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Across advanced industrialized democracies, the political centre is collapsing as politicians on the far right and far left enjoy increasing electoral success. Recent research links import shocks to voter support for far-right parties. However, we know comparatively less about how these shocks impact individual legislator ideology, especially that of mainstream politicians. Do import shocks drive economic or cultural ideological shifts among mainstream legislators? If so, to what extent do local competitive contexts shape these shifts? Using a dataset of French Senate roll call votes, we find that localized increases in import exposure moves elite ideology to the left economically; this is magnified in departments with majoritarian electoral systems. We show that legislators shift their cultural positions in response to import shocks, but only when faced with extremist political competitors focused on cultural issues. Our results suggest the value of attending to how political and economic geography intersect to shape elite policy positions.
The regime concept has featured prominently in Comparative Politics in the last three decades. In the comparative democratization literature, the notion of regime transition and consolidation has provided the direction of much research across regions of the world. It has generated interest in measuring the progress countries make in becoming democratic systems. The indicators provided by Freedom House and the more recently established Varieties of Democracy Institute constitute valuable data for these global comparisons. The merit of relying primarily on such indicators, however, has increasingly come into question as political developments around the world challenge the notion that democracy is the only type of regime that matters. The significant backsliding in recent years confirms the rise of new challenges to democracy (Bermeo 2016; Waldner and Lust 2018). In parallel with this reversal, countries around the world are developing their own regimes reflecting the social and economic conditions on the ground. These structural factors explain, among other things, the rise of populist leaders who may allow electoral competition but put restrictions on other democratic rights (Levitsky and Way 2010). These leaders are a product of changes in society, not just examples of deviant political behavior.
This article investigates determinants of candidate turnover in 10 European established democracies with list-PR electoral systems. We identify party and election variables that affect the supply and demand of new candidates on the parties’ lists. In addition, we apply a weighted candidate turnover measure to investigate the dynamic of renewal on high-ranked list positions. We built an original dataset that contains 3344 electoral lists of represented political parties. Hypotheses are tested by means of a multilevel analysis of political party list renewal rates. At the party level, leadership change and larger party size in terms of members are found to coincide with higher general turnover. At the system level, general turnover is higher in elections with closed lists and high electoral volatility. At higher positions on the list, candidate turnover appears not to be affected by the party- and system-level variables identified in the broader literature.
This study uses prediction market data from the nation’s historical election betting markets to measure electoral competition in the American states during the era before the advent of scientific polling. Betting odds data capture ex ante expectations of electoral closeness in the aggregate, and as such improve upon existing measures of competition based on election returns data. Situated in an analysis of the 1896 presidential election and its associated realignment, I argue that the market odds data show that people were able to anticipate the realignment and that expectations on the outcome in the states influenced voter turnout. Findings show that a month ahead of the election betting markets accurately forecast a McKinley victory in most states. This study further demonstrates that the market predictions identify those states where electoral competition would increase or decline that year and the consequences of these expected partisanship shifts on turnout. In places where the anticipation was for a close race voter expectations account for a turnout increase of as much as 6%. Participation dropped by 1%–6% in states perceived as becoming electorally uncompetitive. The results support the conversion and dealignment theories from the realignment literature.
In this chapter I present results from a mathematical formalization of intensity theory. I apply tools from game theory to analyze the dynamics of electoral competition when voters vary in how much they care about policy and when candidates do not know which voters care more and less intensely. I show that candidates for office choose policy platforms as a function of the size and intensity of opposing policy coalitions. Candidates sometimes set policy with an intense minority even though they know that a less-intense majority wants the opposite policy. But they also sometimes choose not to frustrate majorities even with an intense minority.
In this chapter I walk through the how and why of a theory of issue intensity and electoral competition and build the basics of the mathematical model used to explore intensity theory. I lay out six foundational assumptions of the model drawn from existing theories of elections in political science or political economy. The assumptions rule out current explanations for frustrated majorities so that I can show that the combination of issue intensity and electoral competition alone can cause frustrated majorities. I show how costly political action becomes an important part of the story when candidates cannot perfectly observe the issue intensity of voters. I then present a simple mathematical model with numerical examples to provide intuition for analysis in subsequent chapters.
Drawing insights from legislative, electoral and welfare studies, the article investigates whether and to what extent electoral competition affects incumbent politicians’ overpromising of social welfare benefits. For this, Taiwan is chosen as the case and the article examines the fate of elite-level social welfare legislative proposals in the period between 1992 and 2016. Findings drawn from quantitative bill sponsorship patterns demonstrate that political elites tend to propose failure-prone social welfare bills during election periods. Moreover, this tendency grew even more clearly in tandem with the rising levels of electoral democracy. The article argues that the overpromising of social welfare benefits is likely due to cognitive biases on the voter side allowing politicians to make promises without necessarily facing the negative consequences of under-delivery. The article contributes to the comparative welfare state literature by adding much-needed nuance to the existing debates on the relationship between democratic deepening, electoral competition, and the development of welfare politics.
