We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The chapter analyzes the place of the German nation in politics and society, particularly nationalist activism and ethnic conflict between Germans, Poles, Danes, and French speakers.
In this chapter the “Pashtun Borderland” – a key concept throughout the book – is framed as a distinct physical and geopolitical space. This space, it is argued, is shaped by the complex interplay of imperial aspiration by larger polities claiming their authority over this space and ethnic self-ascriptions arising as a consequence. The heavy ideological baggage both practices pivot on is somewhat disenchanted by significant lines of conflict which traverse the region and its communities: between lowland and upland communities, between local elites and subalterns and between urban and rural communities. It is claimed that the persona of the discontent, or troublemaker, is a systemic result of these complex constellations, heavily fuelled by the agendas of successive imperial actors and the making and un-making of temporary pragmatic alliances typical for this kind of environment, ideal-typically cast here as “Borderland pragmatics”.
This chapter traces how the concept of ethnicity emerged as a depoliticised alternative to nationality. By the end of the nineteenth century, the triumph of nationalism as the hegemonic source of state legitimacy had resulted in the politicisation of the nation concept. This conceptual linkage of ‘nation’ with ‘state’ opened up a terminological vacuum: If nationhood implied statehood, what label should be given to those stateless nations and national minorities that had neither a state of their own nor the political capacity to acquire one? Against this backdrop, the chapter traces how an embryonic concept of ethnicity was articulated to fill in the terminological void. The chapter’s empirical focus is on the early twentieth-century academic literature on nationalism and the establishment of the world’s first international minority rights regime after the First World War. The argument also has significant implications for debates surrounding the conceptual distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism.
The first chapter introduces and outlines the project of the book. As a point of departure, it discusses the logic of the nation-state and explains why this ideal is fundamentally unrealistic and, therefore, inadequate as a principle for political organization. Contra liberal nationalists, it argues that even where the “standard liberal package” is granted to all citizens, the nation-state remains intrinsically exclusionary and unjust. Moreover, the chapter discusses the limitations of existing approaches to national pluralism, including liberal multiculturalism and constitutional patriotism before laying out the ensuing research agenda. In order to recover an alternative to the nation-state, the book proposes to examine the theoretical relationship between nations and political organization prior to the rise of the nation-state in the early modern period. The chapter addresses both methodology and source selection.
Throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages, thinkers understood nations as communities defined by common language, culture, and descent, and sharing strong bonds of belonging and solidarity. Even so, they did not assume that nations would also be appropriate units of government. The recovery of this historical understanding, in turn, yields valuable insights for contemporary political dilemmas. Nations Before the Nation-State offers the first extended study of the idea of the nation in ancient and medieval political thought. It recovers a pre-modern conception of the nation as a cultural and linguistic community, rather than a political association, and examines better means for thinking about nationhood. Offering a historic perspective from which to address challenges of nationalism, this book engages with debates on multiculturalism, liberal nationalism, and constitutional patriotism and argues that contemporary political dilemmas can be resolved more organically by recovering modes of thinking that have resolved similar tensions for centuries.
Chapter 3 makes the case that education systems are almost universally situated in the public sector, and their role is profoundly shaped by economic and social power relations as reflected in the political structures of the nation-State. The chapter argues that the way power relations are reflected in the State provides the framework for a political theory of education The chapter lays out such a State theory and suggests how it helps explain the nature of conflicts over how much to spend on education, who gets the resources, and how they are used in schools. The theory further helps define the structure in which individuals from different social classes, races, ethnicities, and gender make decisions (exercise agency) regarding education. It also helps define the economic opportunities facing different groups and how the State in market economies defines educational norms, standards, and access to education. The chapter’s final sections discuss how economics of education debates – for example, on the efficiency of the public sector in providing education – are influenced by political ideology, and describe the politics of nation-States’ developing social capital to enhance the efficiency of education, often at the cost of individual rights.
The state concept is one of the oldest in the study of politics. It features prominently in the analysis of the founders of modern social science, Max Weber and Karl Marx, the former focusing especially on its inner workings (i.e., the state as organization), the latter on its relation to society. Since the early days of social science research on the state, the focus in Comparative Politics has been on both its role in economic development and in nation-building, resulting in the emergence of two research traditions, one centred on statecraft, the other on statehood. Much of the state literature has assumed the presence of an already cohesive political community, the nation-state. State formation in Europe and Asia was the outcome of the dissolution of empires. The emerging states in the early 20th century were all grounded in specific national identities. African states were also born as empires vanished, but they were not formed around nationalities. The colonial powers had assembled multiple pre-agrarian societies into territories with the purpose of conquest and development. Thus, when Africans gained independence, they had to accept a statehood that was not aligned to nationhood. Because the African state-nation is still a project in the making, the exercise of power relies heavily on such means as co-optation and mutual transactions. African leaders must balance the conflicting pressures from tribe and the larger political community, which limits the capacity of the instruments the state to conduct their business. Instead, it encourages modes of governance that are either rivalrous or monopolistic. Lasting political settlements tend to be transactional compromises involving power-sharing, rather than institutional arrangements that facilitate the conduct of state business. Success in the pursuit of such compacts often involves the use of informal institutions that help overcome the rigidity of formal rules.
