraphic, palaeoecological, and palaeoenvironmental information, appreciably improving the knowledge of palaeoenvironmental and climate conditions during the middle-late Matuyama Chron (late early Pleistocene). Shallow to relatively deep lacustrine deposits and alluvial plain deposits, magnetostratigraphically calibrated, hold malacofaunas, ostracofaunas, and carpological remains, as well as a pollen record. Palaeocarpological remains widely originated from the local (azonal) vegetation of waterlogged environments. Nonetheless, some taxa show transitional morphology between possibly extinct Pliocene-Pleistocene forms and living taxa. The pollen record highlights a conifer-dominated forest phase, indicating a temperate-wet interglacial period, well aligned inside the schemes for the same latitudinal band. The abundance of tree taxa currently absent from the Italian peninsula points to pre-Jaramillo late early Pleistocene biostratigraphical characters, here compared to other sections from central Italy, and contributes to a better definition of modes and timing of their disappearance in southern Europe. Malacofaunas and ostracods, still with late early Pleistocene features, together with Charophyte, mark repeated fluctuations in energy, temperature, and chemical composition of water. The overall record identifies an incipient diachronous cooling trend, for the first time recognized in southern Europe.

The euro crisis brought back a widening gap in prosperity between the eurozone’s core and periphery members, but also revealed a divergence in the strength of its national democracies. This article examines the amplified tension between progressively uprooted national markets governed by a supranational technocracy and nationally organized democratic politics in the eurozone’s periphery. Building on Dani Rodrik’s globalization ‘trilemma’, this article explains the weakening of national democratic institutions in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy since 2008. While the periphery states were forced to choose monetary integration at the expense of both democracy and sovereignty, this trade-off was mostly absent in the core. The eurozone’s policy solutions to the crisis did not allow for any democratic input, were implemented through opaque and often-undemocratic throughput processes, and resulted in deteriorating output. The article concludes that the EU crisis response made euro membership in the periphery less compatible with national democratic principles.

Familistic welfare capitalism is a model of national political economy prevalent in many regions in the world (Southern Europe, Latin America, and Asia), where the family plays a double role as the key provider of welfare and a key agent in the model's socio-economic and political reproduction. The article offers a new approach to the study this model by adopting an expanded concept of social reproduction to capture its historical evolution, using Greece as a case study. Our empirical analysis of austerity measures on employment and pensions demonstrates, how, in the Greek case, a crisis of social reproduction of the traditional form of familistic welfare capitalism was already underway prior to the well-known sovereign-debt crisis. And further we show how the adoption of austerity measures and pro-market reforms is deepening this crisis by severely undermining the key pillars of familial welfare security while rapidly transforming the model into a political economy of generalised insecurity.

The EMU fiscal adjustment paths of the four Southern Europe members (Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal – SE-4) vary along two dimensions: (a) cross-temporal pre- and post-EMU accession and (b) cross-country. We account for the cross-temporal variation by distinguishing between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ EMU conditionality of the pre- and post-accession stage. External constraints in the form of the Maastricht eligibility criteria constituted a significant common ‘push’ factor in the fiscal stabilization process of EMU candidate countries throughout the 1990s. However, their power does not necessarily lead to fiscal sustainability as demonstrated by the post-accession budgetary outlook of the SE-4. We account for the cross-country variation by introducing additional ‘pull’ factors related to the reform content, context and capability, such as unemployment, the level of social concertation, and government effectiveness. Only in cases where such factors were at work did governments engage in structural reforms to consolidate public finances instead of the less controversial path of macroeconomic policy reform.

The western part of the Mediterranean basin is a transitional biogeographical region for the distribution of the representatives of the main guilds of dung beetles; towards the south, Aphodiinae (dung-dwellers) become scarce, whereas northwards Scarabaeinae (soil-diggers) progressively disappear. The number of species in local dung beetle assemblages is enhanced by this double faunistic contribution. Annual dung beetle assemblages were sampled in two sub-Mediterranean sites, which differed by 600 m in elevation, in order to determine the phenological dynamics related to the way of using dung (dung-dwellers/Aphodiinae vs. soil-diggers/Scarabaeinae and Geotrupinae). Aphodiids were active all year round, although they were affected by summer drought and, at high elevation, by the length of the cold season. This reduced activity was related to an impoverishment of Aphodiinae and to reduced temporal segregation between species. In contrast, soil-diggers were not active all year round and showed different species assemblages in the two sites. An extension of the activity period of these beetles was observed due to the occurrence of cold resistant species at high elevation. Our results suggested that the occurrence of soil-diggers seemingly did not affect the seasonality of dung-dwellers; their local abundance showed no negative correlation and, most importantly, phenological differences between dung-dwellers were always significantly higher than the seasonal differences between dwellers and diggers.

The paper explores how regime change affects social movements, drawing on studies of Latin America, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe. After discussing the concepts and method used, it is argued that social movements do exist in authoritarian regimes, and hence the question of the effect of regime change upon them can be posed. Contrary to the assumption that democratisation leads to the flourishing of social movements as repression is removed and new channels of participation are opened up, it is shown that in the immediate period between the end of an authoritarian regime and the initiation of a democratic one the opposite effect may occur. This is because liberalisation in authoritarian regimes can lead to a particularly high level of social movement activity which cannot be sustained once more ‘normal’ conditions apply. The utility of the concept of regime change is questioned, and the desirability of breaking it down into its component parts which may be more or less present in different cases is stressed.