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THE INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF CORPORATE SETTLEMENTS IN FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2020

Radha Ivory  and
Tina Søreide
Radha Ivory
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer, TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland, Australia, r.ivory@law.uq.edu.au
Tina Søreide
Affiliation:
Professor of Law and Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Norway, tina.soreide@nhh.no
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Abstract

International anticorruption treaties create an almost universal requirement that States sanction legal persons for the crime of foreign bribery. However, the vast majority of corporate foreign bribery cases are ‘settled’ between governments and firms. Analysing key anticorruption instruments and treaty body reports, it appears there is a dearth of express rules on settlements in international law but a qualified implicit endorsement of domestic settlement laws and practices. The international regime is investigated in terms of its move towards common standards for the use of settlements, and whether recommendations are consistent with stated objectives. The analysis discloses an irony: States and international organisations fail to clearly articulate their expectations on settlements, while calling for transparent, effective and predictable domestic settlement rules.

Keywords

public international lawcorruptionforeign briberycorporate criminal liabilityenforcementnon-trial resolutionsOECD Conventionpeer review processesUnited Nations Convention against Corruption
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 69 , Issue 4 , October 2020 , pp. 945 - 978
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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Footnotes

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Jørn Jacobson, Jon Petter Rui and Liz Campbell for their very useful comments on drafts of this article.

References

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3 The World Bank, Siemens to Pay $100 Million to Fight Fraud and Corruption as Part of World Bank Group Settlement (2009). In March 2013, Siemens committed a further EUR 13.5 million to anticorruption and good governance initiatives as part of a deal with the European Investment Bank (EIB): Siemens, EIB and Siemens Settlement Agreement (2013).

4 Davis (n 1) 152; Garrett (n 2) 10, 180.

5 Berghoff (n 2) 438; Garrett (n 2) 11; US Department of Justice (n 2).

6 Berghoff (n 2) 438–9 (noting that, ‘[i]n 2009 the UN Secretariat Procurement suspended Siemens from its vendor databank for six months only’); The World Bank (n 3) (noting that the World Bank settlement included a ‘four-year debarment for Siemens’ Russian subsidiary and a voluntary two-year shut-out from bidding on Bank business for Siemens AG and all of its consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates’).

7 Davis (n 1) 143–4.

8 Berghoff (n 2) 438; Garrett (n 2) 11.

9 Siemens, ‘Siemens at a Glance’ (siemens.com Global Website, 1996–2020).

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11 Siemens, Siemens Integrity Initiative Annual Report 2018 (Siemens 2019) 4; The World Bank (n 3).

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14 M Dion, Trudeau II Report (Parliament of Canada 2019) 1.

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19 Conservative Party of Canada, ‘Andrew Scheer to Launch Inquiry into SNC-Lavalin Corruption Scandal’ (Conservative Party of Canada 2019); New Democratic Party, ‘The Courage to Do What's Right’ (New Democratic Party 2019).

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21 J Kirby, ‘SNC-Lavalin Pleads Guilty to Fraud over Libya Work’ (Financial Times, 19 December 2019); Public Prosecution Service of Canada, ‘SNC Lavalin Construction Inc. (Incorporated) Pleads Guilty To Fraud’ (18 December 2019).

22 OECD, Resolving Foreign Bribery Cases with Non-Trial Resolutions: Settlements and Non-Trial Agreements by Parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD 2019) 11. See also Makinwa, A, ‘Negotiated Settlements for Corruption Offences: Wither Europe?’ in Makinwa, A (ed), Negotiated Settlements for Corruption Offences: A European Perspective (Eleven International 2015) 12Google Scholar; Lord, N and King, C, ‘Negotiating Non-Contention: Civil Recovery and Deferred Prosecution in Response to Transnational Corporate Bribery’ in Campbell, L and Lord, N (eds), Corruption in Commercial Enterprise: Law, Theory and Practice (Routledge 2018) 234Google Scholar.

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25 ibid 11, 65–6.

26 ibid 11, 43–61.

27 ibid 152–8.

28 ibid 67–76, 78–81.

29 ibid 141–52.

30 ibid 22–3.

31 ibid 11–12. See also OECD, OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (OECD 2014) 9.

32 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (adopted 21 November 1997, entered into force 15 February 1999) DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 ILM (1998) 1; United Nations Convention against Corruption (adopted 31 October 2003, entered into force 14 December 2005) 2349 UNTS 41.