The introduction to The Jewish Imperial Imagination provides an overview of Baeck’s life, and of the book’s ventral argument. It shows how the Jewish Question – the discussion about emancipation and the place of Jews in modern society – was intertwined with other questions throughout the nineteenth century, including the questions of colonialism and imperial expansion. Instead of focusing on the nation-state, it shows the need to look at the imperial context. This is valid for Baeck’s thought, and German-Jewish thought more broadly. Finally, the introduction offers a theoretical framework for such analysis by developing the concept of “Jewish imperial imagination” as a way of moving beyond a simple dichotomy of ascribing to or resisting hegemonic narratives.
Is nationalism compatible with Islamic belief and practice? Debates on this question began with the rise of modern nationalism in the Muslim world during the nineteenth century and continue in varying forms in the twenty-first century. The middle of the twentieth century marked an important moment in the evolution of these debates. Muslim leaders and activists worked to define the political and cultural identity of the Muslim countries that were becoming independent from European imperialism. They were also defining the possible relationships between Islam and nationalism. The broad spectrum of their views reflects the fundamental issues involved in deciding whether nationalism is compatible with Islam.
The globalisation of political power into structures ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ the nation-state has increasingly been called into question as part of a ‘sovereigntist turn’ in contemporary politics. While such demands for local control by bounded peoples may be democratic, empirically they often also take a nationalist form. Building on Hannah Arendt’s analysis of how ‘the nation conquered the state’, I argue that the slippage from democratic to national sovereigntism is rooted in fundamental conceptual instabilities within the concept of the nation-state. Whereas the first term in this hyphenated construct favours certain individuals based on their ethnic background, the latter is a universal concept that demands the equal treatment of all. My basic thesis is that these internal contradictions help to explain the nationalist tendency in calls to return political power to the nation-state. I illustrate these points by drawing on examples from the ‘illiberal democracies’ of Central-Eastern Europe, focusing on Poland and Hungary.
We can read Jean de Brunhoff’s 1931 children’s story The Story of Babar as a fable illustrating the contours of French imperial rule at a particular time in its history. Political scientists define empire simply—a polity based on asymmetrical contracting that preserves politically significant difference. If this definition provides a constant, the explanations behind it constitute the variables. The French had many explanations of just why they had an empire. This book recounts the history of those explanations, and of the contours of imperial rule that resulted from them. Resistance profoundly shaped imperial rule.
Chapter 2 starts with an overview of the modern phenomena of ethnicity, nationalism, and ethno-national conflicts, and about the probable causes and background conditions that provide fertile ground for their outbreak, as these understandings are essential for evaluating the prevailing theoretical assumptions about justice and democracy in places of ethno-national conflict. To deepen the understanding of the sociology of ethno-national conflicts, the chapter introduces the four conflicts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Israel–Palestine. This chapter singles out political exclusion, the struggle over public goods of the nation-state, and group inequalities along ethno-national lines as leading factors that explain the outbreak of violent conflicts.
You might expect a textbook on Australian politics to begin with a discussion of contemporary Australian politics taking place in a strangely shaped building in Canberra, or with a somewhat esoteric discussion of colonial parliaments. What we will explore in this first chapter are two connected ideas: what is politics and why do we study it. There will, of course, be an overview of the political institutions, as well as discussion of some important terms, and a peek at what challenges might lie ahead for Australian political structures.
So how should we think about with an examination of contemporary politics in Australia? We should begin with acknowledging that the politics we study now is the product, one way or another, of a series activities, actions and interactions that stretch far back in time. The real politics and history of Australia starts somewhere between 50,000 and 65,000 years prior to white settlement – although how far back is not clear. If we acknowledge the past, we can understand how it has shaped our contemporary society.
Chapter 1 focuses on framing research with strong grounding in theory and previous scholarship. This chapter introduces the book’s methodology and sources, as well as providing an overview of the book’s chapters and main arguments. This work claims two central arguments: first, the modern nation-state of Iran was established in 1979 with the revolution that instilled an indigenous and independent nationalism and eradicated all vestiges of foreign power, including the shah; second, the national identity created by the people during the decades preceding the revolution was the most resonant and inclusive because it infused the Shiite symbols ignored by the Pahlavi dynasty, and overused by the Islamic Republic, into populist elements of Iranian society. Despite the political turmoil of the Islamic Republic, that fusion and plurality endure. While the various chapters explore their own specific themes, these ideas run as threads throughout the work to tie the pieces together.
