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When considering the implications of the shareholder-stakeholder debate in defining the purpose of a company, epistemological clarity is vital in this emerging theory of the firm. Such clarity can prevent recurrence based solely on rephrasing key terms. To understand how various stakeholders develop and interpret a shared purpose, I argue for the necessity of a pragmatist approach that is normative and process-oriented. Mental models play a crucial role in interpretive processes that define decision-making, where individual perspectives converge. The figures of Milton Friedman and Ed Freeman serve as “beacons,” as artefacts, in the transmission of knowledge through which we, as individuals, shape a shared understanding. In current societies, profound polarization obstructs solutions to grand challenges. Pragmatism starts by questioning the underlying values of everyone involved. It assumes that sound deliberative processes are the only way to reach real solutions—not only for the mind but, above all, for the heart.
Negative human–wildlife interactions are a growing problem, particularly for people living near protected areas and wildlife refuges. In Kenya, African savannah elephants Loxodonta africana threaten food security for subsistence farmers by crop foraging, which can jeopardize conservation efforts if farmers retaliate against elephants. To inform conservation and management, this study had three objectives: (1) to evaluate stakeholder participatory models of human–elephant conflict; (2) to note any novel or underrepresented variables in the models; and (3) to determine if there were indicators for assessing the success of mitigation programmes using a biocultural approach. We conducted participatory modelling sessions in six villages in rural Kenya using fuzzy cognitive mapping (n = 206 participants). Farmers created group visual models with variables related to conflict with elephants. A total of 14 variables were common across all six villages, with the two highest centrality scores (a measure of importance to overall dynamics) associated with income and feelings of security. Most variables fell into two categories: environmental interactions, and policy and management. Multiple variables such as road infrastructure (drivers) and soil compaction (consequences) were identified as aspects of conflicts that are under-reported or absent in scientific literature, as well as potential socio-cultural indicators. The participatory method used is a tool for gaining more refined insights into interactions with elephants, with implications for other complex conservation issues or wildlife interactions. A more holistic view of the impacts of human–elephant interactions as demonstrated here can lead to sustainable, co-developed programmes that benefit both farmer livelihoods and elephant conservation.
This chapter addresses how cognitive flexibility enables an individual to respond adaptively to new situations and respond appropriately to any situation. Interrupting automaticity avoids being trapped in mindsets that foreclose generating new options; avoiding reductive bias reduces the tendency to oversimplify and turn dynamic processes into fixed objects and make complex interactions linear; avoiding functional fixedness reduces the tendency to apply the same solution to different situations; and cognitive connectivity opens up to new approaches in which mental models can be transformed, schemata reorganized, and cognitive bridges built between previous expertise and new situations. This kind of cognitive flexibility enables individuals to respond and adapt to the new situation into which they are moving. This is discussed in light of the retrospective interviews with twenty-four elite performers in three domains (business, sports, and music) who successfully and repeatedly transitioned to higher positions within their field.
Chapter 4 discusses various theories of learning that have an impact on how EC professionals can work with young children. Theories about how children (and, indeed, adults) learn science and the factors that affect learning in young children are described. The relationship between everyday concepts and scientific concepts is distinguished. The place of affective factors in children’s learning is also described. Various case studies are presented to highlight aspects of children’s learning.
Until recently, economics conceived of poverty solely as a lack of material resources. This view likely captures the reality of poverty experienced by many people around the globe. However, two waves of behavioral economics demonstrate that the narrowing of people’s external environments may change people themselves: poverty lowers the quality of decision-making and poverty and oppression may depress the capacity to aspire. Poverty and a history of oppression also change how individuals are perceived. To overcome these effects may require helping people acquire new mental models. This essay discusses key findings from behavioral economics, the implications for agency, and some interventions with promising outcomes. We hope to inspire scholars and policymakers to think more deeply about the nature of poverty and oppression and to consider policies that target the psychological and sociological factors that create cycles of poverty.
Mental models are the internal representations that guide interactions with the world. Mental models are experience based and they inform an individual’s understanding of what is going on, how things work, and how a situation is likely to evolve. This chapter provides two principles for supporting the development of robust mental models in trainees. The Mental Model Articulation Principle emphasizes building training experiences that encourage learners to verbalize aspects of their mental models to identify flaws and gaps. The Many Variations Principle highlights the value of providing learners with a range of experiences with the intent of expanding their mental models to support performance in diverse conditions.
