Successful leaders are at risk of developing exaggerated pride, contempt for others, and a diminished sense of reality. The ancient Greeks feared this syndrome and called it hubris. Although certain contemporaneous leaders show signs of hubris and pose a great danger, the hubris syndrome does not yet figure in our classification systems. The purpose of this paper is to examine several aspects of its validity, including clinical description, laboratory study, and exclusion of other disorders. Firstly, a substantial body of evidence indicates that the hubris syndrome may develop after a person has held substantial power for a considerable amount of time. Thus, the syndrome differs from a personality disorder with its characteristic onset in late adolescence or early adulthood. It is proposed, therefore, that the syndrome is a non-organic personality change after gaining substantial power or achieving overwhelming success, characterized by the emergence or marked increase of pathological personality traits within the domains of dissociality and disinhibition. Within the domain of dissociality, grandiosity is an obligatory trait. Secondly, with reference to laboratory study, recent evidence suggests that machine learning algorithms have the ability to differentiate hubristic from non-hubristic speech patterns. Thirdly, the exclusion of other disorders is difficult, because individuals with the hubris syndrome do not collaborate in any investigation. Some suggestions are made to overcome this problem. In conclusion, there is sufficient reason to further examine the validity of the hubris syndrome and to consider it for inclusion in our classification systems.

Several scholars have recognized the limitations of theories of moral reasoning in explaining moral behavior. They have argued that moral behavior may also be influenced by moral identity, or how central morality is to one’s sense of self. This idea has been supported by findings that people who exemplify moral behavior tend to place more importance on moral traits when defining their self-concepts (Colby & Damon, 1995). This paper takes the next step of examining individual variation in a construct highly associated with immoral behavior — psychopathy. In Study 1, we test the hypothesis that individuals with a greater degree of psychopathic traits have a weaker moral identity. Within a large online sample, we found that individuals who scored higher on a measure of psychopathic traits were less likely to base their self-concepts on moral traits. In Study 2, we test whether this reduced sense of moral identity can be attributed to differences in moral judgment, which is another factor that could influence immoral behavior. Our results indicated that the reduced sense of moral identity among more psychopathic individuals was independent of variation in moral judgment. These results suggest that individuals with psychopathic traits may display immoral behavior partially because they do not construe their personal identities in moral terms.

The psychological correlates of utilitarian choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas are contentious. In the literature, some research (Greene, et al., 2001) suggested that utilitarianism requires analytic thinking while other research (Kahane et al., 2015) showed that utilitarianism is correlated with psychopathy. In the present research, we looked at the relation of several normative views with analytic cognitive style (ACS), psychopathy and real-world utilitarianism in three Turkish samples. In Study 1 (n = 269), we used four ethical dilemmas and asked participants to select one normative principle as the grounds for their judgment in the dilemma: fatalism, virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontology and amoralism. The results showed that the majority selected the deontological principle. Additionally, there was a considerable amount of fatalistic and virtue ethical justifications. Utilitarianism and psychopathy had a significant positive correlation. In Study 2 (n = 246), we replicated Study 1 and showed a significant relation between ACS and moral minimalism (the view that the sacrificial act is permissible but not necessary). In Study 3, the results showed that the utilitarian option in the sacrificial dilemmas was positively correlated with both real-life utilitarianism and psychopathy, but the latter two variables were not correlated with each other. All in all, the results suggest that some people choose the utilitarian option in moral dilemmas from psychopathic tendencies (as Kahane argued), while others due to real-life utilitarian reasons (as Greene argued). The findings also indicate that virtue ethical and fatalistic justifications cannot be ignored in understanding lay people’s moral judgments.

In response to arguments made by Gawronski et al. (2020), responding to Baron and Goodwin (2020), we concentrate on four issues. First, the CNI design requires substantial numbers of “perverse” responses to congruent items — those in which both consequences and norms both favor action, or both favor inaction — and these responses depend on the ambiguity of the items concerning which norms apply or which consequences are worse. Effects of outside variables, such as psychopathy, may result from the effect of such variables on the interpretation of ambiguous items, rather than from their effect on sensitivity to norms or consequences. Second, the CNI design may not be so useful at measuring general action/inaction biases. Third, the order of the two processes in the model could in fact affect the conclusions drawn (even though it does not do so in most studies done so far). Fourth, the conclusions drawn do in fact depend on the items’ susceptibility to reinterpretation (owing to their ambiguity): the tests proposed for item validity are too weak, since they require only that a majority of subjects agree with the experimenters’ classification, even though a minority could affect the conclusions drawn. We illustrate some of our points with an analysis of the psychopathy study of Luke and Gawronski (2020).

Although psychopathy is widely conceptualised as a mental disorder, some researchers question the maladaptive nature of psychopathy, and argue that it might be advantageous from an evolutionary point of view. According to this view, psychopathy can be seen as an evolutionary adaptative strategy that relies on deception and manipulation to gain short-term reproductive benefits. Psychopathy is also identified as a fast life strategy in response to early life stress and an adaptation to harsh environments. This paper investigates the evidence that psychopathic traits are adaptive, while also addressing the limitations of current evolutionary models of psychopathy based on frequency-dependent selection and life history theory. We review recent studies on the fitness correlates of psychopathy and find that psychopathic traits present potential adaptive trade-offs between fertility and mortality, and offspring quantity and quality. On a proximate level, individual differences in stress reactivity and environmental risk factors in early development predispose to psychopathy through gene–environment interactions. We propose that environmental, developmental, social and cultural factors can mediate the relationship between psychopathic traits and fitness and therefore should be considered to make accurate predictions on the adaptive potential of psychopathy. We end by outlining gaps in the literature and making recommendations for future evolutionary research on psychopathy.

Childhood trauma is linked to impairments in executive function and working memory, thought to underly psychological disorders including depression and posttraumatic stress disorder. Research demonstrates that childhood trauma can partially mediate posttraumatic stress disorder in those with executive function deficits. Despite a link with executive function deficit, psychopathy as a consequence of trauma is yet to be studied in this context. The present study investigates the possibility of a relationship between childhood trauma, psychopathic traits, and response inhibition. Eighty participants were tasked to completed the Childhood Traumatic Events Scale (Pennebaker & Susman, 2013), Levenson’s Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (Levenson et al., 1995), and Flanker task of response inhibition (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Scores of trauma exposure, psychopathic traits, and reaction times in the Flanker task were measured. Regression analysis revealed no significance for trauma exposure in predicting psychopathic traits (p = .201) and response inhibition (p = .183), indicating that childhood trauma does not strongly predict susceptibility to psychopathic traits or response inhibition deficits. These findings form an important basis on which to build a further understanding of the consequences of childhood trauma exposure, specifically in terms of understanding how specific cognitive functions may be influenced and providing a clearer understanding of how psychopathic traits develop.

There are some distinct methodological challenges, and possible pitfalls, for neuroethics when it evaluates neuroscientific results and links them to issues such as moral or legal responsibility. Some problems emerge in determining the requirements for responsibility. We will show how philosophical proposals in this area need to interact with legal doctrine and practice. Problems can occur when inferring normative implications from neuroscientific results. Other problems arise when it is not recognized that data about brain anatomy or physiology are relevant to the ascription of responsibility only when they are significantly correlated with the psychological capacities contemplated by the legal formulations of responsibility. We will demonstrate this by considering two significant cases concerning psychopathy. Some paradigms that aim at measuring higher-order capacities, such as moral understanding, have limited validity. More robust paradigms for the study of learning in restricted controlled conditions, on the other hand, have limited ecological validity across individuals and context to be of any use for the law.