Modern interactions between humans and robots challenge our conceptions of self, privacy, and society, stretching the capacities of legal regimes to preserve autonomy, intimacy, and democratic governance. Where should we look for normative and legal guidance? One possibility in the US context is the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, rules governing “standing” and the state agency requirement limit the Amendment’s potential to protect core norms in these rapidly evolving contexts. This chapter argues that the text, history, and philosophical lineage of the Fourth Amendment favor a broader understanding of who can bring Fourth Amendment challenges and whose conduct should be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. This reading dramatically enhances the Amendment’s role in efforts to understand, regulate, and protect human–robot interactions.

ERISA’s underdeveloped civil enforcement mechanism, section 502(a), has generated extensive litigation. Judicially crafted strictures on the relief available to participants have arisen with respect to standing, scope of judicial review, causes of action, and remedies. While the Supreme Court has held those with a colorable claim to benefits have standing, precisely what that means has proven elusive. Judicial review of denied claims is strictly constrained. Court access requires that participants have exhausted internal review processes, and if the plan grants the administrator discretion to determine eligibility for benefits or construe the plan’s terms (which is virtually always), judicial review is restricted to a cursory scan for abuse of discretion. Deferential review survives even if the administrator is conflicted: lower courts are instructed to consider the conflict merely as one factor in and overall assessment of whether discretion was abused. Finally, the Court has held that ERISA does not permit the full panoply of damages one would expect in the aftermath of contractual or fiduciary breach. Consequential damages are unavailable for denied claims, and equitable relief for fiduciary breach is limited to what was typically available in equity in the days of the divided bench.

Chapter 5 turns to a description of the array of common law and statutory defenses that defendants who are sued for public nuisance claims have used in response to litigation. The chapter surveys several conventional tort defenses to public nuisance claims such as lack of causation, lack of proximate causation, failure to define an injury to a common public right, lack of unreasonable interference with a public right, remoteness, lack of standing, economic loss rule, municipal recovery rule, compliance with regulatory rules and standards, federal preemption, federal displacement, the learned intermediary, third party intervention, unconstitutional vagueness, statutes of limitation, violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, and the Eleventh Amendment. In addition, defendants have argued that individual claimants have failed to satisfy the special injury rule that might entitle them to compensatory damages. The chapter evalutes judicial discussion of these defenses and notes cases in which courts have found several defenses to be inapplicable, or overcome by the plaintiffs factual pleadings.

Environmental harm in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) raises distinct issues of standing because of the collective nature of environmental interests in these areas, including who has the right (or obligation) to take the necessary response action to address environmental harm. Both international law and national law recognize that certain actors have sufficient legal interest to bring claims for environmental damage despite not directly suffering injury or loss. These developments reflect an increasing recognition of the intrinsic value of the environment and shifting conceptions of the environment as a collective good subjective to community interests. However, the parameters of the concepts that affirm collective interests in the protection of the environment are nebulous and the scenarios in which they would apply are likely to be contested. In considering the application of the rules of standing in ABNJ, this chapter explores trends in standing in relation to the environment under international law, civil liability regimes and national law before turning to how the specific regimes governing areas beyond national jurisdiction address the issue of standing.

This chapter on India suggests that the Indian Competition Act of 2002 already had the possibility to offer lenient treatment to a firm that reports the existence of a cartel. However, the details for offering lenient treatment were only elaborated for the first time in 2009, in the Lesser Penalty Regulation. A revision followed in 2017. This resulted in a mere thirteen decisions of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) supported by the leniency programme. This low number may be explained by the discretion the CCI has to judge leniency applications and the uncertainty leniency applicants face in relation to damages claims. The chapter recommends addressing these issues, but also increasing the incentives to apply for leniency by introducing individualised sanctions to directors or immunising successful leniency applicants from debarment from procurement projects. Another recommendation is to avoid creating other pitfalls when the Competition Act is being amended.

This chapter starts from a familiar question: is State responsibility in international law usefully understood on the model of domestic private law or on that of domestic criminal law or neither? It then discusses the attractions and limits of the model of private law. It then turns to ‘international crimes’ or ‘serious breach[es] of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law’ as defined in the International Law Commission's successive works and discusses the ways in which the provisions for such wrongs seem analogous or disanalogous to domestic criminal law. The next section takes up the suggestion that a distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ law is conceptually and practically preferable to that between ‘international crimes’ and ‘international delicts’: is this the best way to capture a category of international wrongs that merit a distinctive response? The final section asks whether State responsibility thus understood can usefully be seen as a species of ‘criminal’ responsibility and whether it offers domestic theorists a fruitful way of ‘deconstructing’ criminal law.