33 OECD-ABC (n 32) art 15(1); Pieth, M, ‘Introduction’ in Pieth, M, Low, LA and Bonucci, N (eds), The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 28Google Scholar.

34 OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (adopted 26 November 2009) C(2009)159/REV1/FINAL as amended by C(2010)19 (18 February 2010).

35 UNODC, Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2009); UNODC, Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2nd edn, 2012); UNODC, State of Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption: Criminalization, Law Enforcement and International Cooperation (2nd edn, 2017). The UNODC is Secretariat to the UNCAC Conference of State Parties and the UNCAC-IRM.

36 See eg Agence Française Anticorruption (France), Annual Report (2018) 40–1; Attorney-General's Department (Australia), Improving Enforcement Options for Serious Corporate Crime: A Proposed Model for a Deferred Prosecution Agreement Scheme in Australia (Public Consultation Paper) (Australian Government 2017) 3; Ministry of Justice (UK), Consultation on a New Enforcement Tool to Deal with Economic Crime Committed by Commercial Organisations: Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2012) Ch 3.

37 OECD (n 22) 21.

38 ibid.

39 See eg Lord and King (n 22) 245–9.

40 See further, J Arlen, ‘The Potential Promise and Perils of Introducing Deferred Prosecution Agreements Outside the US’ in Søreide and Makinwa (n 23) 156.

41 Edelman, LB, Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights (The University of Chicago Press 2016) 12–13Google Scholar; KD Krawiec, ‘Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance’ (2003) WULQ 487, 494, 522–37.

42 Buell, SW, Capital Offenses: Business Crime and Punishment in America's Corporate Age (WW Norton & Co 2016) 241–6Google Scholar; Garrett (n 2) 165–8. On the role of the US in the history of settlements, see BL Garrett ‘The Path of FCPA Settlements’ in Søreide and Makinwa (n 23) 25.

43 King, C and Lord, N, Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime: The Legitimacy of Civil Recovery Orders and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 2–3, 30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 Davis (n 1) 145.

45 L Borlini and S Lonati, ‘Corporate Compliance and Privatization of Law Enforcement’ in Søreide and Makinwa (n 23) 280; Ridge, RJ and Baird, MA, ‘The Pendulum Swings Back: Revisiting Corporate Criminality and the Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements’ (2008) 33 UDaytonLRev 187, 195–7Google Scholar; Bohrer, BA and Trencher, BL, ‘Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation’ (2007) 44 AmCrimLRev 1481Google Scholar; Garrett, BL, ‘Structural Reform Prosecution’ (2007) 93 VaLRev 853Google Scholar.

46 Ivory, R, Corruption, Asset Recovery, and the Protection of Property in Public International Law: The Human Rights of Bad Guys (Cambridge University Press 2014) 15–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 See eg G20, G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan: G20 Agenda for Action on Combating Corruption, Promoting Market Integrity, and Supporting a Clean Business Environment (2010); UNGA Res 71/313 Work of the Statistical Commission pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (6 July 2017) UN Doc A/RES/71/313, Annex [16.5]. See also OECD, Consequences of Corruption at the Sector Level and Implications for Economic Growth and Development (OECD 2015).

48 Pieth (n 33) 30–1.

49 Ivory 2014 (n 46) 66.

50 ibid 96–7.

51 See further below Part III.

52 See also Davis (n 1) 57, 70 and Rose, C, International Anti-Corruption Norms: Their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems (Oxford University Press 2015) 14CrossRefGoogle Scholar (also evaluating international anticorruption laws in view of both procedure and outcomes, albeit with reference to the legitimacy of the system or the procedural aspects thereof).

53 See especially Davis (n 1) Ch 5; Rose (n 52) Ch 3.

54 See eg Ebbesson, J, ‘Public Participation in Environmental Matters’ in Wolfrum, R (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2009). cf Rose (n 52) 36Google Scholar; Davis (n 1) 70.

55 See eg Dion (n 14) 1; The Globe and Mail, ‘Editorial: Fixing the Bad Policy at the Root of the Trudeau Government's SNC-Lavalin Scandal’ (The Globe and Mail, 20 December 2019).