This chapter presents a snapshot of all of Europe in 1450, when the climate was colder and wetter than it had been several centuries earlier, which led to poor harvests and recurring famine. Most people lived in small villages in households organized around a marital couple, and never traveled very far. Cities were growing in many parts of Europe, however, with some urban dwellers becoming wealthy and powerful, though the nobility remained the dominant group. In some areas nation-states were slowly coalescing, and everywhere warfare was common, with gunpowder weapons becoming increasingly important. The invention of the printing press with movable metal type spurred the expansion of literacy in vernacular languages, though advanced education was in Latin, and limited to men. The Christian Church in central and western Europe was a wealthy, hierarchical, bureaucratic institution headed by the pope. Most people living in Europe were Christian, and engaged in a variety of religious rituals throughout the year and across their lifespans, as did Jews and Muslims. Production of most commodities was organized through guilds, but cloth-making and mining were increasingly organized along capitalist lines, with an investor providing money for tools, and workers paid for their labor.
While the Iranian nation-state has long captivated the attention of our media and politics, this book examines a country that is often misunderstood and explores forgotten aspects of the debate. Using innovative multi-disciplinary methods, it investigates the formation of an Iranian national identity over the last century and, significantly, the role of Iranian people in defining the contours of that identity. By employing popular culture as an archive of study, Assal Rad aims to rediscover the ordinary Iranian in studies of contemporary Iran, demonstrating how identity was shaped by music, literature, and film. Both accessible in style and meticulously researched, Rad's work cultivates a more holistic picture of Iranian politics, policy, and society, showing how the Iran of the past is intimately connected to that of the present.
Self-determination is a central concept for political philosophers. For example, many have appealed to this concept to defend a right of states to restrict immigration. Because it is deeply embedded in our political structures, the principle possesses a kind of default authority and does not usually call for an elaborate defense. In this paper, I will argue that genealogical studies by Adom Getachew, Radhika Mongia, Nandita Sharma, and others help to challenge this default authority. Their counter-histories show that the principle was used to justify, strengthen, and adapt imperial rule in the twentieth century. In particular, the idea that controlling a population's composition through regulating immigration is an essential aspect of self-determination emerged as a response to White anxieties about the migration of negatively racialized groups. Genealogies have not been adequately appreciated as a critical tool within the mainstream of political philosophy. I show that these genealogies have a critical role to play because they unsettle our uncritical attachment to the structures of the nation-state system and raise serious questions about the meaning and emancipatory force of the principle of self-determination.
In On the Rights of War and Peace, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) pushes natural law thinking into an international law form, shaping not only the origins of international law but a particular vision of the nation-state as the primary political form of modernity. Along the way, he frames the conditions through which just war thinking will move from being a tradition into becoming a theory (with its preoccupying focus on jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria) and the modern self will become the primary political agent. One implication of his revolutionary thought is that it gives license to colonizing powers to use military force to acquire and defend property, especially the resources of the new world, thereby shaping modern understandings of the natural world as composed of things that can become owned. Another is that it makes refugees all-but-invisible, which will create increasingly acute problems as climate change and violence, together, will dramatically increase the number of displaced persons in the world.
In the first comprehensive English-language portrait of Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm as political thinkers and actors, Jakob Norberg reveals how history's two most famous folklorists envisioned the role of literary and linguistic scholars in defining national identity. Convinced of the political relevance of their folk tale collections and grammatical studies, the Brothers Grimm argued that they could help disentangle language groups from one another, redraw the boundaries of states in Europe, and counsel kings and princes on the proper extent and character of their rule. They sought not only to recover and revive a neglected native culture for a contemporary audience, but also to facilitate a more harmonious and enduring relationship between the traditional political elite and an emerging national collective. Through close historical analysis, Norberg reconstructs how the Grimms wished to mediate between sovereigns and peoples, politics and culture. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This article introduces a special issue on the politics of sovereignty in German history. Historical work provides an important corrective to understand the current discursive resurgence of sovereignty. Historians (and other scholars) should treat sovereignty not as a factual description of the world, but rather analyze it as a rhetorical claim to assert power in territorial, political, economic, legal, and cultural disputes. Much of the power of sovereignty lies in the power to define its boundaries, whether geographical or conceptual. German history offers a particularly fruitful route to historicize the concept, as Germany is arguably both a paradigmatic and a special case in the history of sovereignty. From late-nineteenth-century colonialism to contemporary disputes around gambling restrictions, German discourse on sovereignty has intertwined with and challenged international understandings of sovereignty together with neighboring concepts, such as independence, autonomy, supreme authority, and control. In the twentieth century, perhaps no country experienced stronger affirmations of both sovereignty and the necessity to integrate into inter- and supranational structures than the country at the center of the two world wars and subsequently divided during the Cold War.