Chapter 11 covers issues relating to litigation. Part A first addresses the right of exclusive licensees of patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets to sue to enforce licensed IP against third party infringers, and the rules requiring licensors to be joined in such suits. The chapter next moves to contractual clauses that allocate responsibilty for litigation among the licensor and licensee (Ryan v. Graco). It next addresses contractual provisions relating to domestic and international choice of law and dispute resolution, including required arbitration and mediation (alternate dispute resolution). The shifting of fees and litigation expenses is covered next. The chapter concludes by considering special provisions germane to licenses that are entered into in settlement of litigation.

Central cases of moral blame suggest that blame presupposes that its target deserves to feel guilty, and that if one is blameworthy to some degree, one deserves to feel guilt to a corresponding degree. This, some think, is what explains why being blameworthy for something presupposes having had a strong kind of control over it: only given such control is the suffering involved in feeling guilt deserved. This chapter argues that all this is wrong. As evidenced by a wider range of cases, blame doesn’t presuppose that the target deserves to feel guilt and doesn’t necessarily aim at the target’s suffering in recognition of what they have done. On the constructive side, the chapter offers an explanation of why, in many cases of moral blameworthiness, the agent nevertheless does deserve to feel guilt. The explanation leans on a general account of moral and non-moral blame and blameworthiness and a version of the popular idea that moral blame targets agents’ objectionable quality of will. Given the latter idea, the morally blameworthy have harmed the standing of some person or value, giving rise to obligations to give correspondingly less relative weight to their own standing, and so, sometimes, to their own suffering.

Argued November 4, 1970.Decided July 4, 1971.

Case history: District Court judgment and 398 F.2d 398, vacated and remanded. [397 U.S. 159, 160]; appealed again on the merits. Justice Angela P. HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Anglo-American legal tradition includes a civil tort known as false imprisonment, whereby one who acts intending to confine another without justification within fixed boundaries may be held liable, so long as the other is conscious of or harmed by the confinement. This cause of action is distinct from the criminal and constitutional law framework that governs the authority of the state to detain, investigate, or imprison. The false imprisonment tort encompasses such concerns regarding government overreach, but also extends to confinement that is wrongfully, i.e. “falsely,” imposed by non-governmental actors. This Chapter examines the evolution of the false imprisonment tort with a specific focus on the victim’s required showing of either subjective awareness of confinement or bodily harm. The bodily harm alternative acknowledges the basic wrongfulness of depriving actors of their liberty, irrespective of whether they are conscious of the confinement. Once recognized, however, the bodily harm alternative casts light on yet another possibility, in which an actor might be involuntarily confined but neither aware of nor harmed by the confinement. Such a case seems to slip through the cracks of the false imprisonment tort, but still gives pause when dwelled upon. To shed light on the false imprisonment tort and the particular case of the involuntary but unaware prisoner, this Chapter looks by analogy to the case of nonhuman animal confinement. Because nonhuman animals have often been presumed to lack consciousness, they may offer a useful vehicle for cataloguing the kinds of harms inflicted by confinement, not only in terms of demonstrable welfare impacts, but also in terms of foreclosed opportunities to thrive, loss of dignity, or other such less tangible but nontrivial impairments.

This chapter addresses the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system and examines the terms of reference of WTO panels. It discusses the jurisdiction ratione materiae and the jurisdiction ratione personae of WTO panels, including the concepts of the “measure” and “legal claims” that may be brought before WTO panels. The chapter examines how the concept of standing (locus standi) is applied in WTO dispute settlement. It also discusses the process for reviewing disputed issues regarding the jurisdiction/terms of reference of a panel. The chapter also discusses arbitration in the WTO dispute settlement system.

Justiciability doctrine also dealt with the amenability of states to suit in the federal courts, an issue the Court addressed in Monaco v. Mississippi, which found a general principle of state sovereign immunity embedded in the Constitution. The Court also continued to limn the controus of the law authotizing suits under limited circumstances against state officers charged with enforcing allegedly unconstitutional state laws. And, in an important and confusing decision the Court invoked standing and political questions rules to avoid deciding whether the proposed Child Labor Amendment had expired because of the lapse of time or asserted procedural irregularities in state ratification processes.

Felix Frankfurter invented the field of federal jurisdiction. It concerned the occasions for the proper exercise of federal judicial power under Article III. The Hughes Court endorsed the Declaratory Judgment Act as a mechanism for efficient dispute adjudication. And, though the Court did not follow his advice consistently, in Ashwander v. TVA Justice Brandeis developed a comprehensive list of rules that should limit the number of cases in which the federal courts exercised their power. Among those doctrines was a newly invigorated law of standing that, Brandeis and Frankfurter may have hoped, would have insulated New Deal legislation against constitutional challenge.