56 Rose (n 52) 36, 51–53. See further below Part V(A).

57 Hence, this study focuses on transparency in norm-creation (see Rose (n 52) 35–6), and uses a broader definition of transparency than that of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ‘What is Good Governance?’ (2007) and closer to that of A Chayes et al., ‘Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective’ in E Brown Weiss and HK Jacobson (eds), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, Global Environmental Accord: Strategies for Sustainability and Institutional Innovation 39 (MIT Press 1998) 43, as discussed in Bianchi, A, ‘On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law’ in Bianchi, A and Peters, A (eds), Transparency in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 8 at nn 25 and 26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 eg Garrett (n 2).

59 See (n 45).

60 Rui, JP and Søreide, T, ‘Governments’ Enforcement of Corporate Bribery Laws: A Call for a Two-Track Regulatory Regime’ (2019) 132 TIR 132, 143Google Scholar.

61 King and Lord (n 43) 76. See also Kohler, M, ‘Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement’ (2015) 49 UCDavisLRev 497, 542Google Scholar.

62 Arlen, J, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence’ in Harel, A and Hylton, KN (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 144Google Scholar; Fisse, B, ‘Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions’ (1983) 56 SCalLRev 1141Google Scholar; Khanna, VS, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?’ (1996) 109 HarvLRev 1477, 1493–508Google Scholar. See generally Nagin, DS, ‘Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century‘ (2013) 42 Crime & Justice 199CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Fisse (n 62) 1159–67; Polinsky, AM and Shavell, S, ‘Should Employees be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?‘ (1993) 13 IRLE 239Google Scholar; Tyler, TR, ‘Pscyhology and the Deterrence of Corporate Crime’ in Arlen, J (ed), Research Handbook on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing (Edward Elgar 2018)Google Scholar.

64 Borlini and Lonati (n 45); MH Baer, ‘When the Corporation Investigates Itself’ in Arlen (n 63) 308.

65 Baer, MH, ‘Governing Corporate Compliance’ (2009) 50 BCLRev 949Google Scholar.

66 Whether preventive goals are achieved is difficult to estimate empirically. See Søreide, T, Corruption and Criminal Justice: Bridging Economic and Legal Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2016) 189–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar (efficiency of non-trial resolutions); Uhlmann, DM, ‘Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2013) 72 MdLRev 1295, 1336Google Scholar.

67 Søreide (n 66) 176.

68 OECD (n 47); S Oded, ‘The DOJ's Anti-Piling on Policy: Time to Reflect?’ in Søreide and Makinwa (n 23) 228.

69 OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (adopted 21 November 1997) [20].

70 OECD Recommendation (n 34) Annex I[B].

71 ibid.

72 OECD Recommendation (n 34) Annex I[B.a].

73 ibid Annex I[B.b].

74 OECD-ABC (n 32) art 3(1), (2).

75 cf Communication from the Commission: Ensuring the Effective Implementation of EU Policies through Criminal Law (20 September 2011) COM(2011) 573 final, 9 discussed in P Cullen ‘Article 3. Sanctions’ in Pieth, Low and Bonucci (n 33) 263.

76 OECD-ABC (n 32) art 3(1).

77 OECD Commentaries (n 69) [2].

78 OECD-ABC (n 32) art 3(2).

79 OECD Recommendation (n 34) [X], Annex II. See further M Pieth, ‘Article 2. The Responsibility of Legal Persons’ in Pieth, Low and Bonucci (n 33) 239–40.

80 OECD Commentaries (n 69) [24]; OECD Recommendation (n 34) [XI.i].

81 OECD-ABC (n 32) art 5, read with OECD Commentaries (n 69) [27].

82 OECD Recommendation (n 34) Annex I(D).

83 OECD-ABC (n 32) art 5.

84 UNCAC (n 32) art 26(1).

85 ibid, art 26(2).

86 ibid, art 26(3).

87 UNCAC (n 32) art 26(4).

88 UNODC 2012 (n 35) [316]; UNODC 2017 (n 35) 89.

89 UNODC 2017 (n 35) 91. See also UNCAC (n 32) art 9(1)(d).

90 UNCAC (n 32) art 30(2) (immunities of public officials), (4) (bail for accused offenders), (6) (removal, suspensions and resignation of public officials), (7) (disqualification from public office), (8) (discipline of civil servants), (10) (reintegration of offenders).

