Many international organisations have recently acknowledged the significance of whistleblowing in preventing institutional corruption, particularly in the public sector. Likewise, many countries have enacted whistleblower protection laws, though a robust whistleblower protection system certainly requires much more than legislation. One challenge in developing effective protection systems is finding empirical evidence to evaluate existing systems. Can we measure the effectiveness of whistleblower protection systems accross different countries? What conditions do we need to make the whistleblower protection system work effectively in the public sector? This paper investigates two cases: South Korea and the Republic of Kosovo. South Korean data comes from the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of South Korea, while its counterpart from Kosovo comes from a survey of 400 public officials about whistleblower protection. By analysing both datasets, this paper creates a new index that evaluates the effectiveness of whistleblower protection. Composed of quantitative and qualitative sub-indices, the index serves as a digital comparison tool for assessing whistleblower protection systems across different countries and at different times. In addition to enacting high-quality laws, this index identifies several additional measures that can strengthen whistleblower protection systems in the public sector.

International anticorruption treaties create an almost universal requirement that States sanction legal persons for the crime of foreign bribery. However, the vast majority of corporate foreign bribery cases are ‘settled’ between governments and firms. Analysing key anticorruption instruments and treaty body reports, it appears there is a dearth of express rules on settlements in international law but a qualified implicit endorsement of domestic settlement laws and practices. The international regime is investigated in terms of its move towards common standards for the use of settlements, and whether recommendations are consistent with stated objectives. The analysis discloses an irony: States and international organisations fail to clearly articulate their expectations on settlements, while calling for transparent, effective and predictable domestic settlement rules.

Article 51 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption sets forth the return of assets diverted through corruption as a fundamental principle of the Convention. This raises the question of whether the State where the stolen assets are located is entitled to refuse their repatriation or subject it to certain conditions. This article analyses the Convention and the policy considerations behind it and argues that such a State has a wider discretion over the return of stolen assets than is often thought. Furthermore, the article argues that the rule of law may be better served if States take vigorous action to confiscate the proceeds of corruption regardless of whether they are ultimately repatriated.