Faith, I argue, is a value-oriented perspective, where the subject has a pro-attitude towards the object of the perspective. After summarizing the perspectival account of faith and its upshots that are relevant to the proceeding argument, I give an extended explanatory, cumulative case argument for the account by showing that the perspectival account of faith explains the data that alternative accounts of faith seek to explain, including why faith is present in paradigmatic cases of faith and the truth, or perceived truth, of various statements about faith. In addition, I argue that the perspectival account of faith explains the plausibility of alternative accounts of faith; each of the alternative accounts of faith focuses on a feature or consequence of faith, according to the perspectival account, which we would expect if other faith theorists seek but incorrectly identify the correct account of faith.

This article articulates and defends an underexplored account of faith – the perspectival account of faith – according to which faith is a value-oriented perspective on the world towards which the subject has a pro-attitude. After describing this account of faith and outlining what it is to have faith on the perspectival account, I show that the perspectival account meets methodological criteria for an account of faith. I then show that this account of faith can be used to unify various faith locutions: having faith that p (propositional faith), having faith in something (attitudinal faith), being a person of faith (global faith), articles of faith (creedal faith), and acts of faith (praxical faith). Finally, since the perspectival account of faith is a cognitive account of faith, I defend the perspectival view against objections to cognitive accounts of faith.

As part of a long-term project investigating the relevance of phenomenology for (cognitive) linguistics we analyse two central, interrelated concepts: embodied intersubjectivity (intercorporeality) and sedimentation. With respect to the first, we spell out a number of different intercorporeal structures, emanating at the most fundamental level from the dual Leibkörper nature of the body. Further, we demonstrate that sedimentation is more than a ‘geological metaphor’ as meaning is intrinsically layered in human experience. This is first illustrated by reviewing evidence from ontogenetic semiotic development within the framework of the Mimesis Hierarchy model (Zlatev 2013). Then, we focus on the linguistic construal of situations lacking actual motion in dynamic terms through expressions of non-actual motion such as The road goes through the forest and He was uplifted by her smile. We review studies of non-actual motion in Swedish, English, French, Bulgarian and Thai extending and re-formulating previous analyses. We argue that the present analysis is more adequate than cognitive linguistic explanations in terms of ‘mental simulation’ and ‘conceptual metaphor’. We conclude by pointing out how our phenomenological investigation can help resolve a number of classical dilemmas in semantics: Is language primarily grounded in the body or in society? Is the ontology of linguistic meaning mental or social? What is the relationship between pre-linguistic experiences and linguistic conventions?

In current linguistics, non-objective (i.e. perspectival or construed) facets of linguistic meaning are often explained as properties or correlates of cognitive phenomena. Such outlook, exemplified by Langacker's (1987, 2008) Cognitive Grammar, stands in contrast vis-à-vis the necessary social character of language in general and linguistic meaning in particular. Accordingly, a viable semantic theory should seek to explain non-objective facets of meaning as an intersubjectively valid semantic resource that is an integral part of linguistic meaning at large. In this paper, such theory is proposed based on the phenomenological notions of intentionality and intersubjectivity. I will argue that the non-objectivity of linguistic meaning is most realistically explained as conventionalized intentionality, i.e. object-directedness of conscious experience. The conventionalization of intentionality, in turn, suggests a complex manner in which non-objective meaning motivates the selection of a linguistic expression within an intersubjective context. Finally, this intimate relationship between non-objective meaning and context suggests the feasibility of extending Cognitive Grammar's notion of construal into analysis of non-objective meaning as an intersubjective, context-sensitive facet of interaction (see Etelämäki et al. 2009 for a similar argument).

As an explicitly usage-based model of language structure (Barlow & Kemmer, 2000), cognitive grammar draws on the notion of ‘usage events’ of language as the starting point from which linguistic units are schematized by language users. To be true to this claim for spoken languages, phenomena such as non-lexical sounds, intonation patterns, and certain uses of gesture should be taken into account to the degree to which they constitute the phonological pole of signs, paired in entrenched ways with conceptual content. Following through on this view of usage events also means realizing the gradable nature of signs. In addition, taking linguistic meaning as consisting of not only conceptual content but also a particular way of construing that content (Langacker, 2008, p. 43), we find that the forms of expression mentioned above play a prominent role in highlighting the ways in which speakers construe what they are talking about, in terms of different degrees of specificity, focusing, prominence, and perspective. Viewed in this way, usage events of spoken language are quite different in nature from those of written language, a point which highlights the need for differentiated accounts of the grammar of these two forms of expression taken by many languages.