91 UNODC 2009 (n 35) 83.

92 UNODC 2017 (n 35) 111, discussed further in Coventry, T, ‘Article 30: Prosecution, Adjudication, and Sanction’ in Rose, C, Kubiciel, M and Landwehr, O (eds), The United Nations Convention against Corruption: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2019) 309Google Scholar.

93 UNODC 2017 (n 35) 113.

94 UNCAC (n 32) arts 37–9. See further PM Nichols, ‘Article 37: Cooperation with Law Enforcement Authorities’ in Rose, Kubiciel and Landwehr (n 92) 375.

95 UNODC 2017 (n 35) 180–3. Article 39 is entitled promisingly ‘Cooperation between National Authorities and the Private Sector’ but seems to apply to preventive arrangement between governments and innocent entities: PM Nichols, ‘Article 39: Cooperation between National Authorities and the Private Sector’ in Rose, Kubiciel and Landwehr (n 92) 390.

96 UNCAC (n 32) art 37(1).

97 Nichols (n 94) 375.

98 UNCAC (n 32) art 37(4) referring to art 32.

99 UNODC 2017 (n 35) 171.

100 Although the OECD-WGB would seem to have contemplated the need for coordination on plea agreements in corporate cases, the OECD-ABC Commentaries do not mention settlements: OECD-WGB (n 69) on arts 2 and 3, OECD-WGB, OECD Actions to Fight Corruption (24 October 1997) DAFFE/IME/BR(97) 14, 22. Likewise, settlement procedures do not figure in the travaux préparatoires to UNCAC, arts 26, 30 and 37: UNODC, Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiations for the Elaboration of the United Nations Conventions against Corruption (2010).

101 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT), art 31(3)(b). See further I Buga, Modification of Treaties by Subsequence Practice (Oxford University Press 2018) 43–4.

102 Boyle, AE and Chinkin, CM, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 212–15, 225Google Scholar. See also Chinkin, CM, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 850, 856, 838–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an indication that the law is already moving in this direction, see G20, Annex to G20 Leaders Declaration: G20 High Level Principles on the Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption (8 July 2017), principle 8.

103 This text refers to the documents as reporting documents because our review includes both the reports and, in the case of the UNCAC, executive summaries when the reports were not available. In addition, this text refers to the executive summaries and reports on UNCAC compliance as publications of the UNCAC-IRM, although the executive summaries are published by the UNCAC Implementation Review Group, which oversees the review mechanism, and the UNODC appears on the cover pages of the reports.

104 OECD (n 22) 11–12, 22–3. Those countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

105 In the first, and most relevant, review cycle these were: Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Mexico and Spain.

106 In addition, the executive summary of the Spanish report was not available in English.

107 ‘Settlement’, ‘plea’, ‘resolution’, ‘deferral’, ‘deferred prosecution’, ‘non-prosecution’, ‘DPA’, ‘NPA’, ‘non-trial resolution’ and ‘leniency’.

108 Manually using the PDF ‘find’ function, the standard key words (ibid) were searched for and the names of the settlement system(s) associated with each country, as per OECD (n 22). In addition, the UNCAC-IRM reports and/or executive summaries were visually reviewed for discussions of law enforcement or Articles 30 and 37.

109 For general praise of settlements, see OECD-WGB, Phase 3 [Ph-3] Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Spain (2012) 45; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the United States (2010) 38. For general praise of settlements in the context of individual enforcement actions, see OECD-WGB, Phase 4 [Ph-4] Report: Germany Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (2018) 15.

110 OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in France (2012) [101]; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Italy (2011) [3], [93]–[98], 29; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Switzerland (2011) [41]. See also OECD-WGB, Estonia: Phase 2 [Ph-2] Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (2008) [103]–[104], 30; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Israel (2015) [82]–[85], 31.

111 OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Brazil (2014) [60]; OECD-WGB, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Report: Japan (2019) 66. See also OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) [42]–[44], 20, [108].

112 OECD-WGB, United States: Phase 2 Report on Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combatting Bribery in International Business Transactions (2002) [49]–[52], 17.

113 OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) [112] citing Government Accountability Office, DOJ Has Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, but Should Evaluate Effectiveness, GAO-10-110 (2009) 25–6.

114 OECD-WGB, Italy Ph-3 (n 110) 5. See also OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) 5.

115 OECD-WGB, Italy Ph-3 (n 110) [96], 29. See OECD-WGB, Phase 4 Report: Switzerland, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (2018) [80].