This chapter begins with an outline of logic and of the attempts to use it as a theory of human deduction. The fatal impediments to this approach led to the model theory in which models based on the meanings of premises yield deductive conclusions. And the chapter describes in detail the implementation of this theory’s account of deductions based on sentential connectives such as “if,” and how this simulation led to the discovery of systematic but compelling fallacies.The chapter outlines how algorithms based on models simulate deductions of the spatial relations among objects. And it points out the problems that need to be solved to extend accounts of elementary inferences from quantified assertions to deal with multiply-quantified relations. One alternative to the model theory is the idea that human deduction relies on probabilities. This approach concerns only which inferences people make, not the underlying mental processes by which they are made. The model theory fills the gap, because it applies to the deductions of probabilities, both those based on frequencies or proportions, and those based on evidence pertinent to unique events. The chapter ends with an account of why theories of human deduction need to be simulated in computer programs.
Spoken or written texts are coherent sequences of sentences. Text comprehension is equivalent to the construction of multiple mental representations in working memory. It is based on an interaction between external text information and internal prior knowledge information stored in long-term memory. Mental representations include a text surface representation, a propositional representation, and a mental model. They are characterized by different forgetting rates. As speakers and authors omit information which can be easily completed by listeners and readers, text comprehension always includes inferences. Listening and reading comprehension use the same lexicon and the same syntax but qualitatively different text surface structures. Due to local and global coherence of texts, comprehension is also a process of mental coherence formation. Limitations of working memory require focused attention on the construction of topic-specific mental models which are carried along from sentence to sentence by a flow of consciousness. Speakers and authors can direct this process through topic information within the text surface.
Discourse comprehension relies on the construction of a mental model that represents the unfolding in time of the events described. In causal scenarios, where the action of one agent (the enabler) temporally precedes and enables the action of another agent (the causer), discourse may reflect the underlying event structure by describing the enabler’s action first and then the causer’s action (story order) or may describe the causer’s action first (backward order). Studies in the literature have shown that adults consider causers to be more responsible than enablers in moral scenarios. Based on the assumption that story order favors the construction of a mental model of events, we conducted an experiment to test the prediction that preference for the causer over the enabler should be greater when events are presented in story order than in backward order. The participants in the experiment were 42 fifth-grade children, 42 adolescents, and 42 adults. The results of the experiment confirmed the prediction for all three groups of participants. We discuss the practical implications of these results for learning contexts, legal contexts, and the psychology of moral judgments.
In Chapter 2 I argue that we reason by building and manipulating mental models. These causal models allow us to predict, control and explain the world around us. They are idealized and schematic, which reduces complexity but can lead to reasoning biases. I also present an account of how we generate these models, by using intuitive theories of how things work and how humans behave. This allows for learning and inference at multiple levels, and it helps explain our proficiency at explaining the world.
How do we make sense of complex evidence? What are the cognitive principles that allow detectives to solve crimes, and lay people to puzzle out everyday problems? To address these questions, David Lagnado presents a novel perspective on human reasoning. At heart, we are causal thinkers driven to explain the myriad ways in which people behave and interact. We build mental models of the world, enabling us to infer patterns of cause and effect, linking words to deeds, actions to effects, and crimes to evidence. But building models is not enough; we need to evaluate these models against evidence, and we often struggle with this task. We have a knack for explaining, but less skill at evaluating. Fortunately, we can improve our reasoning by reflecting on inferential practices and using formal tools. This book presents a system of rational inference that helps us evaluate our models and make sounder judgments.
The brain strives to become a model of the world in which it must survive. It is often more important for it to be functional and efficient than it is to be factually correct. Indeed, there are numerous instances in which it seems to favour usefulness over accuracy, expectation over actuality. This has led many to conclude that even normal perception has a constructive or hallucinatory quality. In extremis, under the influence of fatigue, fear, illness or drugs, an entire reality may be created, one that seems to conflict with the reality accepted by those around us. This condition, known as psychosis, offers us important glimpses into the mechanisms of the mind and the many ways in which they may be altered.
Institutional inertia as one of the underlying reasons for hysteresis is often ascribed to external factors such as the distribution of wealth and income. Complementing these findings, the paper focuses on important internal factors, which render institutions stable and which prevent fast institutional changes, namely the role of mental models. Their importance is derived from the analysis of an important set of institutions, which can be described as enabling rules. Such rules enable actors to do certain things, such as speaking a language or playing chess. In doing so, enabling rules arguably require complementary mental models, which contain not only knowledge about the rules and the context in which they are applied, but also about how to apply the rules successfully. An important implication of this conceptualisation is that institutions and their representation are interdependent and mutually stabilising.
