The literature lacks consensus on the role of currency regimes in explaining external competitiveness. Countries not only differ in terms of currency regimes, but can also have different institutional arrangements, namely trade agreements and inflation targeting (IT) frameworks in addition to the overall quality of governance. Hence, using the real effective exchange rate and by covering 35 developing countries over the period 1975–2014, we investigate the role of currency regimes in explaining the degree of misalignment while considering institutional factors. First, we find that intermediate regimes limit the currency misalignment with greater financial openness (FO). Second, non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements improve price competitiveness, whereas free trade and reciprocal ones can only be beneficial with a higher degree of FO. Third, misalignments in fixed regimes decline in the presence of stronger institutions or in countries with an IT type of monetary policy framework. The above results remain robust to alternative specifications.

One of the most important advantages of an inflation target is that it helps to reduce uncertainty about future inflation. However, this confidence may be undermined if actual inflation continuously deviates from the target level. We examine how inflation uncertainty relates to the presence of an inflation target and deviations of inflation from the targeted level. Inflation uncertainty is quantified by means of an unobserved components stochastic volatility model that allows to distinguish between permanent and transitory inflation uncertainty. While long-term inflation appears largely stable in most economies, the short-term inflation uncertainty is found to be time-varying. Most notably, short-term inflation uncertainty is high if inflation rates are below the target level. This is particularly relevant for economies which are currently confronted with the presence of persistently low-inflation rates. Our findings suggest that announcing higher inflation targets as it is currently discussed may be costly in terms of provoking higher inflation uncertainty.

The paper analyzes how actual monetary policy changed following the official adoption of inflation targeting in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland and how it affected the volatilities of important macroeconomic variables in the years thereafter. To disentangle the effects of the policy shift from exogenous changes in the volatilities of these variables, a Markov-switching dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is estimated that allows for regime switches in the policy parameters and the volatilities of shocks hitting the economies. Whereas estimation results reveal periods of high and low volatility for all three economies, the presence of different policy regimes is supported by the underlying data for the Czech Republic and Poland, only. In both economies, monetary policy switched from weak and unsystematic to strong and systematic responses to inflation dynamics. Simulation results suggest that the policy shifts of both central banks successfully reduced inflation volatility in the following years. The observed reduction in output volatility, on the other hand, is attributed more to a reduction in the size of external shocks.

In this paper, we make the case that an argument for price-level targeting over inflation targeting need not to be based on some overly restrictive assumptions. We adopt a theoretical framework that deviates from the assumption of rational expectation, and that takes into account the cognitive limitations and a “trial and error” learning mechanism of the agents. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict consumer price index (CPI) inflation targeting, exchange rate peg, and domestic price-level and CPI-level targeting) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and then create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Therefore, relaxing the rational expectation hypothesis has potential consequences for policy planning. We find that price-level targeting prevails over inflation targeting even under different expectation formation and even when the announced inflation target is not fully credible. The counterfactual analysis and sensitivity test confirm that CPI-level targeting is the most effective for improving social welfare and stability in an open economy. The business cycles induced by animal spirits are enhanced by strict inflation targeting.

As originally published the first keyword in this list was misspelled. The publisher regrets the error and displays the keywords correctly here:

This paper develops an analytically tractable, two-country, two-traded-good dynamic general-equilibrium model of money to examine the long-run and short-run effects of a temporary change in the domestic inflation target on the trade pattern, the terms of trade, the foreign exchange rate, and the capital accumulation of each country and of the world economy. We find that such a temporary monetary innovation can generate permanent effects on the world distribution of capital and the pattern of trade, resulting in nonneutrality in an otherwise money-neutral cash-in-advance setting. This change also leads to very rich transitional dynamics that we fully characterize analytically. In particular, endogenous responses in transition can be monotone or nonmonotone and can exhibit over-shooting. Our analytic findings and quantitative results help explain some noticeable changes in the capital accumulation, output, and bilateral trade of several countries adopting inflation targeting. Since the permanent effects of a temporary change in the domestic inflation target on the pattern of international trade and the performance of the macroeconomy are driven by a new channel through the world distribution of capital, we add new insights to the literature.