116 OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) 42; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Estonia (2014) 31; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the Czech Republic (2013) 29; OECD-WGB, Italy Ph-3 (n 110) 29; OECD-WGB, Spain Ph-3 (n 109) 45; OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-3 (n 110) 21; OECD-WGB, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Report: United Kingdom (2017) 159; OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) 5, 38. For comments in relation to settlements with natural persons, see OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Germany (2011) 47.

117 The prosecutors responsible for the corruption investigation also resigned in protest. OECD-WGB, Chile: Phase 4 Report, Implementing the OECD Anti Bribery Convention (2018) [131]–[132], 43.

118 OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the United Kingdom (2012) 21.

119 OECD-WGB, Phase 4 Report: Finland, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (2017) 37; OECD-WGB, Germany Ph-4 (n 109) [206]–[207], 58; OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [81], 42. See also OECD-WGB, Japan Ph-4 (n 111) 4, 66.

120 OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Chile (2014) [117]–[118], 34; OECD-WGB, Germany Ph-3 (n 116) 48 (procedures for natural persons); OECD-WGB, France Ph-3 (n 110) 41; OECD-WGB, South Africa: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2009 Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (2010) [153]-[156], 49. See also OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) [55]-[56], 27; OECD-WGB, Estonia Ph-2 (n 110) [100]–[104], 30.

121 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-3 (n 120) 34.

122 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [128] citing Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce Plc & Anor (17 January 2017) Crown Court (Southwark).

123 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [128], [171].

124 ibid [172]–[173], 66 discussing OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) 62.

125 OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) [96]. See further OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) [93]–[99], 40.

126 OECD-WGB, Phase 1bis Report, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Argentina (2019) [83].

127 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) 42–3. See also OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) [105], 42; OECD-WGB, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Report: Norway (2018) 31.

128 See, especially, OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia (2012) 29. See also OECD-WGB, Germany Ph-4 (n 109) [192]–[199], 57–8, 85 (procedures for natural persons).

129 OECD-WGB, Estonia Ph-2 (n 110) [104], 30, 53; OECD-WGB, Estonia Ph-3 (n 116) [72], 31, 56–7. cf OECD-WGB, Estonia: Phase 2 Follow-up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations (2010) 10–11.

130 OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) 5.

131 ibid [113].

132 ibid.

133 OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) [93]–[97], 30.

134 OECD-WGB, Argentina Ph-1bis (n 126) [81]; OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) [61]; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Canada (2011) [57]–[61], 25; OECD-WGB, Phase 2 Report on Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Latvia (2015) [259]–[261], 70. See also OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-3 (n 120) [74], 23; OECD-WGB, Czech Republic Ph-3 (n 116) 21–2; OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [163].

135 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) [136], 44. See also OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) [68]–[69], 31; OECD-WGB, Japan Ph-4 (n 111) 66–7; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementation of the OECD AB-C in Norway (2011) (n 127) [55] 19.

136 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) [136]. See also OECD-WGB, Norway Ph-3 (n 135) [3]; OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [105]–[108], 33.

137 OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [101], 49. See also OECD-WGB, Argentina Ph-1bis (n 126) [81]; OECD-WGB, Japan Ph-4 (n 111) [188], [230]–[231]; OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [102]–[104], 32.

138 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [22], [148], 59. See also OECD-WGB, United Kingdom: Phase 2bis Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (2008) [239]–[241], 58. See further OECD (n 22) 80.

139 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [22].

140 ibid. See also OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [109]–[110], 34.

141 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [138], 53. See also OECD-WGB, Canada Ph-3 (n 134) 56.

142 OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Austria (2012) [59]–[60].

143 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [148], [171], 59, 66. See also OECD-WGB, Norway Ph-4 (n 127) [177], 61.

144 OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) 38.

145 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [76]–[78], 26. See also OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) 38.

146 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [154]. See also OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) [165]–[167], 53.

147 OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) [125].

148 The issue of reparations is vexed, research suggesting that victim country officials are generally excluded from settlement negotiations: JA Oduor et al., Left Out of the Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and Implications for Asset Recovery (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2014) 2. Nonetheless, Doig suggests the ‘remedial or restorative’ use of recovered funds is ‘is not significantly at variance with domestic legal approaches in other areas’: A Doig, ‘Non-Conviction Financial Sanctions, Corporate Anti-Bribery Reparation and Their Potential Role in Delivering Effective Anti-Corruption Pay-Back’ in Campbell and Lord (n 22) 258.