The theoretical framework of this book is first of all defined in terms of sociocognitive discourse analysis of antiracism and antiracist discourse within the larger framework of a theory of social movements. In this case the movement is both global and historical and hence rather a macromovement. Different from other studies of social movements, this book focused on discourse and cognition and their history. Antiracism is defined as a movement of resistance and solidarity. After a summary of a theory of antiracist social cognition (mental models, knowledge, attitudes and ideologies) antiracist practices in genersal antiracist discourse are defined - as well as their historical dimensions. A detailed literature summarizes earlier theory and research on antiracism, as well as a discussion of major issues in studies of antiracism - such as whether or not antiracism today is dominant or prevalent.
Medication errors are not random events, nor are they necessarily evidence of a lack of carefulness on the part of the practitioner concerned. To a substantial degree, the particular type of medication error that is likely to occur in a particular set of circumstances is predictable. Furthermore, each of these types of error will continue to occur at their current rate if we continue with current approaches to the management of medications in the perioperative period. Errors will not be reduced by ongoing calls for greater carefulness on behalf of individual practitioners. Instead, the need is for fundamental changes in the ways in which medications are presented, selected and administered to patients. Greater investment in systems-based initiatives to improve medication management is essential if medication safety is to improve. However, it is also essential for clinicians to engage with such initiatives if they are to be effective. Achieving this requires sustained effort by departments and institutions, informed by the principles of implementation science.
For language teachers who are already convinced about why to include transformative learning goals, this chapter will help to clarify what we know about how these sometimes-elusive learning goals can be scaffolded within our existing instruction. Language teachers interested in including transformative learning goals in their language classes should know that the transformative process is difficult to predict and to measure. However, instructors can intentionally and even successfully nurture transformation without straying far from widely accepted classroom practices by taking a more critical approach. Authentic texts can be useful for promoting disorienting dilemmas when they are at the learners' cognitive and proficiency level and include feasible tasks. Critical reflection is also essential to transformative learning and can be encouraged through structured written reflection. This reflection can take place in the L1 or L2. Finally, instructors can motivate students to take action by asking them to think about next steps.
Children attempt to make sense of, and to understand, the various phenomena and experiences they have. This is science in its purest and simplest sense – children gaining an understanding of the world around them. Children’s understandings are based on the range of interactions they have and the cognitive development of ‘key understandings (concepts)’ that help to explain the phenomena, at least to them. The Early Years Learning Framework (DEEWR, 2009, p. 12) indicates that it draws from a range of perspectives from early childhood developmental theory and knowledge about how children learn, which are then used to develop the Principles and Practices. There are many theories about how children (and adults) learn science and the factors that affect learning in young children. This chapter describes and discusses accepted theories of children’s development and the range of influences that impact science learning.
Narrative fiction is a major component of entertainment and culture, comprising books, television, movies, and video games. Our comprehension of these narratives is predicated in part on the imagination, which allows us to simulate fictional events, characters, and worlds. Beyond basic comprehension, the imagination also enables us to generate personalized and unique interpretations of a narrative, effectively allowing us to co-create narratives alongside the author. In this chapter, we discuss the ways in which imagination is used to understand fictional stories across a variety of mediums. We begin with a discussion of mental models, exploring how we use the imagination to translate narrative cues, such as words on a page, into complex and elaborate mental representations. Next, we discuss how the imagination encourages narrative engagement, by allowing us to feel physically transported into fictional worlds. Following that, we examine how the imagination is used to personalize narrative comprehension, through interpreting ambiguous or auxiliary narrative content and through incorporating past personal experiences and current beliefs into the narrative. Finally, we close with a discussion of how modern interactive media may uniquely engage our imagination by providing audiences with the freedom to create their own narratives.
We have some justified beliefs about modal matters. A modal epistemology should explain what’s involved in our having that justification. Given that we’re realists about modality, how should we expect that explanation to go? In the first part of this essay, I suggest an answer to this question based on an analogy with games. Then, I outline a modal epistemology that fits with that answer. According to a theory-based epistemology of modality, you justifiably believe that p if (a) you justifiably believe a theory that says that p and (b) you believe p on the basis of that theory.
This chapter reviews the basics of cognition, showing how old ideas about learning as storehouses of information, standing at the ready to address problems, have given way to much more complex notions about how our brains make meaning of information by attaching it – or not – to existing mental models. Meaning-making is not only vital to our survival as a species but also presents a challenge to our cognitive development. How we change our mental models is known as transformative learning, arguably the most important theory on adult learning in the last half-century.