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products, except that:

Privacy and information security are distinct but related fields.1 Security focuses on questions surrounding the extent to which related products, systems, and processes can effectively defend against “attacks on confidentiality, integrity and availability of code and information.”2 The field of information security often involves inquiries about the legal consequences of security failures.3 In 2018, The Economist reported that “more than ninety percent of the world’s data appeared in just the past two years.”4 In the last decade there have been multiple large-scale data breaches and inadvertent data exposures that have resulted in the disclosure of millions of our data.

Chapter 10 studies judicial review, widely known as administrative litigation in China, under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) (2017), which was first enacted in 1989. The command-and-control approach to pollution control grants wide-ranging powers to administrative agencies. They set standards, monitor performance and impose sanctions. Their acts or omissions directly determine the effectiveness of the environmental legal regime. Judicial review allows courts to check agency behavior to ensure good governance in pollution control and long-term sustainable development. While ALL (1989) has laid down the legal basis for injured parties to sue against unlawful agency acts or omissions, there have been tremendous obstacles for private parties to gain access to courts. The Law was amended in 2014 and 2017 to relax the statutory requirement on standing and expand the scope of judicial review. The chapter examines the issue of standing, the scope of judicial review, and judicial remedies. It concludes with discussion of the special challenges of administrative litigation in China.

Chapter 12 studies environmental public interest litigation (EPIL) including civil and administrative EPIL that aims to protect the public interest in a sound environment. It expands public participation in environmental governance and strengthens environmental law enforcement by allowing the public and procuratorates to play a more effective role in monitoring and supervising both polluters and agencies. The chapter starts with an examination of standing. That is, who are best suited to file EPIL to guard against environmental pollution and ecological destruction for public interest. It then explores China’s experiments with jurisdiction including the use of specialized maritime courts, newly established environmental tribunals, and jurisdiction by designation. It further analyzes the remedies including injunction of the polluting activities, elimination of harm, cleanup of contamination, compensation for loss of ecological function, compelling agency to perform statutory duties, and declaring agency’s acts or omission being unlawful. The chapter concludes with discussion of judicial mediation and the procedural guarantee to ensure the protection of public interest.

Examining changes in the legal rules and procedures that render the courts more or less attractive for rights-claiming helps answer a core question: To what extent and how has civil litigation become an institutional mechanism for rights-claiming in South Korea? The concept of legal opportunity structures pinpoints the relatively stable but not static rules and statutes related to access to the courts, adjudication procedures, and judicial remedies that affect whether individuals and groups will use private litigation to try to enforce rights. This chapter’s analysis indicates that Koreans have benefited from a liberalizing structure of legal opportunities and improved potential for rights protection via the courts in the past two decades. I illustrate how claimants and lawyers are recognizing and using legal opportunities, and sometimes even prying open new opportunities, in pursuit of rights.

This chapter presents the significant influence that British administrative law had on Israeli administrative law – starting with the law of Mandatory Palestine, and then dealing with the gradual process of independence which has developed since the modern State of Israel was founded in 1948. The influence of British administrative law has been one of the most enduring legacies of British Mandatory rule in Palestine. At the same time, the Israeli Supreme Court has allowed itself a significant degree of independence in developing on these traditional principles. This process of independent development has intensified since the 1980s, and even more so following developments in the area of constitutional law since the 1990s.

Of all the common law jurisdictions, New Zealand’s administrative law has probably stayed closest to that of England. Even so, notable differences have developed. The most distinctive part of the local law relates to the Treaty of Waitangi, and the extent to which it constrains the exercise of public powers. On issues common to both jurisdictions, there is a mix of more interventionist or liberal approaches and more conservative ones. A more interventionist approach is notable as regards the effect given to unincorporated international treaties. A more conservative approach can be observed to the human rights legislation and also still, at least to some extent, to the substantive grounds of judicial review (heightened scrutiny unreasonableness, substantive legitimate expectations and mistake of fact). Turning from substance to procedure, access to judicial review is more liberal in several respects. Finally, a notable feature of the New Zealand approach across all aspects of administrative law is a marked resistance to rigid doctrinal categories. Reflecting on these differences, the conservative aspects can be seen in the context of the still fairly unqualified adherence to Parliamentary sovereignty, in the absence of a supra-national source of law such as the ECHR or the EU. The other aspects may be seen as reflecting the national identity as a small polity with informal channels of communication, given to pragmatic solutions, and keen to be seen as a good international citizen.