149 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) [137], 44, 69. See also OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [102], 49.

150 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [79]–[80], 29.

151 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-3 (n 120) [33].

152 OECD-WGB, Argentina Ph-1bis (n 126) [83], [108]; OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) 42; OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) 5, 43, 69; OECD-WGB, Czech Republic Ph-3 (n 116) 29; OECD-WGB, Italy Ph-3 (n 110) [98], 27; OECD-WGB, Spain Ph-3 (n 109) 45; OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-3 (n 110) [41], 21; OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [81]–[87], 41–2. See also OECD-WGB, Japan Ph-4 (n 111) 67; OECD-WGB, Latvia Ph-2 (n 134) 47; OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [58]–[61], 21; OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) [116]–[117], 38. See further OECD (n 22) 94–5, 152–8.

153 OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [59], 22; OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [159], 60. See also OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [62]–[67].

154 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) [128]; OECD-WGB, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Report: Czech Republic (2017) [79]–[84], 36; OECD-WGB, Italy Ph-3 (n 110) [98]; OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [116]. See also OECD-WGB, Germany Ph-4 (n 109) [191], 58.

155 OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [80].

156 OECD-WGB, Canada: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (2004) [82], 40; OECD-WGB, Germany Ph-4 (n 109) [15]–[17], 11–12; OECD-WGB, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in South Africa (2014) [30]–[31], [43]; OECD-WGB, Spain Ph-3 (n 109) [108]–[109], 43. See also OECD-WGB, Czech Republic: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (2006) [101]–[102], 25 cf OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) [33].

157 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) [130], 43.

158 OECD-WGB, Argentina Ph-1bis (n 126) [83], [108]; OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [81]. See also OECD-WGB, Estonia Ph-2 (n 110) [102]-[104], 30; OECD-WGB, France Ph-3 (n 110) 41.

159 OECD-WGB, Phase 4 Report: Australia, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (2017) [155]. See also OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) [110], 38; OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) [105]; OECD-WGB, Israel Ph-3 (n 110) [84], 31.

160 OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [83], [85].

161 OECD-WGB, France Ph-3 (n 110) [101]. See also OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [137].

162 OECG-WGB, Italy Ph-3 (n 110) 29. See also OECD-WGB, Germany Ph-4 (n 109) [191], 58.

163 OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-3 (n 110) [12]–[13]; OECD-WGB, UK Ph-3 (n 118) [101]–[102]; OECD-WGB, UK Ph-4 (n 116) [121]–[126], 49; OECD-WGB, USA Ph-3 (n 109) [68].

164 OECD-WGB, France Ph-3 (n 110) 41; OECD-WGB, Spain Ph-3 (n 109) 45.

165 OECD-WGB, Brazil Ph-3 (n 111) [96], 40, 42. See also OECD-WGB, South Africa Ph-2 (n 120) [153], 49.

166 OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) [124].

167 UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Austria 6, 57 (noting that ‘[p]lea bargaining does not exist in Austria because it runs counter to a fundamental principle of Austrian criminal procedure’).

168 For an exception, see UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Israel [332], [336], [452]–[453]. See also UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of the United Kingdom 111.

169 UNCAC-IRM, Austria Report (n 167) 6, 94–5; UNCAC-IRM, Executive Summary: Colombia (2014) 5; UNCAC-IRM, Executive Summary: Costa Rica (2016) 5–6; UNCAC-IRM, Executive Summary: France (2012) 5; UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Switzerland [245], [248]. See also UNCAC-IRM, Executive Summary: United Mexican States (2015) 5.

170 UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Brazil 72, 95–7; UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Canada 7, 204–6; UNCAC-IRM, Executive Summary: Czechia (2018) 5; UNCAC-IRM, Israel Report (n 168) [766]–[767], [773]; UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Italy 73-4, 131; UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Latvia 65, 100; UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Slovenia 4, 70; UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of South Africa [81]–[82], [139], [141]; UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of the United States of America 47, 132.

171 UNCAC-IRM, Israel Report (n 168) [332]; UNCAC-IRM, UK Report (n 168) [223]; UNCAC-IRM, USA Report (n 170) 47. See also UNCAC-IRM, Country Report: Finland 34.