Benhabib and Farmer show that in a laissez-faire one-sector real business cycle model under aggregate increasing returns, under sufficiently high degrees of productive externality, the demand-side effect in the labor market triggered by agents' expectations about the economy's future outweighs the supply-side effect, making agents' expectations become self-fulfilling. This paper analytically demonstrates that the conduct of monetary policy under nominal gross domestic product (GDP) targeting reinforces the supply-side effect in the labor market, thereby making belief-driven aggregate fluctuations more difficult to occur. This reinforcement effect on labor supply is absent under nominal consumption targeting and inflation targeting. Hence, under these two monetary regimes, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the economy to display equilibrium indeterminacy and sunspot fluctuations are identical to those in Benhabib and Farmer's laissez-faire economy. The results are robust to an endogenous growth extension of the model, implying that targeting the nominal GDP growth rate is more desirable than targeting the nominal consumption growth rate or the inflation rate in terms of macroeconomic stability.

We use laboratory experiments with human subjects to test the relevance of different inflation-targeting regimes. In particular and within the standard New Keynesian model, we evaluate to what extent communication of the inflation target is relevant to the success of inflation targeting. We find that if the central bank cares only about inflation stabilization, announcing the inflation target does not make a difference in terms of macroeconomic performance compared with a standard active monetary policy. However, if the central bank also cares about the stabilization of economic activity, communicating the target helps to reduce the volatility of inflation, interest rate, and output gap, although their average levels are not affected. This finding is consistent with the theoretical literature and provides a rationale for the adoption of a flexible inflation-targeting regime.

This paper reconsiders the monetary policy implications of a model from which a distinction between CPI inflation and PPI inflation arises. More specifically, this paper addresses the policy conclusion by K. Huang and Z. Liu [2005, Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target, Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1435–1462], which states that central banks should use an optimal inflation index that gives substantial weight to stabilizing both CPI and PPI. This paper argues that these authors' findings rely on the assumption that producer prices are as sticky as consumer prices and shows that once empirically relevant frequencies of price adjustment are used to calibrate the model, CPI inflation receives substantial weight in the optimal inflation index. Moreover, this rule is remarkably robust to uncertainty regarding the model parameters.

We examine the evolution of monetary policy rules in a group of inflation-targeting countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), applying a moment-based estimator in a time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. From this novel flexible framework, our main findings are threefold. First, monetary policy rules change gradually, pointing to the importance of applying a time-varying estimation framework. Second, the interest-rate smoothing parameter is much lower than typically reported by previous time-invariant estimates of policy rules. External factors matter for all countries, although the importance of the exchange rate diminishes after the adoption of inflation targeting. Third, the response of interest rates to inflation is particularly strong during periods when central bankers want to break a record of high inflation, such as in the United Kingdom or Australia at the beginning of the 1980s. Contrary to common perceptions, the response becomes less aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting, suggesting a positive anchoring effect of this regime on inflation expectations. This result is supported by our finding that inflation persistence typically decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting.

Emerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting and that combine low credibility, high public debt, and a high interest rate suffer from a typical problem. Increases in the interest rate to reduce departures of inflation from the target imply that a higher primary surplus is required for stabilizing public debt/GDP ratio. This tricky situation is known as “unpleasant fiscal arithmetic” (UFA). This article develops a theoretical model showing how increased financial openness and capital account liberalization can mitigate UFA. Furthermore, empirical evidence from the Brazilian case through OLS, GMM, and GMM system methods is offered. The findings show that increases in capital mobility and financial openness work as a commitment technology, which contributes to the success of the inflation targeting and thus reduces the risk of UFA.

The Friedman rule states that steady-state welfare is maximized when there is deflation at the real rate of interest. Recent work by Khan, King, and Wolman [Review of Economic Studies 10 (4), 825–860] uses a richer model but still finds deflation optimal. In an otherwise standard New Keynesian model we show that, if households have hyperbolic discounting, small positive rates of inflation can be optimal. In our baseline calibration, the optimal rate of inflation is 2.1% and remains positive across a wide range of calibrations.