Political transitions in a multiethnic setting are often marred with violence between groups. Why does ethnocommunal violence during a country’s democratic transition erupt in some places, and not others? Why does it subsequently decline? Existing explanations typically focus on the weakness of state capacity, the power struggle between political candidates around elections, or the structural factors such as economic inequality between groups. However, in many countries in transition, administrative units with similar characteristics have varying levels of violence. In this book, I build on Albert O. Hirschman’s framework of exit, voice, and loyalty, and I argue that excluded local elites mobilize violence to leverage their demands for greater inclusion in local politics during democratic transition. When these demands are accommodated, violence will decline. This chapter provides an overview of my theory, contributions to related literature, methodological approaches, key findings, and plan of the book.
This chapter discusses the specific relationships between Golkar’s entrenchment, the exclusion of local ethnic elites, and the mobilization of riots in two high-conflict Indonesian provinces, Central Sulawesi and Maluku. By comparing two pairs of districts – Ambon and Maluku Tenggara in Maluku province, and Banggai and Poso in Central Sulawesi province – I demonstrate the importance of local elites’ framing, mobilization, and organization of violence. Although the four districts are relatively similar in their religious and ethnic composition, level of economic development, and dependence on the state, Ambon and Poso experienced some of the most protracted and intense ethnocommunal violence in Indonesia’s recent history, while their two neighboring districts, Maluku Tenggara and Banggai, respectively, were relatively peaceful by comparison. Relying on interviews with bureaucrats, community leaders, and former combatants, I show that these diverging outcomes can be attributed to local elites’ initial political configuration at the onset of the democratic transition, and to their actions and responses to trigger events.
This article investigates how unemployment risk within households affects voting for the radical right. The authors contribute to recent advances in the literature that have highlighted the role of economic threat for understanding the support of radical-right parties. In contrast to existing work, the authors do not treat voters as atomistic individuals; they instead investigate households as a crucial site of preference formation. Combining largescale labor market data with comparative survey data, they confirm the expectations of their theoretical framework by demonstrating that the effect of occupational unemployment risk on radical-right support is strongly conditioned by household-risk constellations. Voting for the radical right is a function not only of a voter’s own risk, but also of his or her partner’s risk. The article provides additional evidence on the extent to which these effects are gendered and on the mechanisms that link household risk and party choice. The results imply that much of the existing literature on individual risk exposure potentially underestimates its effect on political behavior due to the neglect of multiplier effects within households.
This chapter analyzes the dramatic expansion of social policy to traditionally unprotected labor-market outsiders (i.e. the informal sector, unemployed, rural workers and dependents) in Latin America. Comprising between 40 and 80 percent of the regional population, outsiders had been historically marginalized from social protection. Focusing on the countries analyzed in Shaping the Political Arena (Collier and Collier 1991) it asks, why did incumbents adopt social policy for outsiders? Why did some expand broad-reaching, nondiscretionary benefits while others refrained from launching significant protections or launched discretionary benefits? The political regime type as well as the presence of either electoral competition for the vote of outsiders or social mobilization by movements representing outsiders and labor unions help explain whether expansion occurred and what pattern of social policy emerged. Moreover, among governments that expanded nondiscretionary and broad-reaching policies, some created more generous and encompassing inclusive benefits in which groups often participated in policy implementation, while others provided more restrictive benefits, with less coverage, lower benefits, and bureaucratic implementation. I show that the balance of partisan power and the involvement of social movements in policy design accounts for whether inclusive or restrictive benefits were launched across three areas – pensions, healthcare, and income support.
The fact that equitable social policy expanded drastically in Latin America during the left turn and during a time of prosperity does not necessarily mean that the ideological color of governing parties and economic growth are the engines behind changes in social policy, as is usually claimed by part of the literature. Using panel data from Latin American countries for 1990–2013, this paper offers an alternative explanation, derived from previous qualitative research, that the level of political competition, the strength of civil society, and wealth are the key factors behind the expansion of equitable social policy. Once these explanations are included in our models, the ideological leaning of governments and economic growth lose statistical significance. Thus, this paper challenges dominant approaches that consider social policy change in Latin America a consequence of the ideological leaning of the government and economic growth.
While party splits are a relatively frequent phenomenon in many new and established democracies, the systematic empirical research on electoral competition after schisms is limited. The analysis of more than 200 splits across 25 European countries in the post-war period addresses this gap in the research. The study shows that the vote shares of rump and splinter parties in the first election after fission are related to their membership strength and the share of splinter legislators. This relationship is present in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, economic growth affects the support of rump parties that hold government office while party system fragmentation and party funding regulations correlate with the electoral performance of splinter parties.
Since the turn of the century, much comparative politics scholarship has examined whether and how income inequality affects the prospects of democratization and, to a lesser extent, whether democracy reduces inequality. What is lacking, however, is a close examination of the extent of income inequality in authoritarian regimes. This article examines the variation in inequality across authoritarian regimes and argues that electoral competition – in conjunction with party ideology and the extent of party institutionalization – helps explain the pattern of inequality under authoritarian rule. I find that electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes – regimes in which multiple parties legally compete in elections – have lower levels of inequality compared to non-EA regimes. I further find that inequality is lower in EA regimes with left-leaning ruling parties and more institutionalized party systems. This analysis highlights the value of exploring the dynamics and contingent effects of electoral competition in authoritarian regimes.