172 UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of the Netherlands 44–5, 92–3, 104, 150.

173 UNCAC-IRM, Swiss Report (n 169) [64]–[65], [67].

174 UNCAC-IRM, USA Report (n 170) 47.

175 UNCAC-IRM, UK Report (n 168) [54], [223].

176 ibid [223].

177 ibid [223].

178 ibid [223].

179 UNCAC-IRM, Slovenia Report (n 170) 70.

180 ibid 70.

181 UNCAC-IRM, South Africa Report (n 170) [82].

182 ibid. cf UNCAC-IRM, Country Review Report of Norway [240], [244].

183 UNCAC-IRM, Italy Report (n 170) 109, 131.

184 UNCAC-IRM, USA Report (n 170) 92–3.

185 UNCAC-IRM, Latvia Report (n 170) 65.

186 UNCAC-IRM, Israel Report (n 168) [453].

187 ibid [453].

188 ibid [768], [773].

189 UNCAC-IRM, Netherlands Report (n 172) 146; UNCAC-IRM, South Africa Report (n 170) [129]. See also UNCAC-IRM, USA Report (n 170) 121.

190 UNCAC-IRM, Italy Report (n 170) 74–5.

191 OECD, Procedure for Self- and Mutual Evaluation of Implementation of the Convention and the Revised Recommendation – Phase 2 (adopted 1 March 2001) DAFFE/IME/BR(99)33/FINAL in OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 2 Monitoring Information Resources (2006) (OECD 2001) [28]; Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption on its Third Session, held in Doha from 9 to 13 November 2009 (2009), Resolution 3/1 Review Mechanism, Annex: Terms of Reference of the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC-IRM TOR) [4].

192 OECD, Request for Destriction by the Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions: Procedure of Self- and Mutual Evaluation of Implementation of the Convention and the Revised Recommendation (1998) DAFFE/IME(98)17 (OECD 1998) 7; OECD-WGB 2001 (n 191) [28]; OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 3 Monitoring Information Resources (2009) Introduction; OECD, ‘Phase 1 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’ (OECD no date).

193 OECD, Revised Guidelines for Phase 2 Reviews (adopted 27 February 2006) DAF/INV/BR/WD(2005)12/REV3 in OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 2 Monitoring Information Resources (2006) (OECD 2006) [V(A)(4)-(5)]; OECD, Post-Phase 2 Evaluation Procedure: The Conduct of Phase 3 Evaluations (adopted 17 December 2009) DAF/INV/BR(2008)25/FINAL in OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 3 Monitoring Information Resources (2009) (OECD 2009) [22]; OECD, Monitoring Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 4 Evaluation Procedure (December 2018) in OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 4 Monitoring Guide (2018) (OECD 2018) [22].

194 OECD 2006 (n 193) [V(A)(4)–(5)].

195 OECD 2006 (n 193) [V(B)(6)].

196 C Rose, ‘The Creation of a Review Mechanism for the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Protocols’ (2020) 114 AJIL 51, 58.

197 UNCAC-IRM TOR (n 191) [28].

198 UNCAC-IRM TOR (n 191) [29]–[30].

199 N Bonucci ‘Article 12. Monitoring and Follow-Up’ in Pieth, Low and Bonucci (n 33) 553–4 (on Phase 2); Pieth (n 48) 44 (on Phase 3).

200 Bonucci (n 199) 553–4 (on Phase 2).

201 OECD 1998 (n 192) 3; OECD 2001 (n 191) [II]; OECD 2009 (n 193) [5], [98]; OECD 2018 (n 193) [5], [93].

202 OECD 1998 (n 192) 5–6; OECD 2001 (n 191) Annex [8]; OECD 2006 (n 193) [VI]; OECD 2009 (n 193) [32]–[50]; OECD 2018 (n 193) [36]–[50].

203 OECD 2001 (n 191) Annex [8.5]; OECD 2009 (n 193) [41]; OECD 2018 (n 193) [6]. cf OECD 1998 (n 192) 9.

204 Pieth (n 48) 46 (on Phase 3).

205 UNCAC-IRM TOR (n 191) [34].

206 ibid [19].

207 ibid [19].

208 ibid [5], [8].

209 OECD-WGB, ‘OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions’ (OECD no date). On settlements, see especially OECD, ‘2018 OECD Consultation on Fighting Foreign Bribery’ (OECD no date).

210 OECD, ‘Review of OECD Anti-Bribery Instruments: Public Consultation’ (OECD no date); OECD, ‘Public Consultation: Review of the 2009 OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation’ (OECD no date).

211 OECD-WGB, Public Consultation Document: Review of the 2009 OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation (2019) 8–9, 10, 17 (Questions 8, 14, 31).

212 ibid, note 14. See also Corruption Watch UK and others, ‘Letter to OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria: Global Standards for Corporate Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases’ (UNCAC Coalition, 2016); Transparency International and others, ‘Letter to OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria: Principles for the Use of Non-Trial Resolutions in Foreign Bribery Cases’ (OECD 2018).

213 OECD-WGB (n 211) note 14 citing The Recommendation 6 Network, ‘International Guidelines for Non-Trial Resolutions of Foreign Bribery Cases’ (NHH 2018); OECD-WGB, Agenda: Plenary Meeting 5–7 March 2019 (2019) 3. Members of the Recommendation 6 Network are listed in the Transmittal Memorandum, available on the NHH website, where they are described as ‘a group of academics, lawyers, corporate officers, NGOs and others’.

214 cf D Kos, ‘Foreword’ in Søreide and Makinwa (n 23).

215 OECD (n 22) 39 (multi-jurisdictional settlements), 96 (corporate guidance), 102 (compliance programmes), 139 (monitoring), 158 (publicity).

216 OECD 2006 (n 193) [III(D)]; OECD 2009 (n 193) [20]–[21]; OECD 2018 (n 193) [20]–[21]; UNCAC-IRM TOR (n 191) [21], [26].

217 OECD 2006 (n 193) [V(B)(2)–(3)]; OECD 2009 (n 193) [25]; OECD 2018 (n 193) [26].

218 OECD 2009 (n 193) [89]; OECD 2018 (n 193) [84]. See also OECD 2006 (n 193) [IV(C)(1)].

219 OECD 2009 (n 193) [105]; OECD 2018 (n 193) [100]. See also OECD 2001 (n 191) [II]; OECD 2006 (n 193) [IX(B)].

220 UNCAC-IRM TOR (n 191) [21].

221 ibid [17].

222 ibid [8].

223 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘About: Preparing Reports’ (IPCC no date)

224 OECD Recommendations (n 29) [XIV]; OECD 2009 (n 193) [5]; OECD 2018 (n 193) [5].

225 UNCAC-IRM TOR (n 191) [37]–[38]. See also Rose (n 52) 105–6.

226 See eg Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols No 11 and No 14 (adopted 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953) 5 ETS, arts 6, 7, 14.

227 See eg OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [87], 41–2. For the UNCAC-IRM, see (n 184)–(n 185) and associated text.

228 See (n 121) and associated text.

229 See eg OECD-WGB, Australia Ph-3 (n 128) 29; OECD-WGB, Chile Ph-4 (n 117) 42–3; OECD-WGB, Switzerland Ph-4 (n 115) [87], 41–2. See also OECD-WGB, Germany Ph-4 (n 109) [92], [195]–[199] (settlements with natural persons).

230 See generally Ivory 2014 (n 46) 196–7, 203–12, 259–61. See eg GIEM SRL and Others v Italy (Merits) (App No 1828/06 et al) (28 June 2018) [241]–[247].

231 See (n 152)–(n 155) and associated text.

232 See (n 157)–(n 160) and associated text.

233 See eg Arlen, J, ‘Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements’ (2016) 8 JLA 191, 192–7; Garrett (n 2) 281–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

234 See eg United States v Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), discussed in Garrett (n 2) 88–95 but not mentioned in the OECD-WGB's reports on the US.

235 See (n 110)–(n 111) and associated text.

236 See (n 134)–(n 137) and associated text.

237 See (n 144)–(n 150) and associated text.

238 See (n 141)–(n 143) and associated text.

239 Corruption Watch UK et al. 2016 (n 212); Corruption Watch UK et al. 2018 (n 212); Recommendation 6 Network, Appendix III (Principles for Non-Trial Resolutions): Principles for the Implementation and Use of Non-Trial Resolutions of Foreign Bribery Cases (2018).

240 Corruption Watch UK et al. 2018 (n 212).

241 See (n 110)–(n 111) and associated text.

242 M Pieth, ‘Negotiating Settlements in a Broader Law Enforcement Context’ in Søreide and Makinwa (n 23) 19.

243 See further Davis (n 1) 72.