How does gerrymandering affect intraparty and interparty electoral competition in state legislatures? Research has shown that electoral competition produces better representation and that descriptive representation positively affects substantive representation or policy outcomes. However, other studies have found an ever increasing incumbency advantage. I argue that the incumbency advantage within Majority Minority Districts is significant and distinct from that of majority White Democrat and Republican districts. I estimate levels of intraparty and interparty competition among Majority Minority Districts, majority White Democrat districts, and majority White Republican districts in the state legislature of Alabama. I use majority White Democrat districts as an intraparty comparison group because of African American’s statistically high support for the Democrat Party. Using three separate measures of competitiveness, I find racial gerrymandering in Alabama has a significant and sui generis negative effect on competition within Majority Minority Districts, compared to majority White districts.
We advance the literature on electoral institutions and legislative representation by investigating legislators’ position taking strategies in Taiwan under the single non-transferable voting period. Existing research largely assumes that representatives elected from the same electoral rule behave similarly. We challenge this conventional understanding by arguing that legislators in multi-member districts (MMDs) tend to move toward the extreme direction from the party line if they come from districts where their party is less competitive. This pattern of legislative representation allows them to appeal to partisan voters, as lowering one's partisan profile can be too costly in such districts. On the contrary, those who are elected from strong partisan districts are expected to deviate from the party toward the moderate direction. Given a solid partisan foundation in these districts, these legislators may target voters across party lines. Our analysis covering the entire period of MMD elections after Taiwan's democratization (1992–2008) provides robust empirical evidence to our theoretical claim. Our findings, therefore, shed lights for future studies on the intertwining nature between electoral systems, district level factors, and legislative representation.
The question of how involvement in institutional politics and governance affects rebel groups’ behaviour is pertinent when studying violent non-state actors, both during and in the aftermath of conflict. This is especially the case when participation in the political system becomes sustained over time. The interactions between the political and governance practices of a rebel group and its overall ideological orientation and state-building aspirations are not sufficiently analysed in the literature, especially in the context of hybrid armed-political organizations operating in latent, frozen or protracted conflicts. This article aims to begin to fill this gap by examining how involvement in institutional politics has shaped both Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s branding, interpretation and reliance on their own constitutive ideological manifestos, with an emphasis on both organizations’ dynamic processes aimed at reconciling political participation with their previous ideological rejection of the legitimacy of the political system and their constitutive calls to dramatically restructure the political order. Based on these detailed accounts, this article reflects on how the complex relationship between politics, electoral competition, governance and ideological principles can shape an armed group’s political identity.
When the U.S. Supreme Court decides to exercise judicial review on a law passed by a democratically elected institution, it can have a profound and critical impact on public policy. Furthermore, recent research shows that the Court more frequently declares state statutes unconstitutional than federal statutes. However, only a limited number of studies have extensively explored this political phenomenon. One aspect of a state that has not been considered in connection with the Supreme Court's use of judicial review over state legislation is the electoral environment in which the laws are produced. We argue that because electoral competition affects the legislative output from a state, it could also influence the likelihood that a state has a statute invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court. When examining all states between 1971 and 2010, we find evidence in support of our theoretical expectation. Specifically, we find that an increase in electoral competition corresponds to an increased likelihood that a state has a statute invalidated by the Supreme Court. This finding contributes to our understanding of the Supreme Court's use of judicial review, and it also suggests that electoral pressure can incentivize states to craft unconstitutional public policy.
This article investigates accountability in South Africa’s dominant party system by studying how the African National Congress (ANC) reacts to electoral incentives at the local level. It compares the ANC’s degree of responsiveness to voters across municipalities with different levels of political competition. The analysis focuses on whether and under which conditions the ANC is more likely to renominate better quality municipal councillors. It examines the relationship between renomination as ANC municipal councillor and local government performance – as measured by voter signals, service delivery and audit outcomes. The results show that the ANC does indeed adapt its behaviour to electoral incentives. In municipalities where the ANC has larger margins of victory, performance matters little for renomination. In contrast, in municipalities with higher electoral competition, local government performance is strongly correlated with renomination. These results suggest the need to expand dominant party research to topics of voter responsiveness and sub-national behaviour.
Parties of ethnic minorities are flourishing in a large number of ethnically divided democracies. While academic research has studied their emergence and success, we know little about intra-group party competition. This paper discusses the reasons for intra-group political plurality, with a focus on intra-party conflict and intra-group party competition: it explains the political orientation of ethnic minority parties and their intra-group challengers as a consequence of the inclusion of minority parties into government. The inclusion of minority parties into national governments produces an inherent conflict between pragmatic office-seekers and radical partisans. In minority parties that have governmental responsibilities, the pragmatist view overwhelms, while in those parties in opposition, radical voices dominate. The formation of two intra-Hungarian challenger parties in Romania and in Slovakia in 2007 and 2009 represents two very similar cases, which appear to be in line with our hypotheses.